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VpreSentation
CEJIL is proud to present a new addition to the series: Tools for the Protection of Human 
Rights: Summaries of Jurisprudence. The focus of the present publication is Health and 
Reproductive Rights.
Access to health services, including those pertaining to reproductive health, is recognized 
as a basic right by international bodies dedicated to the protection of human rights. In-
deed, according to the recommendations made by the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), States must guarantee that all health services 
are “consistent with the human rights of women, including the rights to autonomy, 
privacy, confidentiality, informed consent and choice” (General Recommendation Nº 24, 
Paragraph 31.e)
The rulings included in this volume have been selected as examples that illustrate the sys-
temic inadequacies affecting the effective possession of these rights. Furthermore, they 
demonstrate how this directly affects the rights of women to make choices regarding 
maternity, to access relevant health information and to ensure respect for their [physical] 
autonomy and privacy.
This publication aims to cast light on the scope of relevant jurisprudence in relation to 
health and reproductive rights. The following pages contain a selection of rulings and 
sentences dictated by the Inter-American Commission and Inter-American Court on Hu-
man Rights as well as the European Court of Human Rights, the Committee on the Elimi-
nation of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Human Rights Committee. 
They have been selected for their explicit or implicit reference to discussions or judicial 
interpretations which contribute to the defense of the aforementioned.
In addition to the included thematic index, whose purpose is to facilitate the location of 
information through keyword searches, a supplementary annex has been included. This 
document contains extracts from various relevant instruments which prove to be useful 
when approaching the issues of health and reproductive rights. We hope that this book 
represents a valuable tool in their defence and protection.
Finally, we would like to offer our sincere thanks for the invaluable contributions of all 
those who have made the publication of this book possible: Martine Lemmens, who saw 
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the project through its initial stages; Louis Robertson, Marisa Díaz and Valerie Gobeil, 
who collaborated in the selection and editing of the texts during the months they spent 
as interns at CEJIL Buenos Aires; and Ludmila Novotny and María Pía Rebussone, students 
at the I.E.S en Lenguas Vivas “Juan Ramón Fernández” in Buenos Aires (Argentina), 
whose practicum experiences in translation were carried out as part of the established 
programme of internships between CEJIL and this institution.
Viviana Krsticevic 
Executive Director 
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[…]
i. introduction of the caSe
1. On June 11, 2003, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter 
“the Commission” or “the Inter-American Commission”) filed before the Court an ap-
plication against the State of Peru (hereinafter “the State” or “Peru”) originating from 
petition No. 12,138, received by the Secretariat of the Commission on September 1, 
1998.
[…]
3. According to the Commission, María Teresa De La Cruz Flores, a physician by pro-
fession; was detained by police agents on March 27, 1996, after she had completed 
her shift as a pediatrician with the Peruvian Social Security Institute. She was charged 
with terrorism, processed under file No. 113-95 and, after she had been detained, was 
notified of a warrant for her arrest in file No. 723-93 for the crime of terrorism, a file 
which, according to the Commission, had been reported to be mislaid at that time. 
The alleged victim was prosecuted by a court composed of a “faceless” judge, which 
sentenced her on November 21, 1996, for the crime of terrorism to 20 years’ imprison-
ment, under the provisions of Decree Law No. 25,475.  This sentence was confirmed 
by the judgment of the Special Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice on 
June 8, 1998. The Commission also stated that, on January 3, 2003, the Constitutional 
Court of Peru had delivered a judgment in which it declared the unconstitutionality of 
several provisions of Decree Laws Nos. 25,475 and 25,659; although it did not issue 
any special ruling in relation to Article 2 of Decree Law 25,475, which defined the 
crime of terrorism.  Following that decision, the Government issued Legislative Decrees 
Nos. 923, 924, 925, 926 and 927, on February 19, 2003. These decrees established 
that, within sixty working days from the entry into force of this legislation, the National 
Terrorism Chamber should gradually annul, de oficio, the judgment and the oral pro-
ceeding and, if applicable, declare the absence of grounds for the charge, in criminal 
trials for offences of terrorism conducted before secret judges or prosecutors, unless 
the person convicted waived this right. However, the Commission indicated that, at the 
date the application was submitted, Mrs. De La Cruz Flores was still detained, convicted 
of the crime of terrorism.
[…]
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vii. articLeS 9, 7, 8 and 24 of the american convention in 
reLation to articLe 1.1 thereof (freedom from ex poSt 
facto LawS, right to perSonaL Liberty, right to a fair 
triaL and right to equaL protection)
[…]
Considerations of the Court
77. Article 9 of the American Convention establishes that:
No one shall be convicted of any act or omission that did not constitute a criminal 
offense, under the applicable law, at the time it was committed.  A heavier penalty 
shall not be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal 
offense was committed.  If subsequent to the commission of the offense the law 
provides for the imposition of a lighter punishment, the guilty person shall benefit 
therefrom.
78. First, it should be noted that the Inter-American Commission and the representa-
tives have alleged that the definition of the crime of terrorism in article 2 of Decree Law 
No. 25,475 violates the principle of legality embodied in Article 9 of the American Con-
vention (supra paras. 74(e), (g) and (h), and 75(b)). In this regard, the Court observes that 
article 2 of Decree Law No. 25,475 (crime of terrorism) was not applied in the proceeding 
against the alleged victim; consequently, this Court will not examine it and will proceed 
to consider the arguments presented by the parties in relation to article 4 of this Decree 
Law (crime of acts of collaboration with terrorism).
[…]
83. María Teresa De La Cruz Flores was prosecuted and convicted for acts of collabora-
tion with terrorism, under article 4 of Decree Law No. 25,475 in a judgment of November 
21, 1996. Even though, in this judgment, the judge declared that María Teresa de La 
Cruz Flores was convicted as perpetrator of the “crime of terrorism against the State,” 
the Court observes that the article on which the domestic court based itself to deliver 
this sentence is article 4 of Decree Law No. 25,475, which defines the crime of acts of 
collaboration with terrorism. (…)
84. In relation to the principle of legality, the Court will now refer to the following is-
sues: a) the relationship between the behavior that Mrs. De La Cruz Flores was charged 
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with in the judgment of November 21, 1996, and article 4 of Decree Law No. 25,475; 
b) the failure to specify which of the acts defined in the said article 4 encompassed the 
behavior of Mrs. De La Cruz Flores; c) the penalization of a medical activity; and d) the 
obligation to report possible criminal acts by physicians.
[…]
c) Penalization of medical activities
90. On September 16, 1995, during the trial against the alleged victim, the Lima Four-
teenth Criminal Court issued an order to open the pre-trial investigation against María 
Teresa De La Cruz Flores and others, because they “were members of the Peruvian Com-
munist Party (Sendero Luminoso), and had provided medical care, treatment and op-
erations, and supplied medication and medical equipment for the treatment of terrorist 
criminals[;] acts [which] constitute the crime established and penalized in article 4 of [D]
ecree [L]aw [No.] 25,475.”
91. On April 1, 1996, the Prosecutor of the Lima Fourteenth Provincial Prosecutor’s of-
fice indicated in his report (supra para. 73(22)) that María Teresa De La Cruz Flores had 
“used her professional activities in the field of medicine [… and] that her actions were 
designed to save rights [...] such as life.”
92. On June 7, 1996, the Lima Superior Prosecutor issued his report (supra para. 73(23)), 
in which he indicated, with regard to María Teresa de La Cruz Flores, that “her participa-
tion had consisted in providing medical care to militants.”
93. In relation to María Teresa De la Cruz Flores, the judgment of November 21, 1996 
(supra para. 73(27)), considered that:
[the case file] describes the documentation found in 1992 on Víctor Zavala Castaño, 
Francisco Morales Zapata, Eduviges Crisóstomo Huayanay, Felipe Crisóstomo Huay-
anay, Rosa Esther Malo Vilca and Miriam Rosa Juárez Cruzatt, which implicates 
the defendant, and in which she appears under the alias “Elíana”; one of these 
documents refers not only to meetings with the defendant, but also, examines her 
doctrinal and ideological evolution within the organization, there are descriptions 
of talks that she has given, as a physician; that she has taken part in an operation 
as the assistant surgeon, and of problems within the health sector, all of which has 
been corroborated [...] by the defendant, Elisa Mabel Mantilla Moreno, who, in 
the presence of the Prosecutor states that, on one occasion, she met with María 
5De La Cruz Flores v. Peru
Teresa De la Cruz on the orders of her ‘handler,’ to coordinate several matters; 
[…] the same defendant […] accuses her of being one of the supportive elements 
responsible for providing treatment and performing operations; [...] accuses her of 
participating in an operation on ‘Mario’ whose hand had been burned, which cor-
roborates the foregoing; namely, that she took part as assistant surgeon in a skin-
grafting operation; and it is evident that the defendant has denied this during the 
proceeding so as to elude her criminal liability, which has been adequately proved[.]
94. The Court observes that the medical act is acknowledged in numerous normative 
and declarative documents relating to the medical profession99. For example, article 12 of 
the Code of Ethics and Deontology of the Physician’s Professional Association states that 
“[the] medical act is any activity or procedure performed by a physician in the exercise 
of the medical profession. It includes the following: acts of diagnosis, therapeutics and 
prognosis carried out by a physician when providing comprehensive care to patients, and 
also acts deriving directly therefrom. Such medical acts may only be exercised by mem-
bers of the medical profession.”
95. For information only, the Court recalls that Article 18 of the First Geneva Conven-
tion of 1949 states that: “[n]o one may ever be molested or convicted for having nursed 
the wounded or sick.” Also, Article 16 of Protocol I and Article 10 of Protocol II, both 
Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, establish that  “Under no circumstances shall 
any person be punished for carrying out medical activities compatible with medical eth-
ics, regardless of the person benefiting therefrom.” At the time of the facts of this case, 
Peru was a party to those international instruments.
d) A physician’s reporting obligation concerning possible criminal acts 
96. The judgment of November 21, 1996 (supra para. 73(27)), also considered “that 
when the physician merely presumes or knows the unlawful origin of the injuries caused 
to an individual, he is obliged to report the fact or advise the authorities so that they may 
conduct the respective investigation.”
99  Cf. International Code of Medical Ethics, World Medical Association; Regulations in time of armed conflict, 
World Medical Association; European Principles of Medical Ethics; Code of Ethics and Deontology of the 
Peruvian Physicians’ Professional Association (file on merits, reparations, and costs, tome IV, folios 846 to 
857); and Law, Statute and Rules of Procedure of the Peruvian Physicians’ Professional Association (file on 
merits, reparations, and costs, tome IV, folios 858 to 941)
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97. In this regard, the Court considers that the information a physician obtains in the 
exercise of his profession is privileged by professional confidentiality. For example, the 
International Code of Medical Ethics of the World Medical Association establishes that 
“a physician must keep absolutely secret everything that has been confided in him, even 
after the death of the patient.”
98. In this regard, Article 2(18) of the 1993 Constitution of Peru, which has precedence 
over any other domestic norm in Peruvian legislation, establishes that everyone has the right:
Not to make known his political, philosophical, religious or any other kind of beliefs, 
and also to respect professional confidentiality.
99. Moreover, Article 141 of the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes that: “the fol-
lowing shall not be obliged to testify: 1. members of religious orders, lawyers, physicians, 
notaries and midwives, with regard to the secrets confided to them in the exercise of 
their profession.
100. The Human Rights Committee has already recommended that domestic legislation 
be modified to protect the confidentiality of medical information100. 
101. The Court considers that physicians have a right and an obligation to protect the 
confidentiality of the information to which, as physicians, they have access.
102. Consequently, in light of the above considerations, the Court believes that, when 
delivering the judgment of November 21, 1996, the State violated the principle of 
legality: by taking into account as elements that gave rise to criminal liability, member-
ship in a terrorist organization and failure to comply with the reporting obligation, but 
only applying an article that did not define these behaviors; by not specifying which of 
the behaviors established in article 4 of Decree Law No. 25,475 had been committed 
by the alleged victim in order to be found guilty of the crime; for penalizing a medical 
activity, which is not only an essential lawful act, but which it is also the physician’s 
obligation to provide; and for imposing on physicians the obligation to report the pos-
sible criminal behavior of their patients, based on information obtained in the exercise 
of their profession.
100  Cf. Final observations of the Human Rights Committee, Chile, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/79/Add.104 (1999).
7De La Cruz Flores v. Peru
103. In view of the above, the Court considers that the State violated the principle of 
legality established in Article 9 of the American Convention, to the detriment of Mrs. De 
La Cruz Flores.
[…]
xii. operative paragraphS
188. Therefore, 
the court, decLareS:
Unanimously, that:
1. The State violated the right to freedom from ex post facto laws embodied in Article 
9 of the American Convention on Human Rights, in relation to Article 1(1) thereof, to the 
detriment of María Teresa De La Cruz Flores, (…).
(…)
[…]
Separate opinion of Judge Sergio garcia ramirez (…)
1. In this separate opinion I refer to only one issue examined in the judgment delivered 
by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on November 18, 2004, in the Case of De La 
Cruz Flores: the medical act and criminal legislation, from the perspective of human rights 
and in the circumstances ratified in this case. I refer to the expression ‘medical act’ as it is 
used in the judgment, which borrows the definition from article 12 of the Code of Ethics 
and Deontology of the Doctors’ Professional Association of Peru (the State referred to in 
the matter sub judice), which includes generally accepted concepts: “a medical act is any 
activity or procedure carried out by a doctor in the exercise of the medical profession. It 
includes the following: acts of diagnosis, therapeutics and prognosis performed by a doctor 
when providing comprehensive care to patients, and also acts deriving directly therefrom. 
Such medical acts may only be exercised by the members of the medical profession.”
2. A clear distinction should be established between this activity (which falls within the 
framework of the exercise of a profession and responds the corresponding purposes and 
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methods), from any other activity that is penally typical or atypical, and that is subject to 
its own type of regulation and to the legal consequences established by law, including 
those of a penal nature. It should not be forgotten that, at times, it may be difficult to 
make a distinction and that some situations may suggest the existence of a criminal viola-
tion behind an alleged medical procedure. However, these practical problems do not in-
validate the significance of the affirmation contained in this opinion, which supports the 
judgment delivered by the Court. On the one hand, there are the characteristics of each 
fact, act or conduct, which must be assessed in their own terms, and on the other hand, 
the problems involved in the investigation and identification of the facts. The former is 
a matter for the legislator and the judge, and the latter for the investigator. The Court 
must avoid a flawed investigation, with uncertain or erroneous results, contaminating its 
assessment of the nature of the conduct and the appropriate legal response.
3. It is obviously possible that someone exercising the medical profession may, in-
dependent of this, perform acts that might be established in criminal legislation and 
therefore merit different types of penalties. This leads us to insist on the need to trace a 
borderline, as precisely as possible – at the threefold level of legal classification, investiga-
tion and prosecution – between such punishable conducts and others that are performed 
exclusively within the framework of the medical act; that is, within the framework of the 
activities of a professional in the field of medicine, using his knowledge and expertise in 
this discipline to safeguard the lives and health of others. In brief, this is the purpose of 
the medical act, which contributes to its legal classification.
4. For the purpose of establishing penalties, criminal legislation must include certain be-
haviors that gravely affect the most relevant juridical rights. The idea of a minimum criminal 
law, associated with guaranteeism which today faces attacks from different sources, sup-
poses the incrimination of such unlawful behaviors, in view of their gravity and the harm 
they produce, when there are no alternate social or legal means to avoid them or punish 
them. According to this concept, criminal legislation should be used as a last resort for so-
cial control, and focus on those behaviors of extreme gravity. Even when classifying certain 
behaviors as crimes is justified, this must be done objectively and prudently – which could 
be called “Beccarian prudence” – fitting the penalties to the gravity of the offence and to 
the guilt of the perpetrator, without losing sight of the possible differences within the same 
category – murder and culpable homicide, for example - which call for a different sanc-
tion. This matter has been examined in the Inter-American Court’s case law, with regard to 
Article 4(2) of the American Convention – concerning protection of the right to life – in the 
judgment delivered in Hilaire, Constantine y Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, on June 
21, 2002. I refer to what I said in my separate opinion accompanying that judgment.
9De La Cruz Flores v. Peru
5. If, when incriminating unlawful conducts, the penal legislator must distinguish be-
tween the different possible hypotheses and deal with each one appropriately, rationally 
and specifically, with all the more reason must he avoid incriminating conducts that are 
not unlawful. The fact that a conduct is objectively established in a category of crime 
included in the relevant legislation does not imply that this automatically satisfies the 
requirement of the legitimacy of criminal laws. Otherwise, one could justify accepting 
acts, which are materially admissible and even plausible, established by authoritarian re-
gimes to combat dissent, differences and discrepancies, an occurrence that is well known 
throughout history and widely condemned. The Inter-American Court has ruled on this 
issue also when examining the characteristics of legislation that provides for limitations or 
restrictions to the exercise of rights. The rulings contained in Advisory Opinion OC-6/86 
of May 9, 1986, on “The Word “Laws” in Article 30 of the American Convention of Hu-
man Rights,” should be recalled, in this respect.
6. When a conduct is carried out with the intention of harming a juridical right, the 
application of a penalty to the author can be justified – with the abovementioned limi-
tations. However, the situation is very different when the intention of the agent is to 
preserve a high-ranking juridical right whose protection also constitutes an immediate 
and direct obligation of the person executing the behavior. It must be borne in mind that 
the safeguard and development of the lives of the individual and the group have led to 
identifying, encouraging and regulating the performance of certain activities – scientific, 
technical, artistic, relating to public or social service, etc. – which are considered to be 
socially useful and even necessary, and which are generally surrounded by appropriate 
guarantees. The systematic recognition of these activities, at times converted into social 
functions, constitutes a point of reference to quality their lawfulness and establish the 
pertinent legal consequences.
7. One of the oldest and most noble activities is that designed to safeguard the life 
and health of the individual. In this case, what is involved is the protection of the highest-
ranking rights, a condition for the enjoyment of all the others. Society as a whole has 
an interest in it and the State must protect it.  This is precisely, the case of the medical 
profession, whose regulation includes an important ethical component, in addition to 
elements relating to the techniques to be applied in each case, in keeping with the duty 
to provide care inferred from the lex artis. The medical professional who takes care of 
the health of his fellow men and protects them from disease and death fulfills his natural 
obligation, and the law must protect this carefully.  This task and this protection have 
their own meaning, totally independent of the political, religious or philosophical ideas of 
the doctor and his patient.  If the State imposed on or authorized doctors to misuse their 
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profession, as has occurred under totalitarian regimes, it would be just as censurable as if 
it prevented them from complying with their ethical and juridical duty, and even imposed 
penalties for such compliance. In both cases the State would be harming the right to life 
and health of the individual, both directly and by intimidation or restrictions imposed on 
those who, due to their profession, are regularly obliged to intervene in the protection of 
those rights.
8. In my opinion, the State cannot violate the protection of health and life for which 
doctors are responsible, by norms or interpretations of norms that dissuade a doctor from 
complying with his duty, either because they threaten him with the application of a penalty 
(a threat that can prevent him from providing medical services), or because they induce 
him to make distinctions contrary to the principles of equality and non-discrimination, or 
because they oblige him to deviate from his proper functions and assume others that enter 
into conflict with the former, pose unacceptable dilemmas, or change the basis of the rela-
tionship between doctor and patient, as would happen if doctors were obliged to inform 
on the patients they treat. A similar situation would arise, if lawyers were forced to report 
the unlawful acts committed by their clients (which they learn about through their relation-
ship of assistance and defense), or priests to reveal the secrets of the confessional.
9. This does not mean trying to prevent the legitimate prosecution of unlawful con-
ducts, which must be combated with appropriate means, but rather maintaining each 
social relationship in its corresponding niche, not only for the benefit of the individual, but 
also for the benefit of society. Given their functions, the prosecutor and the investigator 
must ask the necessary questions. The doctor, the defense lawyer and the priest must do 
the same, fully protected by the State, in the exercise of their mission, and this is evidently 
not the investigation of offences and the prosecution of perpetrators. It is not necessary 
to describe the crisis that would occur if the professional and social roles were disrupted 
and doctors, defense lawyers and priests were tacitly incorporated into the ranks of the 
police. If confidential communications between the lawyer and the accused are protected 
from interference, and it is accepted that the priest is not obliged to violate the secret of 
the confessional (an essential characteristic of this specific communication, which believers 
consider a sacrament), the relationship between doctor and patient should receive, at least, 
the same consideration.
10. The concept that a doctor is obliged to attend all individuals equally without enter-
ing into considerations on their moral or legal status, and that healthcare is an obligation 
for the doctor and also a right, and acceptance of the confidential nature of the doctor-
patient relationship as regards what the patient reveals, has long been recognized and 
11
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has been firmly established in several of this profession’s best-known ethical-juridical 
instruments, which include, inter alia, the particularities of the doctor-patient relation-
ship and the characteristics of the loyalty that the doctor owes to his patient. Aesculapius 
wrote to his son: “Your door shall remain open to all […] The evildoer shall have the same 
right to your help as the honorable man.” The Hippocratic oath, which is still sworn by 
many young people when they receive their professional diploma in medicine, states: 
“What I may see or hear in the course of the treatment or even outside [...], which on no 
account must be spread abroad, I will keep to myself, holding such things secret.”
11. The judgment, which this opinion accompanies, mentions the conclusive text of 
several principles of international humanitarian law. The reference to these texts is given 
merely for information because, as the Court’s case law has indicated, it helps illustrate 
the interpretation given to the provisions that are directly applicable.  Thus, Article 18 of 
the First Geneva Convention of 1949 indicates that, “No one may ever be molested or 
convicted for having nursed the wounded or sick.” Article 16 of Protocol 1 and Article 10 
of Protocol II, both to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, state that “Under no circumstances 
shall any person be punished for carrying out medical activities compatible with medical 
ethics, regardless of the person benefiting therefrom.” 
12. The Declaration of Geneva of the World Medical Association (WMA), 1948-1968-
1983, proclaimed the physician’s promise that “The health of my patient will be my first 
consideration”; “I will respect the secrets which are confided in me” and “I will not 
permit considerations of religion, nationality, race, party politics or social standing to 
intervene between my duty and my patient.” The WMA International Code of Medical 
Ethics repeats that: “A physician shall preserve absolute confidentiality [...] about his pa-
tient even after the patient has died”; “A physician shall act only in the patient’s interest 
when providing medical care which might have the effect of weakening the physical and 
mental condition of the patient.”; “A physician shall owe his patients complete loyalty 
and all the resources of his science.” The WMA Declaration of Lisbon on the rights of the 
patient of 1981-1995, states that: “All identifiable information about a patient’s health 
status, medical condition, diagnosis, prognosis and treatment and all other information 
of a personal kind, must be kept confidential, even after death.” The WMA Declaration 
of Helsinki, 1964-1975-1983-1989-1996-2000-2002, states that: “It is the duty of the 
physician to promote and safeguard the health of the people. The physician’s knowledge 
and conscience are dedicated to the fulfillment of this duty.”
13. In brief, I consider that it is inadmissible – a consideration that coincides with the 
opinion of the Inter-American Court, as stated in the judgment in this case – to criminally 
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penalize the conduct of a doctor who provides care designed to protect the health and 
life of other individuals, notwithstanding their characteristics, activities and beliefs, and 
the origin of their injuries or illnesses. I also consider it necessary to prohibit incriminat-
ing the conduct of a doctor who abstains from providing information to the authori-
ties about his patient’s punishable conduct, which he is aware of through information 
provided to him by the patient in connection with the medical procedure. In that case, 
there could be an absolutory excuse similar to that which protects the next of kin of the 
defendant in cases of concealment owing to kinship.
14. Once again, it should be emphasized that the considerations and decisions of the 
inter-American jurisdiction in the cases it has heard have never justified, in any case and 
for any reason, the committing of crimes established in legislation enacted in accordance 
with the principles and postulates of a democratic society.  It is clear that the State must 
protect individuals and society from attacks on their juridical rights, and also safeguard 
democratic institutions. It is also evident, from the perspective of human rights, that this 
protection must be exercised observing the conditions that characterize the rule of law.
[…].
Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights
The Xákmok Kásek  
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay
Merits, Reparations and Costs
Judgment of 
August 24, 2010
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i. introduction of the caSe and purpoSe of the diSpute
1. On July 3, 2009, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter “the 
Commission” or “the Inter-American Commission”), in accordance with Articles 51 and 
61 of the Convention, submitted an application against the Republic of Paraguay (herein-
after “the State” or “Paraguay”), based on which the instant case was commenced. (…)
2. The application relates to the State’s alleged international responsibility for the al-
leged failure to ensure the right of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community (herein-
after “the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community,” “the Xákmok Kásek Community,” 
“the Indigenous Community,” or “the Community”) and its members’ (hereinafter “the 
members of the Community”) to their ancestral property, because the actions concerning 
the territorial claims of the Community were being processed since 1990 “and had not 
yet been decided satisfactorily.” According to the Commission, “[t]his has meant that, 
not only has it been impossible for the Community to access the property and take pos-
session of their territory, but also, owing to the characteristics of the Community, that it 
has been kept in a vulnerable situation with regard to food, medicine and sanitation that 
continuously threatens the Community’s integrity and the survival of its members.”
[…]
vii. right to Life (articLe 4.1 of the american convention)
[…]
186. The Court has indicated that the right to life is a fundamental human right, the full 
enjoyment of which is a precondition for the enjoyment of all the other human rights192. 
If this right is not respected, all the other rights are meaningless. Therefore, restrictive 
notions with regard to this right are not admissible193.
192  Cf. Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales and et al.) v. Guatemala. Merits, supra para. 167, para. 
144; Case of Montero Aragorn et al. (Retén de Catia) v. Venezuela. Preliminary objections, merits, repara-
tions and costs. Judgment of July 5, 2006, Series C. No. 150, para. 63, and Case of Zambrano Vélez et al. 
v. Ecuador. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of July 4, 2007. Series C No. 166, para. 78.
193 Cf. Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Merits, supra note 167, para. 144; 
Case of Montero Aranguren et al. (Retén de Catia) v. Venezuela, supra note 192, para. 63, and Case of 
Zambrano Vélez et al. v. Ecuador, supra note 192, para. 78.
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187. Consequently, the States are obliged to ensure the creation of the necessary condi-
tions to prevent violations of this right and, in particular, the obligation to prevent its 
agents from endangering it. The observance of Article 4, in relation to Article 1(1) of the 
Convention, not only presumes that no one be deprived of their life arbitrarily (negative 
obligation), but also requires the States to take all appropriate measures to protect and 
preserve the right to life (positive obligation)194, in keeping with the obligation to ensure 
the full and free exercise, without discrimination, of the rights of all persons under their 
jurisdiction195.
188. The Court has emphasized that a State cannot be held responsible for every situ-
ation that jeopardizes the right to life. Taking into account the difficulties envolved in 
the planning and adoption of public policies and the operational choices that must be 
made based on priorities and resources, the positive obligations of the State must be 
interpreted in such a way that an impossible or disproportionate burden is not placed on 
the authorities196. To give rise to this positive obligation, it must be established that, at 
the time of the facts, the authorities knew or should have known of the existence of a 
situation of real and immediate risk to the life of an individual or Group of specific indi-
viduals, and that they did not take the necessary measures within their powers that could 
reasonably be expected to prevent or avoid that risk197.
189. In the instant case, on June 11, 1991198, and on September 22, 1992199, INDI officials 
verified the situation of special vulnerability of the members of the Community because 
194 Cf. Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Merits, supra note 167 para. 144; 
Case of Kawas Fernández v. Honduras, supra note 14, para. 74, and Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) 
v. Mexico, supra note 14 para. 245.
195  Cf. Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of January 31, 
2006. Series C No. 140, para. 120; Case of Kawas Fernández v. Honduras, supra note 14 para. 74, and Case 
of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, supra note 14, para. 245.
196 Cf. Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre, supra note 195, para. 124, and Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indig-
enous Community v. Paraguay, supra note 20, para. 155.. 
197 Cf. Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre, supra note 195, paras. 123 and 124, and Case of the Sawhoyamaxa 
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, supra note 20, para. 155. 
198  Cf. Handwritten record of an on-site inspection of the Xákmok Kásek Community made on June 11, 1991, 
in relation to the land claimed (file of appendices to the application, appendix 3, tome II, folio 790), and 
report of on-site visit made by Pastor Cabanellas, supra note 62, folios 791 to 794).
199 Cf. Report on the expanded on-site visit on September 22, 1992, supra note 62, folios 883 and 884).
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they did not have title to their land. On November 11, 1993, the indigenous leaders repeat-
ed to the IBR that their land claim was a priority because “they [were] living in extremely 
difficult and precarious conditions and [did] not know how long they [could] hold out200.”
190. The Prosecutor for labor matters inspected the Salazar, Cora-í, and Maroma Ranch-
es. He recorded “the precarious situation in which [the members of the Community 
live] […] without minimum conditions of hygiene, clothing, and space sufficient for the 
number of inhabitants; and also [the] houses […] do not have impermeable walls or tile 
roofs and were built in such a way that they endangered the safety and health of the 
indigenous people; the floors [were] of earth201.” In addition, the said report indicated 
“that they received very limited rations202.” During the visit, irregularities were also veri-
fied with regard to the labor exploitation suffered by the members of the Community.
191. On April 17, 2009, the President of the Republic and the Ministry of Education and 
Culture, issued Decree No. 1830203, declaring a state of emergency in two indigenous 
communities204, one of them the Xákmok Kásek Community. The pertinent part of De-
cree No. 1830 indicates that:
Due to situations beyond their control, these Communities are deprived of access to 
the traditional means of subsistence related to their pre-colonial identity, within the 
territories claimed as part of their ancestral territories, […] [and this] hampers the 
normal way of life of the said communities […] owing to the absence of minimum 
and essential food and medical care, which is a concern of the Government that 
requires urgent response […]. 
[Consequently, it ordered that]
The [INDI], together with the National Emergency Secretariat and the Ministry of 
Public Health and Social Welfare take the necessary measures to immediately pro-
vide medical care and food to the families that are members of [the Xákmok Kásek 
200 Communication of the Community addressed to the IBR President of November 11, 1993, supra note 65 
(file of appendices to the application, attachment 5, folio 2351).
201 Cf. Report prepared by the Prosecutor for labor matters, undated (file of appendices to the application, ap-
pendix 3, tome IV, folio 1808).
202  Cf. Report prepared by the Prosecutor for labor matters, undated, supra note 201, folio 1810.
203  Cf. Decree No. 1830 of April 17, 2009 (file of attachments to the answer to the application, attachment 7, 
folios 3643 to 3646).
204 The said Decree No. 1830 of April 17, 2009, supra note 203, also refers to the Kelyenmagategma Com-
munity of the Enxet and Y´ara Marantu People.
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Community] until the conclusion of the legal and administrative procedures regard-
ing the legalization of the land claimed as part of the its traditional habitat205.
192. In brief, in this case the domestic authorities knew of the existence of a situation of real 
and immediate risk to the life of the members of the Community. Consequently, this gave 
rise to certain State obligations of prevention – under the American Convention (Article 4 in 
relation to Article 1[1]) and under its own domestic law (Decree No. 1830) – that obliged it to 
take the necessary measures that could reasonably be expected, to prevent or avoid this risk.
193. Based on the above, the Court must assess the measures taken by the State to com-
ply with its obligation to guarantee the right to life of the members of the Xákmok Kásek 
Community. To this end, the Court will analyze the alleged violation of this right in two 
parts: (1) the right to a decent existence, and (2) the alleged international responsibility 
of the State for the alleged deaths.
1. The right to a decent existence
[…]
 1.3 Health 
203. Regarding access to health care services, the Commission argued that the children 
“suffer from malnutrition” and, in general, the other members of the Community suf-
fer from diseases such as tuberculosis, diarrhea, Chagas disease, and other occasional 
epidemics. In addition, it indicated that the Community has not been provided with ad-
equate medical care and the children do not receive the necessary vaccines. The represen-
tatives agreed with the Commission’s arguments and clarified that the new settlement 
(the village of “25 de Febrero”), is located 75 kilometers from the nearest health clinic, 
which operates “deficiently and does not have a vehicle that could, eventually, reach 
the Community.” Consequently, “the seriously ill must be attended to in the hospital in 
Limpio, which is more than 400 km from the Community’s settlement, and the bus fare 
is beyond the means of the members of the Community.” 
204. The State indicated that the “complaints of the Xákmok Kásek leaders concerning 
medical care and medicines have been attended to” and indicated that the public health-
205  Cf. Decree No. 1830, supra note 203. 
The Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay
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care service is free in Paraguay. It reported that, since October 2009, the State has been 
employing an indigenous health care promoter to provide services to the Community, 
and a Family Health Unit had been assigned237. Additionally, the State indicated that it 
had provided health-care assistance to the Community in its habitat and that the General 
Directorate for Vulnerable Groups provided medical assistance and had designed the 
health-care policy to be implemented.
205. The case file indicates that, prior to Decree No. 1830, the members of the Commu-
nity had “receiv[ed] […] minimal medical assistance238” and the health clinics were few 
and far apart. In addition, for years “the children had not received general medical care 
or vaccinations239.” Regarding access to health-care services, “only those who work on 
ranches [could] access the [Health Insurance Institute], and even [then], the use of this in-
surance is not possible because the cards are not delivered or [the Community members] 
do not have the resources to travel to and stay in the Loma Plata Hospital, which is the 
closest one240.” Also, “a 1993 health census conducted by the National Health Service 
(SENASA) […] confirmed that a large percentage of the current Xákmok Kásek popula-
tion carried the Chagas disease virus241.”
206. Regarding current conditions, the Court has verified that an indigenous community 
health care promoter was hired on November 2, 2009242. Also, following the issue of 
Decree No. 1830 on April 17, 2009, the State has organized nine health-care workshops 
with the Community243, during which it attended 474 consultations, providing treat-
ment and medicines in some cases244. In addition, the State forwarded documentation 
on a project to build a health clinic for the Community, at an estimated cost of Gs. 
120,000,000 (one hundred and twenty million guaranís)245.
237  Cf. Report of December 16, 2009, signed by María Filomena Bejarano, General Director of the General 
Directorate for Assistance to Vulnerable Groups (file of attachments to the answer to the application, at-
tachment 1(4), folios 3307 to 3308)
238  Cf. CEADUC Anthropological Report, supra note 55, folio 1742.
239  Cf. CEADUC Anthropological Report, supra note 55, folio 1742.
240 Cf. CEADUC Anthropological Report, supra note 55, folio 1742.
241  Cf. CEADUC Anthropological Report, supra note 55, folio 1742.
242  Cf. Communication MSPyBS/DGAPS No. 865/2009 of December 18, 2009 (file of attachments to the an-
swer to the application, attachment 1.4, folio 3306).
243  Cf. Report of the General Directorate for Assistance to Vulnerable Groups of December 16, 2009, supra 
note 237.
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207. Nevertheless, according to Marcelino Lopez, Community leader, and Gerardo Larrosa, 
the Community’s health-care promoter, the health situation is fairly critical. They indicated 
that “indigenous people die owing to lack of transportation [or] medicine246,” and their 
perception is that, in the case of “most of the indigenous people concerned, this is be-
cause of the […] Government247.” Specifically, Gerardo Larrosa indicated that “the health 
brigades almost never provide assistance, except on a few occasions,” and “[t]here is no 
stock of basic medicines for primary care, or even an adequate place to store them248.”  
208. The Court acknowledges the progress made by the State. However, the measures 
taken following Decree No. 1830 (2009) are characterized by being temporary and tran-
sitory. In addition, the State has not guaranteed members of the Community physical 
or geographical access to health-care establishments and, from the evidence provided, 
there is no indication that positive measures were taken to guarantee that the medical 
supplies and services provided would be acceptable, or that any educational measures 
were taken on health matters that respected traditional customs and practices. 
[…]
214. In short, this Court emphasizes that the assistance provided by the State under 
Decree No. 1830 of April 17, 2009, has been insufficient to overcome the conditions of 
special vulnerability of the Xákmok Kásek Community verified in the decree.
215. The situation of the members of the Community is closely tied to its lack of its lands. 
Indeed, the absence of possibilities for the members to provide for and support them-
selves, according to their ancestral traditions, has led them to depend almost exclusively 
on State actions and be forced to live not only in a way that is different from their cultural 
244 Cf. Information presented by the Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare on December 16, 2009, with 
data on medical attention provided between May 1 and November 4, 2009, and data from the lists for-
warded by the General Directorate for Assistance to Vulnerable Groups to the Ministry of Public Health and 
Welfare (file of attachments to the answer to the application, tome VIII, attachment 4, folios 3292 to 3305), 
and records of attention provided in January and February 2010 (file of attachments to the final arguments 
of the State, folios 4423 to 4435).
245  Cf. Report on the “medical clinic – for the indigenous settlement of the XV sanitary region of President 
Hayes” (file of attachments to the answer to the application, attachment 4, folios 3315 to 3321). 
246 Testimony of Marcelino López, supra note 63, folio 587.
247 Testimony of Marcelino López, supra note 63, folio 587
248 Testimony of Marcelino López, supra note 63, folio 606
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patterns, but in squalor. This was noted by Marcelino López, Community leader, who 
said, “[i]f we have our land, then everything else will improve and, above all, we will be 
able to live openly as indigenous people; otherwise, it will be very difficult to survive255.”
216. On this point, it should be noted that, as the United Nations Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights has said, “in practice, poverty seriously restricts the ability of a 
person or a group of persons to exercise the right to take part in, gain access and contribute 
to, on equal terms, all spheres of cultural life, and more importantly, seriously affects their 
hopes for the future and their ability to effectively enjoy their own culture255.”
217. Consequently, the Court declares that the State has not provided the basic services 
to protect the right to a decent life of a specific group of individuals in these conditions 
of special, real and immediate risk, and this constitutes a violation of Article 4(1) of the 
Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) thereof, to the detriment of all the members of the 
Xákmok Kásek Community.
2. The deaths that have occurred in the Community
218. The representatives asked that the State be declared internationally responsible for 
the death of several members of the Community. In contrast, the Commission indicated 
that it “lacked evidence to determine if each death described by the representatives 
[was] indirectly related to the Xákmok Kásek Community’s possibility of acceding to its 
ancestral territory.” The State objected that its international responsibility could not be 
declared and contested the representatives’ allegation.
[…]
232. The death of Remigia Ruíz, who died in 2005 at 38 years of age, and who was 
pregnant and did not receive medical attention, reveals many of the inherent characteris-
tics of maternal mortality, such as: death during labor without adequate medical care, a 
situation of exclusion or extreme poverty, lack of access to adequate health services, and 
a lack of documentation on cause of death, among others.
255  Testimony of Marcelino López, supra note 63, folio 585.
256 United Nations, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. General Comment No. 21, December 
21, 2009, E/C.12/GC/21, para. 38.
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233. In this regard, the Court underscores that extreme poverty and the lack of adequate 
medical care for pregnant women or women who have recently given birth result in 
high maternal mortality and morbidity269. Because of this, States must design appropri-
ate health-care policies that permit assistance to be provided by personnel who are ad-
equately trained to attend to births, policies to prevent maternal mortality with adequate 
pre-natal and post-partum care, and legal and administrative instruments for health-care 
policies that permit cases of maternal mortality to be documented adequately. All this is 
because pregnant women require special measures of protection.
234. Based on the above, the Court declares that the State violated the right established in 
Article 4(1) of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) thereof, to the detriment 
of the persons mentioned in this paragraph, because it failed to take the required positive 
measures, within its powers, that could reasonably be expected to prevent or to avoid the risk 
to the right to life. Consequently, the death of the following individuals can be attributed to 
the State: Sara Gonzáles López, who died from gastroenteritis and dehydration in July 2008, 
and did not receive medical attention; Yelsi Karina López Cabañas, who died of whooping 
cough in 2005, at the age of one, and did not receive medical attention; Remigia Ruiz, who 
died from complications while in labor in 2005, at 38 years of age, and did not receive medi-
cal attention; Aida Carolina Gonzáles, who died from anemia in June 2003, at eight months 
of age, and did not receive medical assistance; NN Ávalos or Ríos Torres, who died from teta-
nus in 1999, three days after birth, and did not receive medical care; Abundio Inter Dermott, 
who died from pneumonia in 2003, two months after birth, and did not receive medical care; 
NN Dermott Martínez, who died from enterocolitis in 2001, at eight months of age, and it is 
not known if he or she received medical care; NN García Dermott, who died from whooping 
cough in 2001, at one month of age, and did not receive medical care; Adalberto Gonzáles 
López, who died from pneumonia in 2000, aged one year and two months, and did not 
receive medical care; Roberto Roa Gonzáles, who died from tuberculosis in 2000, at 55 years 
of age, and did not receive medical care; NN Ávalos or Ríos Torres, who died from tetanus in 
1998, nine days after birth, and did not receive medical care; NN Dermontt Ruiz, who died at 
birth in 1996 and did not receive medical care, and NN Wilfrida Ojeda Chavez, who died of 
dehydration and enterocolitis in May 1994 and did not receive medical care.
The Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay
269  Cf. Paul Hunt. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest at-
tainable standard of health, A/HRC/14/20/Add.2, April 15, 2010. A maternal death is the death of a woman 
while pregnant or within 42 days of termination of pregnancy, irrespective of the duration and the site of 
the pregnancy, from any cause related to or aggravated by the pregnancy or its management, but not from 
accidental or incidental causes. WHO, International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health 
Problems, Tenth Revision, vol. 2, Instruction Manual, 2nd ed. (Geneva, 2005), p. 141.
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[…]
xiii. operative paragraphS
337. Therefore, 
the court
[…]
decLareS, 
By seven votes to one, that:
3. The State violated the right to life, established in Article 4(1) of the American Con-
vention, in relation to Article 1(1) thereof, to the detriment of all the members of the 
Xákmok Kásek Community, in the terms of paragraphs (…) 205 to 208 and 211 to 217 
of this judgment.
By seven votes to one, that:
4. The State violated the right to life established in Article 4(1) of the American Con-
vention, in relation to Article 1(1) thereof, to the detriment of Sara Gonzáles López, Yelsi 
Karina López Cabañas, Remigia Ruiz, Aida Carolina Gonzáles, NN [Note: NN = no first 
name] Ávalos or Ríos Torres, Abundio Inter Dermott, NN Dermott Martínez, NN García 
Dermott, Adalberto Gonzáles López, Roberto Roa Gonzáles, NN Ávalos or Ríos Torres, 
NN Dermontt Ruiz and NN Wilfrida Ojeda, in the terms of paragraphs 231 to 234 of this 
judgment.
[…]
Inter-American Court  
of Human Rights
Gelman v. Uruguay
Merits and Reparations
Judgment of 
February 24, 2011
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[…]
i. introduction of the caSe and the purpoSe of the 
controverSy
1. On January 21, 2010, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter 
“the Commission” or “the Inter-American Commission”) presented, pursuant to Articles 
51 and 61 of the Convention, an application against the Eastern Republic of Uruguay 
in relation to the case of Juan Gelman, María Claudia García de Gelman, and María 
Macarena Gelman García2 (hereinafter “the case of Gelman”) v. Uruguay3. On March 9, 
2007, the Commission adopted Admissibility Report No. 30/07, wherein it declared the 
admissibility of the case and on July 18, 2008, approved, under the terms of Article 50 of 
the Convention, the Report on the Merits No. 32/084.
2 Also mentioned as María Macarena Tauriño Vivian, due to the facts of the case.
3  The Commission appointed as delegats Ms. Luz Patricia Mejía, Commissioner, and Mr. Santiago A. Canton, 
Executive Secretary; and as legal advisors Ms. Elizabeth Abi-Mershed, Deputy Executive Secretary, Christina 
Cerna and Lilly Ching, attorneys of the Executive Secretary.
4 In this report, the Commission concluded that the State is responsible for the violation of Articles 3, 4, 
5, and 7, in relation to Article 1(1) of the American Convention, with Articles I.b, III, IV, and V of the 
Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons and with Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-
American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture and Articles I, XVIII and XXVI of the American Declara-
tion on the Rights and Duties of Man, to the detriment of María Claudia García; of Articles 1(1), 2, 8(1) 
and 25 of the American Convention, Articles I.b, III, IV, and V of the Inter-American Convention on Forced 
Disappearance of Persons and Articles 1, 6, 8, and 11 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and 
Punish Torture, to the detriment of the next of kin of María Claudia García; Articles 5(1) and 1(1) of the 
Convention  to the detriment of Juan Gelman, his family and María Macarena Gelman; Articles 3, 11, 17, 
18, 19, 20, and 1(1) of the American Convention, Article XII of the Inter-American Convention on Forced 
Disappearance of Persons and Articles VI, VII, and XVII of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties 
of Man, to the detriment of Juan Gelman and his family and of María Macarena Gelman. In this report, 
the Commission made the following recommendations to the State: a) carry out a complete and impartial 
investigation in order to identify and punish those responsible for the human rights violations in the case; 
b) adopt the legislative or any measures necessary to revoke Law 15.848 or the Expiry Law of the State; c) 
create a domestic mechanism, with binding legal powers and authority over all the State bodies to supervise 
these recommendations; and d) order full reparation for the next of kin that includes compensation and 
symbolic acts that guarantee the non-repetition of the acts committed.
25
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2. The facts alleged by the Commission relate to the enforced disappearance of María 
Claudia García Iruretagoyena de Gelman since late 1976, subsequent to her detention in 
Buenos Aires, Argentina, during the advanced stages of her pregnancy, to which it is pre-
sumed that she was then transported to Uruguay where she gave birth to her daughter, 
who was then given to an Uruguayan family; actions which the Commission notes were 
committed by Uruguayan and Argentine State agents in the context of “Operation Cón-
dor,” and, to date, the whereabouts of María Claudia García as well as the circumstances 
in which the disappearance took place remain unknown. Furthermore, the Commission 
alleged the suppression of identity and nationality of María Macarena Gelman García 
Iruretagoyena, daughter of María Claudia García de Gelman and Marcelo Gelman and 
the denial of justice, impunity, and in general, the suffering caused to Juan Gelman, his 
family, María Macarena Gelman, and the next of kin of María Claudia García, as a con-
sequence of the failure to investigate the facts, prosecute, and punish those responsible 
under Law No. 15.848 or the Expiry Law (hereinafter “the Expiry Law”), promulgated in 
1986 by the democratic government of Uruguay.
[…]
vi. meritS
vI.1 the right to JuridicaL perSonaLity, to Life, to perSonaL 
integrity and to perSonaL Liberty of maría cLaudia 
garcía iruretagoyena de geLman, in reLation to the 
obLigation to reSpect and guarantee rightS (american 
convention and inter-american convention on the 
forced diSappearance of perSonS)
41. (…) The State did not make reference to these arguments, but it did acknowledge 
the human rights violations against Maria Claudia García in their entirety (…), reason for 
which in the following section the State’s arguments are not included.
A. Arguments and claims of the parties
[…]
43. The representatives argued that:
(…)
e) in relation to the alleged violation of Article 5 of the Convention, and in con-
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sideration of the  definition of the crime of torture established in Article 2 of the 
Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, as well as the definition 
of violence against women contained in Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention of 
Belém do Pará, the unlawful detention, solitary confinement, and suffering inflicted 
on María Claudia García are particularly serious given her vulnerability due to the 
advanced state of pregnancy, which “allow for the inference that María Claudia 
[García] was a victim of psychological torture during the time she was in detention.” 
Said facts constitute an “immediate” violation to her personal integrity due to the 
acts of torture; 
(…).
[…]
D. The enforced disappearance of María Claudia García Iruretagoyena de Gelman
[…]
 D. 2 Legal classification
91. In the manner that María Claudia was deprived of her liberty during the advanced 
stages of her pregnancy, kidnapped in Buenos Aires by Argentine forces and possibly 
Uruguayan authorities in a context of illegal detentions in clandestine centers (“Automo-
tores Orletti” and SID) and subsequently transported to Montevideo under the “Opera-
tion Condor,” her deprivation of liberty was clearly illegal, in violation of Article 7(1) of 
the Convention, and can only be understood as the constitution of a complex violation 
of rights that is an enforced disappearance. It also constitutes a flagrant breach of the 
State´s obligation to keep persons deprived of liberty in officially recognized detention-
centers, and to present them without delay before the competent judicial authority.
[…]
97. The state of pregnancy in which she was in when detained constituted a condition 
of particular vulnerability, reason for which—in her case—there was differential treat-
ment. In turn, in Argentina she had been separated from her husband and later trans-
ported to Uruguay without knowing his fate, which in itself represented a cruel and 
inhumane act. Subsequently, she was retained in a clandestine center of detention and 
torture, SID, where her given differential treatment in regard to other detainees, seeing 
as she was separated from these, was not carried out in order to comply with the special 
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obligation to protect her, but rather in what regards her unlawful detention, her transfer 
to Uruguay, and her possible enforced disappearance, which was, the use of her body 
in order to give birth, and for her daughter to be breastfeed, who was given to another 
family after being abducted and her identity substituted for another.(infra paras. 106 to 
116). The facts of the case reveal a particular conception of women that threatens free-
doms entailed in maternity, that which forms an essential part of the free development of 
the female personhood. The foregoing is even more serious if one considers, as indicated, 
that her case took place in a context of disappearances of pregnant women and illegal 
abductions of children in the framework of Operation Condor. 
98. The mentioned acts committed against Maria Claudia García can be classified 
as one of the most serious and reprehensible forms of violence against women110, 
perpetrated against her by State officials from Argentina and Uruguay, which severely 
affected her personal integrity, were clearly based on her gender, and caused damage 
to her physical and psychological suffering, and contributed to her feelings of serious 
anguish, desperation, and fear she experienced by living with her daughter in a clan-
destine detention center, where one normally could hear the torture inflicted on the 
other prisoners in SID111 and not knowing the fate of her daughter when they were 
separated112, as well as being unable to foresee her final fate. All this constitutes an 
affectation of such magnitude that it should be qualified as the most serious form of 
violation of her psychological integrity.
110  Cf., In this sense, Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention of Belem do Para. As has been noted previously by 
this tribunal, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination of all forms of Violence against Women 
has maintained the definition of discrimination against women to “include violence based on sex, that is, 
violence directed at a women [i] because hse is a women or[ii] because it affects her in a disporportionate 
form.” Moreover, it has also noted that “[t]he violence against women is a form of discrimination that 
severly impedes the enjoyment of rights and freedoms as to those of man.” Cf., In this regard, Case of 
González et al.s (“Campo Algodonero”), supra note 79, para. 395; Case of Fernández Ortega et al.. V. 
México. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 30, 2010 Series C No. 
215, para. 129, and Case of Rosendo Cantú et al. supra note 9, para. 120.
111  Testimony of Sara Méndez. Rendered by Juan Gelman during the public hearing. 
112  Cf., mutatis mutandi, Case of del Penal Miguel Castro Castro V. Perú. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judg-
ment of November 25, 2006. Series C No. 160, para. 103.
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99. This enforced disappearance constitutes, due to the nature of the injured rights, a 
violation of a jus cogens principle, especially serious because it occurred in the context of 
a systematic practice of “State-sponsored terrorism,” at an inter-state level113.
100. The preparation and execution of the arrest and subsequent disappearance of María 
Claudia García could not have been perpetrated without the knowledge or higher or-
ders of the military, police, and intelligence headquarters at the time, or without the 
collaboration, acquiescence, or tolerance, manifested in various actions, carried out in 
a coordinated or concatenated manner, by members of the security forces and intelli-
gence services (and even diplomats) of the States involved, wherein State agents not only 
grossly failed in the obligations to prevent and protect against violations of the rights of 
the alleged victims, enshrined in Articles 1(1) of the American Convention, but also used 
the official investiture and resources provided by the State to commit the violations.
101. In consideration of the preceding, in relation with the enforced disappearance that 
continues to this date, the Court finds that the State is responsible for the violation of the 
personal liberty, to the personal integrity, to the right to juridical personality, and to life 
of María Claudia García Iruretagoyena de Gelman, recognized in Articles 7(1); 5(1) and 
5(2); 3 and 4(1), given the failure to comply with the obligation to respect and guarantee 
rights, established in Article 1(1) of the American Convention, in relation with Articles I 
and XI of the Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons114.
[…]
113  As such, it may be classified as a crime against humanity.
114  In various cases, the Court has analyzed, or declared the violation, of the provisions mentione din the Inter-
American Convention on Forced Disappearance. In this regard, see the following cases: Case of Blanco 
Romero et al. V. Venezuela, arts. I, X and XI; Case of Heliodoro Portugal V. Panamá. arts. I and II; Case of 
Tiu Tojín V. Guatemala, art. I; Case of Ticona Estrada V. Bolivia, arts. I, III and XI; Case of Anzualdo Castro V. 
Perú, arts. I and II; Case of Radilla Pacheco V. México, arts. I and II; Case of Ibsen Cárdenas V. Bolivia, arts. I 
and XI; and Case of Chitay Nech et al. V. Guatemala.  
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viii. operative paragraphS
312.  Therefore,
the court, decLareS,
unanimously, that:
2. The State is responsible for the enforced disappearance of María Claudia García 
Iruretagoyena de Gelman, wherein it violated her right to juridical personality, to life, to 
humane treatment [personal integrity], and to personal liberty, recognized in Articles 3, 
4, 5, and 7, in relation to Article 1(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights and 
Articles I and XI of the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, 
in the terms of paragraphs 44 to 63 and 79 to 101 of the Judgment.

Inter-American Commission  
on Human Rights
Baby Boy v.
United States of America
Case 2141
Resolution 23/81
March 6, 1981
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Summary of the caSe 
1. On January 19, 1977, Christian B. White and Gary K. Potter, filed with the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights a petition against the United States of America 
and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for the purposes established in the Statute 
and Regulations of the Commission. The petition is accompanied by a cover letter of the 
Catholics for Christian Political Action, signed by Gary Potter, President. 
2. The pertinent parts of the petition are the following: 
Name of the person whose human rights have been violated: “Baby Boy” (…).
Address: Boston City Hospital, Boston Massachusetts.
Description of the violation: Victim was killed by abortion process (hysterectomy), by Dr. 
Kenneth Edelin, M.D., in violation of the right to life granted by the American Declara-
tion of the Rights and Duties of Man, as clarified by the definition and description of the 
American Convention on Human Rights (…). 
Place and date of the violation: Boston City Hospital, Boston, Massachusetts, October 3, 
1973, U.S. Supreme Court Building, Washington, D.C. January 22, 1973.
Local authority who took cognizance of the act and the date on which this occurred: 
District Atrorney’s Office, Boston, Massachusetts. 
Judge or court which took cognizance of the act and the date on which this occurred: 
Superior Court of Boston, Massachusetts, Judge McGuire sitting, April 5-11, 1976. 
Final decision of the authority (if any) that acted in the matter: The Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts, Boston, Massachusetts, acquitted Edelin on appeal, on Decem-
ber 17, 1976. 
In the case of it not being possible to have recourse to a local authority, judge or court, 
explain the reasons for such impossibility: On a related point, no appeal to the Supreme 
Court of the United States is possible (…). 
[…]
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The undersigned should indicate whether they wish their identity to be withheld: No 
withholding is necessary. 
3. In the “Amplificatory Document” attached to the petition; the petitioners add, inter 
alia, the following information and arguments: 
a) The victim in this case, a male child not yet come to the normal term of preg-
nancy, has from the beginning been identified by the Massachusetts authorities only 
as “Baby Boy”, 
b) This violation of the following rights granted by the American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man, Chapter 1, Article I (“... right to life...”, Article II (“All 
persons are equal before the law... without distinction as to race, sex, language, 
creed, or any other factor,” here, age), Article VII (“All children have the right to 
special protection, care, and aid”) and Article XI (“Every person has the right to the 
preservation of his health...”) began on January 22, 1973, when the Supreme Court 
of the United States handed down its decisions in the cases of Roe vs. Wade, 410 
U.S. 1131 and Doe vs. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179. 
c) The effect of the Wade and Bolton decisions, supra, in ending the legal protec-
tion of unborn children set the stage for the deprivation of “Baby Boy’s right to life. 
These decisions in and of themselves constitute a violation of his right to life, and 
the United States of America therefore stands accused of a violation of Chapter 1, 
Article I of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. 
The United States Government, through its Supreme Court, is guilty of that viola-
tion. 
d) At trial, the jury found Dr. Edelin guilty of manslaughter, necessarily finding as 
fact that the child was such as to fit within a “protectable exception” (over six 
months past conception and/or alive outside the womb) to the Supreme Court of 
the United States’ rubric in the Wade and Bolton cases. On appeal, the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed (…).
e) This decision came down on December 17, 1976, and, by preventing Dr. Edelin 
from being punished for his acts, put the State of Massachusetts in the posture of 
violating “Baby Boy’s” right to life under the Declaration. 
1 “410 U.S. 113” means United States Reports, vol. 410, p.113. This explanation is offered for the benefit of 
persons unfamiliar with United States systems of legal reporting and case citation. 
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the inter-american commiSSion o n human rightS, 
Whereas: 
[…]
18. The first violation denounced in the petition concerns article I of the American Dec-
laration of Rights and Duties of Man: “Every human being has the right to life...”. The 
petitioners admitted that the Declaration does not respond “when life begins,” “when a 
pregnancy product becomes a human being” or other such questions. However, they try 
to answer these fundamental questions with two different arguments: 
a) The travaux preparatoires, the discussion of the draft Declaration during the IX 
International Conference of American States at Bogotá in 1948 and the final vote, 
demonstrate that the intention of the Conference was to protect the right to life 
“from the moment of conception.” 
b) The American Convention on Human Rights, promulgated to advance the Decla-
ration’s high purposes and to be read as a corollary document, gives a definition of 
the right to life in article 4.1: “This right shall be protected by law from the moment 
of conception.” 
19. A brief legislative history of the Declaration does not support the petitioner’s argu-
ment, as may be concluded from the following information and documents: 
a) Pursuant to Resolution XL of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of 
War and Peace (Mexico, 1945), the Inter-American Juridical Committee of Río de 
Janeiro, formulated a preliminary draft of an International Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man to be considered by the Ninth International Conference of Amer-
ican States (Bogotá, 1948). This preliminary draft was used by the Conference as a 
basis of discussion in conjuction with the draft of a similar Declaration prepared by 
the United Nations in December, 1947. 
b) Article 1 - Right to Life - of the draft submitted by the Juridical Committee 
reads: “Every person has the right to life. This right extends to the right to life from 
the moment of conception; to the right to life of incurables, imbeciles and the 
insane. Capital punishment may only be applied in cases in which it has been pre-
scribed by pre-existing law for crimes of exceptional gravity.” (Novena Conferencia 
International Americana - Actas y Documentos Vol. V Pág. 449). 
c) A Working Group was organized to consider the observations and amendments 
introduced by the Delegates and to prepare an acceptable document. As a result of 
its work, the Group submitted to the Sixth Committee a new draft entitle American 
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Declaration of the Fundamental Rights and Duties of Man, article I of which reads: 
“Every human being has the right to life, liberty, security and integrity of this person.” 
d) This completely new article I and some substantial changes introduced by the 
Working Group in other articles has been explained, in its Report of the Working 
Group to the Committee, as a compromise to resolve the problems raised by the 
Delegations of Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, United States of America, Mexico, Peru, 
Uruguay and Venezuela, mainly as consequence of the conflict existing between the 
laws of those States and the draft of the Juridical Committee. (Actas y Documentos 
Vol. 5 pages 474-484, 495-504, 513-51S. 
e) In connection with the right to life, the definition given in the Juridical Commit-
tee’s draft was incompatible with the laws governing the death penalty and abortion 
in the majority of the American States. In effect, the acceptance of this absolute 
concept--the right to life from the moment of conception--would imply the obligation 
to derogate the articles of the Penal Codes in force in 1948 in many countries because 
such articles excluded the penal sanction for the crime of abortion if performed in one 
or more of the following cases: A-when necessary to save the life of the modern; B-to 
interrupt the pregnancy of the victim of a rape; C-to protect the honor of an honest 
woman; D-to prevent the transmission to the fetus of a hereditary on contagious 
disease; E-for economic reasons (angustia económica). 
f) In 1948, the American States that permitted abortion in one of such cases and, 
consequently, would be affected by the adoption of article I of the Juridical Commit-
tee, were; Argentina - article 86 n.1, 2 (cases A and B); Brasil - article n.I, II (A and B); 
Costa Rica - article 199 (A); Cuba - article 443 (A, B and D); Ecuador -article 423 n.l, 
2 (A and B); Mexico (Distrito y Territorios Federales) - articles 333e 334 (A and B); Ni-
caragua - article 399 (frustrated attempt) (C); Paraguay - article 352 (A); Peru - article 
163 (A-to save the life or health of the mother); Uruguay - article 328 n. 1-5 (A, B, C. 
and F - the abortion must be performed in the three first months from conception); 
Venezuela - article 435 (A); United States of America - see the State laws and prec-
edents*; Puerto Rico S S 266, 267 (A) (Códigos Penales Iberoamericanos - Luis Jiménez 
de Asua - Editorial Andrés Bello - Caracas, 1946 - volúmenes I y II). 
g) On April 22, 1948, the new article I of the Declaration prepared by the Work-
ing Group was approve by the Sixth Committee with a slight change in the wording 
of the Spanish text (there was no official English text at that stage) (Actas y Docu-
mentos) vol. V pages 510-516 and 578). Finally, the definitive text of the Declaration 
Baby Boy v. United States of America
* Daniel Callahan - Abortion: Law, Choice and Morality. William A.Nolen - The Baby in the Bottle - Cowarn, 
McCann & Geoghengan, Inc. -New York, 1978; 410 U.S. 113 provites a list of the articles of State’s Penal 
Codes and similar statutes on abortion in existence in a majority of states in 1973 (pages 118-119).
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in Spanish, English, Portuguese and French was approved by the 7th plenary Session 
of the Conference on April 30, 1948, and the Final Act was signed May 2nd. The 
only difference in the final text is the elimination of the word “integrity” (Actas y 
Documentos vol. VI pages 297-298; vol. I pages 231, 234, 236, 260, 261). 
h) Consequently, the defendant is correct in challenging the petitioners’ assump-
tion that article 1 of the Declaration has incorporated the notion that the right of life 
exists from the moment of conception. Indeed, the conference faced this question but 
chose not to adopt language which would clearly have stated that principle. 
20. The second argument of the petitioners, related to the possible use of the Conven-
tion as an element for the interpretation of the Declaration requires also a study of the 
motives that prevailed at the San José Diplomatic Conference with the adoption of the 
definition of the right to life. 
21. The Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OAS, held at 
Santiago, Chile in 1959, entrusted the Inter-American Council of Jurists with the prepara-
tion of a draft of the Convention on Human Rights contemplated by the American States 
since the Mexico Conference in 1945. 
22. The draft, concluded by the Commission in about two weeks, developed the Ameri-
can Declaration of Bogotá, but has been influenced also by other sources, including the 
work in course at the United Nations. It consists of 88 articles, begin with a definition 
of the right to life (article 2), which reintroduced the concept that “This right shall be 
protected by law from the moment of conception.” (Inter-American Year-book, 1968 - 
Organization of American States, Washington, 1973 - pages 67, 237.) 
23. The Second Special Conference of Inter-American States (Rio de Janeiro, 1965) con-
sidered the draft of the Council with two other drafts presented by the Governments of 
Chile and Uruguay, respectively, and asked the Council of the OAS, in cooperation with 
the IACHR, to prepare the draft of the Convention to be submitted to the diplomatic 
conference to be called for this purpose. 
24. The Council of the OAS, considering the Opinion enacted by the IACHR on the draft 
convention prepared by the Council of Jurists, give a mandate to Convention to be sub-
mitted as working document to the San José conference (Yearbook, 1968, pages 73-93.) 
25. To accommodate the views that insisted on the concept “from the moment of con-
ception,” with the objection raised, since the Bogota Conference, based on the legisla-
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tion of American States that permitted abortion, inter alia, to save the mother’s life, and 
in case of rape, the IACHR, redrafting article 2 (Right to life), decided, by majority vote, 
to introduce the words “in general.” This compromise was the origin of the new text 
of article 2 “1. Every person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be 
protected by law, in general, from the moment of conception.” (Yearbook, 1968, page 
321.) 
26. The rapporteur of the Opinion proposed, at this second opportunity for discussion 
of the definition of the right of life, to delete the entire final phrase “...in general, from 
the moment of conception.” He repeated the reasoning of his dissenting opinion in the 
Commission; based on the abortion laws in force in the majority of the American States, 
with an addition: “to avoid any possibility of conflict with article 6, paragraph 1, of the 
United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states this right in a general 
way only.” (Yearbook, 1968 - page 97). 
27. However, the majority of the Commission believed that, for reasons of principle, it 
was fundamental to state the provision on the protection of the right to life in the form 
recommended to the Council of the OAS in its Opinion (Part One). It was accordingly 
decided to keep the text of paragraph 1 without change. (Yearbook, 1968, page 97). 
28. In the Diplomatic Conference that approved the American Convention, the Delega-
tions of Brazil and the Dominican Republic introduced separate amendments to delete 
the final phrase of paragraph 1 of article 3 (Right to life) “in general, from the moment 
of conception”. The United States delegation supported the Brazilian position. (Confer-
encia Especializada Interamericana sobre Derechos Humanos - ACTAS Y DOCUMENTOS 
- Washington 1978 (reprinted) - pages 57, 121 y 160.) 
29. Conversely, the Delegation of Ecuador supported the deletion of the words “and in 
general”. Finally, by majority vote, the Conference adopted the text of the draft submit-
ted by the IACHR and approved by the Council of the OAS, which became the present 
text of article 4, paragraph 1, of the American Convention (ACTAS Y DOCUMENTOS - 
pages 160 and 481.) 
30. In the light of this history, it is clear that the petitioners’ interpretation of the defini-
tion given by the American Convention on the right of life is incorrect. The addition of 
the phrase “in general, from the moment of conception” does not mean that the draft-
ers of the Convention intended to modify the concept of the right to life that prevailed 
in Bogota, when they approved the American Declaration. The legal implications of the 
Baby Boy v. United States of America
38
H
ea
lth
 an
d 
Re
pr
od
uc
tiv
e R
ig
ht
s
clause “in general, from the moment of conception” are substantially different from the 
shorter clause “from the moment of conception” as appears repeatedly in the petition-
ers’ briefs. 
[…]
the inter-american commiSSion on human rightS, 
Resolves:
1. The decision of the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts and other facts stated in the petition do not constitute a violation of articles I, II, 
VII and XI of the American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man. 
European Court  
of Human Rights
Open Door and Dublin Well Woman 
v. Ireland
Application Nº 14234/88  
and 14235/88 
Judgment of 
October 29, 1992
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[…]
the factS
i. introduction 
The applicants
9. The applicants in this case are (a) Open Door Counselling Ltd (hereinafter referred 
to as Open Door), a company incorporated under Irish law, which was engaged, inter 
alia, in counselling pregnant women in Dublin and in other parts of Ireland; and (b) 
Dublin Well Woman Centre Ltd (hereinafter referred to as Dublin Well Woman), a com-
pany also incorporated under Irish law which provided similar services at two clinics 
in Dublin; (c) Bonnie Maher and Ann Downes, who worked as trained counsellors for 
Dublin Well Woman; (d) Mrs X, born in 1950 and Ms Maeve Geraghty, born in 1970, 
who join in the Dublin Well Woman application as women of child-bearing age. The 
applicants complained of an injunction imposed by the Irish courts on Open Door and 
Dublin Well Woman to restrain them from providing certain information to pregnant 
women concerning abortion facilities outside the jurisdiction of Ireland by way of non-
directive counselling (…). Open Door and Dublin Well Woman are both non-profit- 
making organisations. Open Door ceased to operate in 1988 (…). Dublin Well Woman 
was established in 1977 and provides a broad range of services relating to counselling 
and marriage, family planning, procreation and health matters. The services offered 
by Dublin Well Woman relate to every aspect of women’s health, ranging from smear 
tests to breast examinations, infertility, artificial insemination and the counselling of 
pregnant women.
[…]
iii. aLLeged vioLation of articLe 10
53. The applicants alleged that the Supreme Court injunction, restraining them from as-
sisting pregnant women to travel abroad to obtain abortions, infringed the rights of the 
corporate applicants and the two counsellors to impart information, as well as the rights 
of Mrs X and Ms Geraghty to receive information. They confined their complaint to that 
part of the injunction which concerned the provision of information to pregnant women 
as opposed to the making of travel arrangements or referral to clinics (…). They invoked 
41
Open Door and Dublin W
ell W
oman v. Ireland
Article 10 which provides:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom 
to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interfer-
ence by public authority and regardless of frontiers (...).
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, 
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are pre-
scribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national 
security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights 
of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for 
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
A. Was there an interference with the applicants’ rights?
55. The Court notes that the Government accepted that the injunction interfered with 
the freedom of the corporate applicants to impart information. Having regard to the scope 
of the injunction which also restrains the “servants or agents” of the corporate applicants 
from assisting “pregnant women” (…), there can be no doubt that there was also an in-
terference with the rights of the applicant counsellors to impart information and with the 
rights of Mrs X and Ms Geraghty to receive information in the event of being pregnant.
To determine whether such an interference entails a violation of Article 10, the Court 
must examine whether or not it was justified under Article 10 para. 2 by reason of being 
a restriction “prescribed by law” which was necessary in a democratic society on one or 
other of the grounds specified in Article 10 para. 2.
B. Was the restriction “prescribed by law”?
[…]
2. Court’s examination of the issue
59. This question must be approached by considering not merely the wording of Article 
40.3.3o in isolation but also the protection given under Irish law to the rights of the un-
born in statute law and in case-law (…).
It is true that it is not a criminal offence to have an abortion outside Ireland and that the 
practice of non-directive counselling of pregnant women did not infringe the criminal law 
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as such. Moreover, on its face the language of Article 40.3.3o appears to enjoin only the 
State to protect the right to life of the unborn and suggests that regulatory legislation will 
be introduced at some future stage (…).
60. Taking into consideration the high threshold of protection of the unborn provided 
under Irish law generally and the manner in which the courts have interpreted their 
role as the guarantors of constitutional rights, the possibility that action might be taken 
against the corporate applicants must have been, with appropriate legal advice, reason-
ably foreseeable (See the Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom judgment of 26 April 
1979, Series A no. 30, p. 31, para. 49). This conclusion is reinforced by the legal advice 
that was actually given to Dublin Well Woman that, in the light of Article 40.3.3o, an 
injunction could be sought against its counselling activities (…). 
The restriction was accordingly “prescribed by law”.
C. Did the restriction have aims that were legitimate under Article 10 para. 2?
61. The Government submitted that the relevant provisions of Irish law are intended for 
the protection of the rights of others -in this instance the unborn-, for the protection of 
morals and, where appropriate, for the prevention of crime.
62. The applicants disagreed, contending inter alia that, in view of the use of the term 
“everyone” in Article 10 para. 1 and throughout the Convention, it would be illogical to 
interpret the “rights of others” in Article 10 para. 2 as encompassing the unborn.
63. The Court cannot accept that the restrictions at issue pursued the aim of the pre-
vention of crime since, as noted above (paragraph 59), neither the provision of the infor-
mation in question nor the obtaining of an abortion outside the jurisdiction involved any 
criminal offence. However, it is evident that the protection afforded under Irish law to the 
right to life of the unborn is based on profound moral values concerning the nature of 
life which were reflected in the stance of the majority of the Irish people against abortion 
as expressed in the 1983 referendum (…). The restriction thus pursued the legitimate aim 
of the protection of morals of which the protection in Ireland of the right to life of the 
unborn is one aspect. It is not necessary in the light of this conclusion to decide whether 
the term “others” under Article 10 para. 2 extends to the unborn.
43
D. Was the restriction necessary in a democratic society?
[…]
1. Article 2 
[…]
66. The Court observes at the outset that in the present case it is not called upon to 
examine whether a right to abortion is guaranteed under the Convention or whether the 
foetus is encompassed by the right to life as contained in Article 2. The applicants have 
not claimed that the Convention contains a right to abortion, as such, their complaint 
being limited to that part of the injunction which restricts their freedom to impart and 
receive information concerning abortion abroad (…).
Thus the only issue to be addressed is whether the restrictions on the freedom to impart 
and receive information contained in the relevant part of the injunction are necessary in a 
democratic society for the legitimate aim of the protection of morals as explained above 
(see paragraph 63). (…)
2. Proportionality
[…]
68. The Court cannot agree that the State’s discretion in the field of the protection of 
morals is unfettered and unreviewable (see, mutatis mutandis, for a similar argument, the 
Norris v. Ireland judgment of 26 October 1988, Series A no. 142, p. 20, para. 45).
It acknowledges that the national authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in 
matters of morals, particularly in an area such as the present which touches on matters 
of belief concerning the nature of human life. As the Court has observed before, it is not 
possible to find in the legal and social orders of the Contracting States a uniform Euro-
pean conception of morals, and the State authorities are, in principle, in a better position 
than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of the requirements 
of morals as well as on the “necessity” of a “restriction” or “penalty” intended to meet 
them (see, inter alia, the Handyside v. the United Kingdom judgment of 7 December 
1976, Series A no. 24, p. 22, para. 48, and the Müller and others v. Switzerland judgment 
of 24 May 1988, Series A no. 133, p. 22, para. 35). 
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However this power of appreciation is not unlimited. It is for the Court, in this field also, 
to supervise whether a restriction is compatible with the Convention.
69. As regards the application of the “proportionality” test, the logical consequence of 
the Government’s argument is that measures taken by the national authorities to protect 
the right to life of the unborn or to uphold the constitutional guarantee on the subject 
would be automatically justified under the Convention where infringement of a right of 
a lesser stature was alleged. It is, in principle, open to the national authorities to take 
such action as they consider necessary to respect the rule of law or to give effect to con-
stitutional rights. However, they must do so in a manner which is compatible with their 
obligations under the Convention and subject to review by the Convention institutions. 
To accept the Government’s pleading on this point would amount to an abdication of 
the Court’s responsibility under Article 19 “to ensure the observance of the engagements 
undertaken by the High Contracting Parties ...”.
70. Accordingly, the Court must examine the question of “necessity” in the light of 
the principles developed in its case-law (see, inter alia, the Observer and Guardian v. the 
United Kingdom judgment of 26 November 1991, Series A no. 216, pp. 29-30, para. 
59). It must determine whether there existed a pressing social need for the measures in 
question and, in particular, whether the restriction complained of was “proportionate to 
the legitimate aim pursued” (ibid.).
71. In this context, it is appropriate to recall that freedom of expression is also applicable 
to “information” or “ideas” that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the 
population. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness 
without which there is no “democratic society” (see, inter alia, the above-mentioned 
Handyside judgment, Series A no. 24, p. 23, para. 49).
72. While the relevant restriction, as observed by the Government, is limited to the 
provision of information, it is recalled that it is not a criminal offence under Irish law for a 
pregnant woman to travel abroad in order to have an abortion. Furthermore, the injunc-
tion limited the freedom to receive and impart information with respect to services which 
are lawful in other Convention countries and may be crucial to a woman’s health and 
well-being. Limitations on information concerning activities which, notwithstanding their 
moral implications, have been and continue to be tolerated by national authorities, call 
for careful scrutiny by the Convention institutions as to their conformity with the tenets 
of a democratic society.
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73. The Court is first struck by the absolute nature of the Supreme Court injunction which 
imposed a “perpetual” restraint on the provision of information to pregnant women con-
cerning abortion facilities abroad, regardless of age or state of health or their reasons for 
seeking counselling on the termination of pregnancy. The sweeping nature of this restric-
tion has since been highlighted by the case of The Attorney General v. X and others and by 
the concession made by the Government at the oral hearing that the injunction no longer 
applied to women who, in the circumstances as defined in the Supreme Court’s judgment 
in that case, were now free to have an abortion in Ireland or abroad (…).
74. On that ground alone the restriction appears over broad and disproportionate. 
Moreover, this assessment is confirmed by other factors.
75. In the first place, it is to be noted that the corporate applicants were engaged in the 
counselling of pregnant women in the course of which counsellors neither advocated nor 
encouraged abortion, but confined themselves to an explanation of the available options 
(…). The decision as to whether or not to act on the information so provided was that of 
the woman concerned. There can be little doubt that following such counselling there were 
women who decided against a termination of pregnancy. Accordingly, the link between the 
provision of information and the destruction of unborn life is not as definite as contended. 
Such counselling had in fact been tolerated by the State authorities even after the pass-
ing of the Eighth Amendment in 1983 until the Supreme Court’s judgment in the present 
case. Furthermore, the information that was provided by the relevant applicants concern-
ing abortion facilities abroad was not made available to the public at large.
76. It has not been seriously contested by the Government that information concerning 
abortion facilities abroad can be obtained from other sources in Ireland such as maga-
zines and telephone directories (…) or by persons with contacts in Great Britain. Accord-
ingly, information that the injunction sought to restrict was already available elsewhere 
although in a manner which was not supervised by qualified personnel and thus less 
protective of women’s health. Furthermore, the injunction appears to have been largely 
ineffective in protecting the right to life of the unborn since it did not prevent large num-
bers of Irish women from continuing to obtain abortions in Great Britain (…).
77. In addition, the available evidence, which has not been disputed by the Govern-
ment, suggests that the injunction has created a risk to the health of those women 
who are now seeking abortions at a later stage in their pregnancy, due to lack of proper 
counselling, and who are not availing themselves of customary medical supervision after 
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the abortion has taken place (…). Moreover, the injunction may have had more adverse 
effects on women who were not sufficiently resourceful or had not the necessary level of 
education to have access to alternative sources of information (see paragraph 76 above). 
These are certainly legitimate factors to take into consideration in assessing the propor-
tionality of the restriction.
3. Articles 17 and 60 
78. The Government, invoking Articles 17 and 60  of the Convention, have submitted 
that Article 10 should not be interpreted in such a manner as to limit, destroy or derogate 
from the right to life of the unborn which enjoys special protection under Irish law.
79. Without calling into question under the Convention the regime of protection of 
unborn life that exists under Irish law, the Court recalls that the injunction did not prevent 
Irish women from having abortions abroad and that the information it sought to restrain 
was available from other sources (see paragraph 76 above). Accordingly, it is not the 
interpretation of Article 10 but the position in Ireland as regards the implementation of 
the law that makes possible the continuance of the current level of abortions obtained 
by Irish women abroad.
4. Conclusion
80. In the light of the above, the Court concludes that the restraint imposed on the 
applicants from receiving or imparting information was disproportionate to the aims pur-
sued. Accordingly there has been a breach of Article 10.
[…]
for theSe reaSonS, the court
[…]
3. Holds by fifteen votes to eight that there has been a violation of Article 10 (art. 10);
[…].
European Court  
of Human Rights
Tysiąc v. Poland
Application Nº 5410/03 
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[…]
the factS
i. the circumStanceS of the caSe
[…]
9. The applicant became pregnant in February 2000. She had previously had two chil-
dren, both born by caesarean section. As the applicant was worried about the possible 
impact of the delivery on her health, she decided to consult her doctors. She was ex-
amined by three ophthalmologists (Dr M.S., Dr N. S.-B., Dr K.W.). It transpires from the 
documents submitted by the applicant that Dr M.S. recommended that the applicant 
have frequent health checks and avoid physical exertion. Dr N. S.-B. stated that the ap-
plicant should consider sterilisation after the birth. All of them concluded that, due to 
pathological changes in the applicant’s retina, the pregnancy and delivery constituted a 
risk to her eyesight. However, they refused to issue a certificate for the pregnancy to be 
terminated, despite the applicant’s requests, on the ground that the retina might detach 
itself as a result of pregnancy, but that it was not certain.
10. Subsequently, the applicant sought further medical advice. On 20 April 2000 Dr. 
O. R. G., a general practitioner (GP), issued a certificate stating that the third pregnancy 
constituted a threat to the applicant’s health as there was a risk of rupture of the uterus, 
given her two previous deliveries by caesarean section. She further referred to the ap-
plicant’s short sightedness and to significant pathological changes in her retina. These 
considerations, according to the GP, also required that the applicant should avoid physi-
cal strain which in any case would hardly be possible as at that time the applicant was 
raising two small children on her own. The applicant understood that on the basis of this 
certificate she would be able to terminate her pregnancy lawfully.
11. On 14 April 2000, in the second month of the pregnancy, the applicant’s eyesight 
was examined. It was established that she needed glasses to correct her vision in both 
eyes by 24 dioptres.
12. Subsequently, the applicant contacted a state hospital, the Clinic of Gynaecology and 
Obstetrics in Warsaw, in the area to which she was assigned on the basis of her residence, 
with a view to obtaining the termination of her pregnancy. On 26 April 2000 she had an ap-
pointment with Dr R.D., head of the Gynaecology and Obstetrics Department of the Clinic.
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13. Dr. R.D. examined the applicant visually and for a period of less than five minutes, 
but did not examine her ophthalmological records. Afterwards, he made a note on the 
back of the certificate issued by Dr O.R.G. that neither her short-sightedness nor her two 
previous deliveries by caesarean section constituted grounds for therapeutic termination 
of the pregnancy. He was of the view that, in these circumstances, the applicant should 
give birth by caesarean section. During the applicant’s visit Dr R.D. consulted an endocri-
nologist, Dr B., whispering to her in the presence of the applicant. The endocrinologist 
co-signed the note written by Dr R.D., but did not talk to the applicant.
14. The applicant’s examination was carried out in a room with the door open to the 
corridor, which, in the applicant’s submission, did not provide a comfortable environment 
for a medical examination. At the end of the appointment Dr R.D. told the applicant that 
she could even have eight children if they were delivered by caesarean section.
15. As a result, the applicant’s pregnancy was not terminated. The applicant delivered 
the child by caesarean section in November 2000.
16. After the delivery her eyesight deteriorated badly. On 2 January 2001, approximately 
six weeks after the delivery, she was taken to the Emergency Unit of the Ophthalmologi-
cal Clinic in Warsaw. While doing a test of counting fingers, she was only able to see from 
a distance of three metres with her left eye and five metres with her right eye, whereas 
before the pregnancy she had been able to see objects from a distance of six metres. A 
reabsorbing vascular occlusion was found in her right eye and further degeneration of 
the retinal spot was established in the left eye.
17. According to a medical certificate issued on 14 March 2001 by an ophthalmolo-
gist, the deterioration of the applicant’s eyesight had been caused by recent haemor-
rhages in the retina. As a result, the applicant is currently facing a risk of blindness. Dr 
M.S., the ophthalmologist who examined the applicant, suggested that she should be 
learning the Braille alphabet. She also informed the applicant that, as the changes to 
her retina were at a very advanced stage, there were no prospects of having them cor-
rected by surgical intervention.
18. On 13 September 2001 the disability panel declared the applicant to be signifi-
cantly disabled, while previously she had been recognised as suffering from a disability 
of medium severity. It further held that she needed constant care and assistance in her 
everyday life.
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19. On 29 March 2001 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against Dr R.D., al-
leging that he had prevented her from having her pregnancy terminated on medical 
grounds as recommended by the GP and permissible as one of the exceptions to a gen-
eral ban on abortion. She complained that, following the pregnancy and delivery, she had 
sustained severe bodily harm by way of almost complete loss of her eyesight. She releed 
on Article 156 § 1 of the Criminal Code, which lays down the penalty for the offence of 
causing grievous bodily harm, and also submitted that, under the applicable provisions 
of social-insurance law, she was not entitled to a disability pension as she had not been 
working the requisite number of years before the disability developed because she had 
been raising her children.
[…]
29. In a final decision of 2 August 2002, not subject to a further appeal and numbering 
twenty-three lines, the District Court upheld the decision to discontinue the case. Having 
regard to the medical expert report, the court considered that the refusal to terminate 
the pregnancy had not had a bearing on the deterioration of the applicant’s vision. Fur-
thermore, the court found that the haemorrhage in the applicant’s eyes had in any event 
been likely to occur, given the degree and nature of the applicant’s condition. The court 
did not address the procedural complaint which the applicant had made in her appeal 
against the decision of the district prosecutor.
30. The applicant also attempted to bring disciplinary proceedings against Dr R.D. and 
Dr B. However, those proceedings were finally discontinued on 19 June 2002, the com-
petent authorities of the Chamber of Physicians finding that there had been no profes-
sional negligence.
31. Currently, the applicant can see objects only from a distance of approximately 1.5 
metres and is afraid of going blind. On 11 January 2001 the social welfare centre issued 
a certificate to the effect that the applicant was unable to take care of her children as 
she could not see from a distance of more than 1.5 metres. On 28 May 2001 a medical 
panel gave a decision certifying that she suffered from a significant disability. She is at 
present unemployed and in receipt of a monthly disability pension of PLN 560. She raises 
her three children alone.
[…]
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the Law
II. the meritS of the caSe
[…]
B. Alleged violation of Article 8 of the Convention
67. The applicant complained that the facts of the case had given rise to a breach of 
Article 8 of the Convention. Her right to due respect for her private life and her physical 
and moral integrity had been violated both substantively, by failing to provide her with a 
legal therapeutic abortion, and as regards the State’s positive obligations, by the absence 
of a comprehensive legal framework to guarantee her rights. Article 8 of the Convention 
insofar as relevant, reads as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private life (...).
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of elath or mor-
als, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
[…]
2. The Court’s assessment
 a. The scope of the case
103. The Court notes that in its decision on admissibility of 7 February 2006 it declared 
admissible the applicant’s complaints Articles 3, 8, 13 and 8 read together with Article 14 
of the Convention. Thus, the scope of the case before the Court is limited to the com-
plaints which it has already declared admissible (see, among many authorities, Sokur v. 
Ukraine, no. 29439/02, § 25, 26 April 2005).
104. In this context, the Court observes that the applicable Polish law, the 1993 Act, 
while it prohibits abortion, provides for certain exceptions. In particular, under section 4 
(a) 1 (1) of that Act, abortion is lawful where pregnancy poses a threat to the woman’s 
life or health, certified by two medical certificates, irrespective of the stage reached in 
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pregnancy. Hence, it is not the Court’s task in the present case to examine whether the 
Convention guarantees a right to have an abortion.
 b. Applicability of Article 8 of the Convention
105. The Court first observes that it is not disputed between the parties that Article 8 is 
applicable to the circumstances of the case and that it relates to the applicant’s right to 
respect for her private life.
106. The Court agrees. It first reiterates that legislation regulating the interruption of 
pregnancy touches upon the sphere of private life, since whenever a woman is pregnant 
her private life becomes closely connected with the developing foetus (Eur. Comm. HR, 
Bruggeman and Scheuten v. Germany, cited above [July 12 1977 Report, DR]).
107. The Court also reiterates that “private life” is a broad term, encompassing, inter 
alia, aspects of an individual’s physical and social identity including the right to personal 
autonomy, personal development and to establish and develop relationships with other 
human beings and the outside world (see, among many other authorities, Pretty v. the 
United Kingdom, § 61). Furthermore, while the Convention does not guarantee as such 
a right to any specific level of medical care, the Court has previously held that private life 
includes a person’s physical and psychological integrity and that the State is also under a 
positive obligation to secure to its citizens their right to effective respect for this integrity 
(Glass v. the United Kingdom, no. 61827/00, §§ 74-83, ECHR 2004-II; Sentges v. the 
Netherlands (dec.) no. 27677/02, 8 July 2003; Pentiacova and others v. Moldova (dec.), 
no. 14462/03, ECHR 2005-(...); Nitecki v. Poland (dec.), no. 65653/01, 21 March 2002; 
Odièvre v. France [GC], no. 42326/98, ECHR 2003 III; mutatis mutandis). The Court notes 
that in the case befote it a particular combination of different aspects of private life is 
concerned. While the State regulations on abortion relate to the traditional balancing of 
privacy and the public interest, they must – in case of a therapeutic abortion – be also 
assessed against the positive obligations of the State to secure the physical integrity of 
Mathers to be.
108. The Court finally observes that the applicant submitted that the refusal of an abor-
tion had also amounted to an interference with her rights guaranteed by Article 8. How-
ever, the Court is of the view that the circumstances of the applicant’s case and in par-
ticular the nature of her complaint are more appropriately examined from the standpoint 
of the respondent State’s above-mentioned positive obligations alone.
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 c. General principles
109. The essential object of Article 8 is to protect the individual against arbitrary interfer-
ente by public authorities. Any interference under the first paragraph of Article 8 must 
be justified in terms of the second paragraph, namely as being “in accordance with the 
law” and “necessary in a democratic society” for one or more of the legitimate aims 
listed therein. According to settled case-law, the notion of necessity implies that the in-
terferente corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular that it is proportionate 
to one of the legitimate aims pursued by the authorities (see e.g. Olsson v. Sweden (No. 
1), judgment of 24 March 1988, Series A no 130, § 67).
110. In addition, there may also be positive obligations inherent in an effective “respect” 
for private life. These obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to se-
cure respect for private life even in the sphere of relations between individuals, including 
both the provision of a regulatory framework of adjudicatory and enforcement machin-
ery protecting individuals’ rights and the implementation, where appropriate, of specific 
measures (see, among other authorities, X and Y v. the Netherlands, judgment of 26 
March 1985, Series A no. 91, p. 11, § 23).
111. However, the boundaries between the State’s positive and negative obligations under 
this provision do not lend themselves to precise definition. The applicable principles are 
nonetheless similar. In both the negative and positive contexts regard must be had to the 
fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and 
of the community as a whole; and in both contexts the State enjoys a certain margin of 
appreciation (see, among other authorities, Keegan v. Ireland, judgment of 26 May 1994, 
Series A no. 290, p.19, § 49; Różażski v. Poland, no. 55339/00, § 61, 18 May 2006).
112. The Court observes that the notion of “respect” is not clear cut, especially as far 
as those positive obligations are concerned: having regard to the diversity of the prac-
tices followed and the situations obtaining in the Contracting States, the notion’s re-
quirements will vary considerably from case to case. Nonetheless, for the assessment of 
positive obligations of the State it must be borne in mind that the rule of law, one of 
the fundamental principles of a democratic society, is inherent in all the Articles of the 
Convention (see Iatridis v. Greece [GC], no. 31107/96, § 58, ECHR 1999 II; Carbonara 
and Ventura v. Italy, no. 24638/94, § 63, ECHR 2000-VI; and Capital Bank AD v. Bulgaria, 
no. 49429/99, §133, ECHR 2005...). Compliance with requirements imposed by the rule 
of law presupposes that the rules of domestic law must provide a measure of legal pro-
tection against arbitrary interferences by public authorities with the rights safeguarded 
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by the Convention (see Malone v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 2 August 1984, 
Series A no. 82, p. 32, § 67 and, more recently, Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 
30985/96, § 84, ECHR 2000 XI).
113. Finally, the Court reiterates that in the assessment of the present case it should be 
borne in mind that the Convention is intended to guarantee not rights that are theoreti-
cal or illusory but rights that are practical and effective (see Airey v. Ireland, judgment of 
9 October 1979, Series A no. 32, p. 12-13, § 24). Whilst Article 8 contains no explicit pro-
cedural requirements, it is important for the effective enjoyment of the rights guaranteed 
by this provision that the relevant decision-making process is fair and such as to afford 
due respect to the interests safeguarded by it. What has to be determined is whether, 
having regard to the particular circumstances of the case and notably the nature of the 
decisions to be taken, an individual has been involved in the decision-making process, 
seen as a whole, to a degree sufficient to provide her or him with the requisite protection 
of their interests (see, mutatis mutandis, Hatton and others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 
no. 36022/97, § 99, ECHR 2003-VIII).
 d. Compliance with Article 8 of the Convention
114. When examining the circumstances of the present case, the Court must have regard 
to its general context. It notes that the 1993 Act prohibits abortion in Poland, provid-
ing only for certain exceptions. A doctor who terminates a pregnancy in breach of the 
conditions specified in that Act is guilty of a criminal offence punishable by up to three 
years’ imprisonment (…). According to the Polish Federation for Women and Family Plan-
ning, the fact that abortion was essentially a criminal offence deterred physicians from 
authorising an abortion, in particular in the absence of transparent and clearly defined 
procedures determining whether the legal conditions for a therapeutic abortion were 
met in an individual case.
115. The Court also notes that in its fifth periodical report to the ICCPR, Committee the 
Polish Government acknowledged, inter alia, that there had been deficiencies in the 
manner in which the 1993 Act had been applied in practice (…). This further highlights, 
in the Court’s view, the importance of procedural safeguards regarding access to a thera-
peutic abortion as guaranteed by the 1993 Act.
116. A need for such safeguards becomes all the more relevant in a situation where a 
disagreement arises as to whether the preconditions for a legal abortion are satisfied 
in a given case, either between the pregnant woman and her doctors, or between the 
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doctors themselves. In the Court’s view, in such situations the applicable legal provisions 
must, first and foremost, ensure clarity of the pregnant woman’s legal position. The 
Court further notes that the legal prohibition on abortion, taken together with the risk 
of their incurring criminal responsibility under Article 156 § 1 of the Criminal Code, can 
well have a chilling effect on doctors when deciding whether the requirements of legal 
abortion are met in an individual case. The provisions regulating the availability of lawful 
abortion should be formulated in such a way as to alleviate this effect. Once the legisla-
ture decides to allow abortion, it must not structure its legal framework in a way which 
would limit real possibilities to obtain it.
117. In this connection, the Court reiterates that the concepts of lawfulness and the rule 
of law in a democratic society command that measures affecting fundamental human 
rights be, in certain cases, subject to some form of procedure before an independent 
body competent to review the reasons for the measures and the relevant evidence (see, 
among other authorities, Rotaru v. Romania [GC], no. 28341/95, ECHR 2000 V, §§ 55 
63). In ascertaining whether this condition has been satisfied, a comprehensive view 
must be taken of the applicable procedures (AGOSI v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 
24 October 1986, Series A no. 108, p. 19, § 55; and Jokela v. Finland, no. 28856/95, § 
45, ECHR 2002 IV, mutatis mutandis). In circumstances such as those in issue in the in-
stant case such a procedure should guarantee to a pregnant woman at least a possibility 
to be heard in person and to have her views considered. The competent body should also 
issue written grounds for its decision.
118. In this connection the Court observes that the very nature of the issues involved in 
decisions to terminate a pregnancy is such that the time factor is of critical importance. 
The procedures in place should therefore ensure that such decisions are timely so as to 
limit or prevent damage to a woman’s health which might be occasioned by a late abor-
tion. Procedures in which decisions concerning the availability of lawful abortion are 
reviewed post factum cannot fulfil such a function. In the Court’s view, the absence of 
such preventive procedures in the domestic law can be said to amount to the failure of 
the State to comply with its positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention.
119. Against this general background the Court observes that it is not in dispute that 
the applicant suffered from severe myopia from 1977. Even before her pregnancy she 
had been officially certified as suffering from a disability of medium severity (…). Having 
regard to her condition, during her third pregnancy the applicant sought medical advice. 
The Court observes that a disagreement arose between her doctors as to how the preg-
nancy and delivery might affect her already fragile vision. The advice given by the two 
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ophthalmologists was inconclusive as to the possible impact of the pregnancy on the 
applicant’s condition. The Court also notes that the GP issued a certificate that her preg-
nancy constituted a threat to her health, while a gynaecologist was of a contrary view. 
The Court stresses that it is not its function to question the doctors’ clinical judg Gender-
based Violence ment as regards the seriousness of the applicant’s condition (Glass v. 
the United Kingdom, no 61827/00, § 87, ECHR 2004 II, mutatis mutandis). Nor would 
it be appropriate to speculate, on the basis of the medical information submitted to it, 
on whether their conclusions as to whether her pregnancy could or could not lead to a 
deterioration of her eyesight in the future were correct. It is sufficient to note that the 
applicant feared that the pregnancy and delivery might further endanger her eyesight. In 
the light of the medical advice she obtained during the pregnancy and, significantly, the 
applicant’s condition at that time, taken together with her medical history, the Court is of 
the view that her fears cannot be said to have been irrational.
120. The Court has examined how the legal framework regulating the availability of a 
therapeutic abortion in Polish law was applied to the applicant’s case and how it ad-
dressed her concerns about the possible negative impact of pregnancy and delivery on 
her health.
121. The Court notes that the Government referred to the Ordinance of the Minister of 
Health of 22 January 1997 (…). However, the Court observes that this Ordinance only 
stipulated the professional qualifications of doctors who could perform a legal abortion.
It also made it necessary for a woman seeking an abortion on health grounds to obtain a 
certificate from a physician “specialising in the field of medicine relevant to [her] condition”.
The Court notes that the Ordinance provides for a relatively simple procedure for ob-
taining a lawful abortion based on medical considerations: two concurring opinions of 
specialists other than the doctor who would perform an abortion are sufficient. Such a 
procedure allows for taking relevant measures promptly and does not differ substantially 
from solutions adopted in certain other member States. However, the Ordinance does 
not distinguish between situations in which there is a full agreement between the preg-
nant woman and the doctors - where such a procedure is clearly practicable - and cases 
where a disagreement arises between the pregnant woman and her doctors, or between 
the doctors themselves. The Ordinance does not provide for any particular procedural 
framework to address and resolve such controversies. It only obliges a woman to obtain 
a certificate from a specialist, without specifying any steps that she could take if her 
opinion and that of the specialist diverged.
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122. It is further noted that the Government referred also to Article 37 of the 1996 Medi-
cal Profession Act (…). This provision makes it possible for a doctor, in the event of any 
diagnostic or therapeutic doubts, or upon a patient’s request, to obtain a second opinión 
of a colleague. However, the Court notes that this provision is addressed to members 
of the medical profession. It only specifies the conditions in which they could obtain a 
second opinion of a colleague on a diagnosis or on the treatment to be followed in an 
individual case. The Court emphasises that this provision does not create any procedural 
guarantee for a patient to obtain such an opinion or to contest it in the event of a dis-
agreement. Nor does it specifically address the situation of a pregnant woman seeking a 
lawful abortion.
123. In this connection, the Court notes that in certain State Parties various procedural 
and institutional mechanisms have been put in place in connection with the implementa-
tion of legislation specifying the conditions governing access to a lawful abortion (…).
124. The Court concludes that it has not been demonstrated that Polish law as applied to 
the applicant’s case contained any effective mechanisms capable of determining whether 
the conditions for obtaining a lawful abortion had been met in her case. It created for the 
applicant a situation of prolonged uncertainty. As a result, the applicant suffered severe 
distress and anguish when contemplating the possible negative consequences of her 
pregnancy and upcoming delivery for her health.
125. The Court is further of the opinion that the provisions of the civil law on tort as ap-
plied by the Polish courts did not afford the applicant a procedural instrument by which 
she could have vindicated her right to respect for her private life. The civil law remedy was 
solely of a retroactive and compensatory character. It could only, and if the applicant had 
been successful, have resulted in the courts granting damages to cover the irreparable 
damage to her health which had come to light after the delivery.
126. The Court further notes that the applicant requested that criminal proceedings 
against Dr R.D. be instituted, alleging that he had exposed her to grievous bodily harm 
by his refusal to terminate her pregnancy. The Court first observes that for the purposes 
of criminal responsibility it was necessary to establish a direct causal link between the acts 
complained of – in the present case, the refusal of an abortion – and the serious dete-
rioration of the applicant’s health. Consequently, the examination of whether there was 
a causal link between the refusal of leave to have an abortion and the subsequent dete-
rioration of the applicant’s eyesight did not concern the question whether the pregnancy 
had constituted a “threat” to her health within the meaning of section 4 of the 1993 
Tysiąc v. P
oland
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Act. Crucially, the examination of the circumstances of the case in the context of criminal 
investigations could not have prevented the damage to the applicant’s health from aris-
ing. The same applies to disciplinary proceedings before the organs of the Chamber of 
Physicians.
127. The Court finds that such retrospective measures alone are not sufficient to provide 
appropriate protection for the physical integrity of individuals in such a vulnerable posi-
tion as the applicant (Storck v. Germany, no. 61603/00, § 150, ECHR 2005...).
128. Having regard to the circumstances of the case as a whole, it cannot therefore be 
said that, by putting in place legal remedies which make it possible to establish liability on 
the part of medical staff, the Polish State complied with the positive obligations to safe-
guard the applicant’s right to respect for her private life in the context of a controversy as 
to whether she was entitled to a therapeutic abortion.
129. The Court therefore dismisses the Government’s preliminary objection and con-
cluyes that the authorities failed to comply with their positive obligations to secure to the 
applicant the effective respect for her private life.
130. The Court concludes that there has been a breach of Article 8 the Convention.
[…]
for theSe reaSonS, the court
[…]
3. Holds by six votes to one that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Conven-
tion in that the State failed to comply with its positive obligations to secure to the ap-
plicant the effective respect for her private life;
[…]
European Court 
of Human Rights
Evans v. The United Kingdom
Application Nº 6339/05
Judgment of 
April 10, 2007
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[…]
procedure
1. The case originated in an application (no. 6339/05) against the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) 
by a British national, Ms Natallie Evans (“the applicant”), on 11 February 2005.
[…]
the factS
the circunStanceS of the caSe
[…]
A. The IVF Treatment
13. On 12 July 2000 the applicant and her partner, J (born in November 1976), com-
menced treatment at the Bath Assisted Conception Clinic (“the clinic”). The applicant 
had been referred for treatment at the clinic five years earlier, when she was married, but 
had not pursued it because of the breakdown of her marriage.
14. On 10 October 2000 the applicant and J were informed, during an appointment at 
the clinic, that preliminary tests had revealed that the applicant had serious pre-cancer-
ous tumours in both ovaries, and that her ovaries would have to be removed. They were 
told that because the tumours were growing slowly, it would be possible first to extract 
some eggs for in vitro fertilisation (“IVF”), but that this would have to be done quickly.
15. The consultation of 10 October 2000 lasted approximately an hour in total. A nurse 
explained that the applicant and J would each have to sign a form consenting to the IVF 
treatment and that, in accordance with the provisions of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990 (“the 1990 Act”), it would be possible for either to withdraw his 
or her consent at any time before the embryos were implanted in the applicant’s uterus 
(see paragraph 37 below). The applicant asked the nurse whether it would be possible 
to freeze her unfertilised eggs, but was informed that this procedure, which had a much 
lower chance of success, was not performed at the clinic. At that point J reassured the 
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applicant that they were not going to split up, that she did not need to consider the 
freezing of her eggs, that she should not be negative and that he wanted to be the father 
of her child.
16. Thereafter, the couple entered into the necessary consents, by signing the forms 
required by the 1990 Act (…).
Immediately beneath the title to the form appeared the following words:
“NB – do not sign this form unless you have received information about these mat-
ters and have been offered counselling. You may vary the terms of this consent at 
any time except in relation to sperm or embryos which have already been used. 
Please insert numbers or tick boxes as appropriate.”
J ticked the boxes which recorded his consent to use his sperm to fertilise the applicant’s 
eggs in vitro and the use of the embryos thus created for the treatment of himself and the 
applicant together. He further ticked the box headed “Storage”, opting for the storage of 
embryos developed in vitro from his sperm for the maximum period of 10 years and also 
opted for sperm and embryos to continue in storage should he die or become mentally in-
capacitated within that period. The applicant signed a form which, while referring to eggs 
rather than sperm, essentially replicated that signed by J. Like J, she ticked the boxes provid-
ing for the treatment of herself and for the treatment “of myself with a named partner.”
17. On 12 November 2001 the couple attended the clinic and eleven eggs were har-
vested and fertilised. Six embryos were created and consigned to storage. On 26 Novem-
ber the applicant underwent an operation to remove her ovaries. She was told that she 
should wait two years before attempting to implant any of the embryos in her uterus.
B. The High Court proceedings
18. In May 2002 the relationship broke down. The future of the embryos was discussed 
between the parties. On 4 July 2002 J wrote to the clinic to notify it of the separation and 
to state that the embryos should be destroyed.
19. The clinic notified the applicant of J’s lack of consent to further use of the embryos 
and informing her that it was now under a legal obligation to destroy them, pursuant to 
paragraph 8(2) of Schedule 3 to the 1990 Act (…)
[…]
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the Law
[…]
ii. aLLeged vioLation of articLe 8 of the convention*
[…]
B. The Court’s assessment
1. The nature of the rights at issue under Article 8
71. It is not disputed between the parties that Article 8 is applicable and that the case 
concerns the applicant’s right to respect for her private life. The Grand Chamber agrees 
with the Chamber that “private life”, which is a broad term encompassing, inter alia, 
aspects of an individual’s physical and social identity including the right to personal au-
tonomy, personal development and to establish and develop relationships with other hu-
man beings and the outside world (see Pretty, cited above, § 61), incorporates the right 
to respect for both the decisions to become and not to become a parent.
72. It must be noted, however, that the applicant does not complain that she is in any 
way prevented from becoming a mother in a social, legal, or even physical sense, since 
there is no rule of domestic law or practice to stop her from adopting a child or even 
giving birth to a child originally created in vitro from donated gametes. The applicant’s 
complaint is, more precisely, that the consent provisions of the 1990 Act prevent her 
from using the embryos she and J created together, and thus, given her particular circum-
stances, from ever having a child to whom she is genetically related. The Grand Chamber 
considers that this more limited issue, concerning the right to respect for the decision to 
become a parent in the genetic sense, also falls within the scope of Article 8.
* ed. Article 8 establishes:
 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in 
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection 
of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
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73. The dilemma central to the present case is that it involves a conflict between the 
Article 8 rights of two private individuals: the applicant and J. Moreover, each person’s 
interest is entirely irreconcilable with the other’s, since if the applicant is permitted to use 
the embryos, J will be forced to become a father, whereas if J’s refusal or withdrawal of 
consent is upheld, the applicant will be denied the opportunity of becoming a genetic 
parent. In the difficult circumstances of this case, whatever solution the national authori-
ties might adopt would result in the interests of one or the other parties to the IVF treat-
ment being wholly frustrated (cf. Odièvre, cited above, § 44).
[…]
2. Whether the case involves a positive obligation or an interference
75. Although the object of Article 8 is essentially that of protecting the individual against 
arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it does not merely compel the State to ab-
stain from such interference: in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may 
be positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for private life. These obligations 
may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in 
the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves. The boundaries between 
the State’s positive and negative obligations under Article 8 do not lend themselves to 
precise definition. The applicable principles are nonetheless similar. In particular, in both 
instances regard must be had to the fair balance which has to be struck between the 
competing interests; and in both contexts the State enjoys a certain margin of apprecia-
tion (Odièvre, cited above, § 40).
76. In the domestic proceedings, the parties and the judges treated the issue as one in-
volving an interference by the State with the applicant’s right to respect for her private life, 
because the relevant provisions of the 1990 Act prevented the clinic from treating her once 
J had informed it that he did not consent. The Grand Chamber, however, like the Chamber, 
considers that it is more appropriate to analyse the case as one concerning positive obliga-
tions, the principal issue, as in the Odièvre case cited above, being whether the legislative 
provisions as applied in the present case struck a fair balance between the competing public 
and private interests involved. In this regard, the Grand Chamber accepts the findings of the 
domestic courts that J had never consented to the applicant using the jointly created embry-
os alone - his consent being limited to undergoing “treatment together” with the applicant 
(…). The Court does not find it of importance to the determination of the Convention issue, 
whether in these circumstances J is to be regarded as having “refused” rather than “with-
drawn” his consent to the implantation of the embryos, as the Government argue (…).
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3. The margin of appreciation
77. A number of factors must be taken into account when determining the breadth 
of the margin of appreciation to be enjoyed by the State in any case under Article 8. 
Where a particularly important facet of an individual’s existence or identity is at stake, 
the margin allowed to the State will be restricted (see, for example, X. and Y. v. the 
Netherlands, judgment of 26 March 1985, Series A no. 91, §§ 24 and 27; Dudgeon v. 
the United Kingdom, judgment of 22 October 1981, Series A no. 45; Christine Good-
win v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 28957/95, § 90, ECHR 2002-VI; cf. Pretty, cited 
above, § 71). Where, however, there is no consensus within the Member States of the 
Council of Europe, either as to the relative importance of the interest at stake or as to 
the best means of protecting it, particularly where the case raises sensitive moral or 
ethical issues, the margin will be wider (X., Y. and Z. v. the United Kingdom, judgment 
of 22 April 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-II, § 44; Frette v. France, 
no. 36515/97, § 41, ECHR 2002-I; Christine Goodwin, cited above, § 85; see also, mu-
tatis mutandis, Vo, cited above, § 82). There will also usually be a wide margin if the 
State is required to strike a balance between competing private and public interests or 
Convention rights (see Odièvre, §§ 44-49 and Frette § 42).
[…]
79. In addition, while the Court is mindful of the applicant’s submission to treat the 
comparative law data with caution, it is at least clear, and the applicant does not 
contend otherwise, that there is no uniform European approach in this field. Certain 
States have enacted primary or secondary legislation to control the use of IVF treat-
ment, whereas in others this is a matter left to medical practice and guidelines. While 
the United Kingdom is not alone in permitting storage of embryos and in providing 
both gamete providers with the power freely and effectively to withdraw consent up 
until the moment of implantation, different rules and practices are applied elsewhere 
in Europe. It cannot be said that there is any consensus as to the stage in IVF treatment 
when the gamete providers’ consent becomes irrevocable (…).
80. While the applicant contends that her greater physical and emotional expenditure 
during the IVF process, and her subsequent infertility, entail that her Article 8 rights 
should take precedence over J’s, it does not appear to the Court that there is any clear 
consensus on this point either. The Court of Appeal commented on the difficulty of 
comparing the effect on J of being forced to become the father of the applicant’s child 
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and that on the applicant of being denied the chance to have genetically-related off-
spring (see paragraphs 25-26 above), and this difficulty is also reflected in the range of 
views expressed by the two panels of the Israeli Supreme Court in Nachmani and in the 
United States case-law (…).
81. In conclusion, therefore, since the use of IVF treatment gives rise to sensitive moral 
and ethical issues against a background of fast-moving medical and scientific develop-
ments, and since the questions raised by the case touch on areas where there is no 
clear common ground amongst the Member States, the Court considers that the mar-
gin of appreciation to be afforded to the respondent State must be a wide one (…).
82. The Grand Chamber, like the Chamber, considers that the above margin must 
in principle extend both to the State’s decision whether or not to enact legislation 
governing the use of IVF treatment and, once having intervened, to the detailed rules 
it lays down in order to achieve a balance between the competing public and private 
interests.
4. Compliance with Article 8
84. The fact that it is now technically possible to keep human embryos in frozen stor-
age gives rise to an essential difference between IVF and fertilisation through sexual 
intercourse, namely the possibility of allowing a lapse of time, which may be substan-
tial, to intervene between creation of the embryo and its implantation in the uterus. 
The Court considers that it is legitimate – and indeed desirable - for a State to set up a 
legal scheme which takes this possibility of delay into account. In the United Kingdom, 
the solution adopted in the 1990 Act was to permit storage of embryos for a maximum 
of five years. In 1996 this period was extended by secondary legislation to ten or more 
years where one of the gamete providers or the prospective mother is, or is likely to 
become, prematurely infertile, although storage can never continue after the woman 
being treated reaches the age of 55 (…).
85. These provisions are complemented by a requirement on the clinic providing the 
treatment to obtain a prior written consent from each gamete provider, specifying, 
inter alia, the type of treatment for which the embryo is to be used (Schedule 3, para-
graph 2(1) to the 1990 Act), the maximum period of storage, and what is to be done 
with it in the event of the gamete provider’s death or incapacity (Schedule 3, paragraph 
2(2)). Moreover, paragraph 4 of Schedule 3 provides that “the terms of any consent un-
66
H
ea
lth
 an
d 
Re
pr
od
uc
tiv
e R
ig
ht
s
der this Schedule may from time to time be varied, and the consent may be withdrawn, 
by notice given by the person who gave the consent to the person keeping the gametes 
or embryo ...” up until the point that the embryo has been “used” (that is, implanted 
in the uterus; see paragraph 37 above). Other States, with different religious, social and 
political cultures, have adopted different solutions to the technical possibility of delay 
between fertilisation and implantation (…). For the reasons set out above (paragraphs 
77-82), the decision as to the principles and policies to be applied in this sensitive field 
must primarily be for each State to determine.
[…]
88. That Schedule places a legal obligation on any clinic carrying out IVF treatment to 
explain the consent provisions to a person embarking on such treatment and to obtain 
his or her consent in writing (…). It is undisputed that this occurred in the present 
case, and that the applicant and J both signed the consent forms required by the law. 
While the pressing nature of the applicant’s medical condition required her to make a 
decision quickly and under extreme stress, she knew, when consenting to have all her 
eggs fertilised with J’s sperm, that these would be the last eggs available to her, that 
it would be some time before her cancer treatment was completed and any embryos 
could be implanted, and that, as a matter of law, J would be free to withdraw consent 
to implantation at any moment.
89. While the applicant criticised the national rules on consent for the fact that 
they could not be disapplied in any circumstances, the Court does not find that the 
absolute nature of the law is, in itself, necessarily inconsistent with Article 8 (see 
also the Pretty and Odièvre cases cited in paragraph 60 above). Respect for human 
dignity and free will, as well as a desire to ensure a fair balance between the parties 
to IVF treatment, underlay the legislature’s decision to enact provisions permitting of 
no exception to ensure that every person donating gametes for the purpose of IVF 
treatment would know in advance that no use could be made of his or her genetic 
material without his or her continuing consent. In addition to the principle at stake, 
the absolute nature of the rule served to promote legal certainty and to avoid the 
problems of arbitrariness and inconsistency inherent in weighing, on a case by case 
basis, what the Court of Appeal described as “entirely incommensurable” interests 
(…). In the Court’s view, these general interests pursued by the legislation are legiti-
mate and consistent with Article 8.
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90. As regards the balance struck between the conflicting Article 8 rights of the par-
ties to the IVF treatment, the Grand Chamber, in common with every other court which 
has examined this case, has great sympathy for the applicant, who clearly desires a ge-
netically related child above all else. However, given the above considerations, includ-
ing the lack of any European consensus on this point (see paragraph 79 above), it does 
not consider that the applicant’s right to respect for the decision to become a parent 
in the genetic sense should be accorded greater weight than J’s right to respect for his 
decision not to have a genetically-related child with her.
91. The Court accepts that it would have been possible for Parliament to regulate the 
situation differently. However, as the Chamber observed, the central question under 
Article 8 is not whether different rules might have been adopted by the legislature, but 
whether, in striking the balance at the point at which it did, Parliament exceeded the 
margin of appreciation afforded to it under that Article.
92. The Grand Chamber considers that, given the lack of European consensus on this 
point, the fact that the domestic rules were clear and brought to the attention of the 
applicant and that they struck a fair balance between the competing interests, there 
has been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention.
[…]
for theSe reaSonS, the court
[…]
2. Holds, by thirteen votes to four, that there has been no violation of Article 8 of the 
Convention;
[…]
Joint diSSenting opinion of JudgeS türmen, tSatSa-
nikoLovSka, SpieLmann and ziemeLe
[…]
5. We are unable to subscribe to the Court’s decision that it is more appropriate to 
analyse the case as one concerning positive obligations.
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6. We see the case as one of interference with the applicant’s right to respect for the 
decision to become a genetically related parent. We can accept that the interference was 
prescribed by law and had a legitimate aim in terms of the protection of public order and 
morals and the rights of others. But was this interference necessary and proportionate 
in the special circumstances of the case? We consider that the applicant’s right to decide 
to become a genetically related parent weighs heavier than that of J’s decision not to 
become a parent in the present case. Our reasons are as follows:
i) The 1990 Act does not provide for the possibility of taking into consideration 
the very special medical condition affecting the applicant. We can agree with the 
majority that, in particular where an issue is of a morally and ethically delicate 
nature, a bright line rule may best serve the various – often conflicting – interests 
at stake. It has been said that “the advantage of a clear law is that it provides 
certainty.” But it has also been admitted that “its disadvantage is that if it is too 
clear – categorical – it provides too much certainty and no flexibility1”. Therefore, 
given the particular circumstances of the case, the main problem lies in the abso-
lute nature of the “bright line rule”.
(…)
7. Therefore, in our view the application of the 1990 Act in the applicant’s circum-
stances is disproportionate. Because of its absolute nature, the legislation precludes the 
balancing of competing interests in this particular case. In fact, even though the majori-
ty accepts that a balance has to be struck between the conflicting Article 8 rights of the 
parties to the IVF treatment (paragraph 90), no balance is possible in the circumstances 
of the present case since the decision upholding J’s choice not to become a parent 
involves an absolute and final elimination of the applicant’s decision. Rendering empty 
or meaningless a decision of one of the two parties cannot be considered as balancing 
the interests. It is to be noted that the case is not about the possibility of adopting a 
child or hosting a donated embryo (see paragraph 72). Incidentally, J will still be able 
to take a decision to become a parent of his own child, whereas the applicant has had 
her last chance.
8. The applicant underwent surgery to remove her ovaries (26 November 2001). 
Therefore, the eggs that were extracted from her for IVF treatment were her last 
1 See M.-B. Dembour, Who Believes in Human Rights? Reflections on the European Convention, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 93..
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chance to have a genetically related child. J not only knew this fact very well, but also 
gave her an assurance that he wanted to be the father of her child. Without such an 
assurance, the applicant could have tried to seek other ways to have a child of her own. 
In paragraph 90 of the judgment, where the majority tries to strike a balance between 
the rights and interests of the applicant and of J, no weight is given to this “assurance” 
element, that is, to the fact that the applicant acted in good faith, relying on the assur-
ance given to her by J. The decisive date was 12 November 2001: the date when the 
eggs were fertilized and six embryos created. From that moment on, J was no longer in 
control of his sperm. An embryo is a joint product of two people, which, when planted 
into the uterus, will turn into a baby. The act of destroying an embryo also involves 
destroying the applicant’s eggs. In this sense too, the British legislation has failed to 
strike the right balance.
9. The particular circumstances of the case lead us to believe that the applicant’s inter-
ests weigh more heavily than J’s interests and that the United Kingdom authorities’ failure 
to take this into account constitutes a violation of Article 8.
10. Once again, we would like to emphasize that we agree with the majority that the 
1990 Act per se is not contrary to Article 8 and that the consent rule is important for IVF 
treatment. We agree that, looking at the relevant legislation of the other States, different 
approaches emerge and that the Court is justified in saying that there is no European 
consensus on the details of regulation of IVF treatment. As we have said, however, we 
see the instant case differently since its circumstances make us look beyond the mere 
question of consent in a contractual sense. The values involved and issues at stake as far 
the applicant’s situation is concerned weigh heavily against the formal contractual ap-
proach taken in this case.
[…]
12. A sensitive case like this cannot be decided on a simplistic, mechanical basis, name-
ly, that there is no consensus in Europe, therefore the Government have a wide margin 
of appreciation (…).
Certainly, States have a wide margin of appreciation when it comes to enacting legisla-
tion governing the use of IVF. However, that margin of appreciation should not prevent 
the Court from exercising its control, in particular in relation to the question whether a 
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fair balance between all competing interests has been struck at the domestic level 2. The 
Court should not use the margin of appreciation principle as a merely pragmatic substi-
tute for a thought-out approach to the problem of proper scope of review3.
[…]
2 We would like to point out that in the recent judgment of Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers & 
Firemen (ASLEF) v. the United Kingdom, no. 11002/05, § 46, 27 February 2007, the Court restated the role 
of this margin clearly: “Finally, in striking a fair balance between the competing interests, the State enjoys a 
certain margin of appreciation in determining the steps to be taken to ensure compliance with the Conven-
tion (amongst many authorities, Hatton and others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 36022/97, § 98, ECHR 
2003-VIII). However, since this is not an area of general policy, on which opinions within a democratic soci-
ety may reasonably differ widely and in which the role of the domestic policy-maker should be given special 
weight (see e.g. James and others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A no. 98, 
p. 32, § 46, where the Court found it natural that the margin of appreciation “available to the legislature 
in implementing social and economic policies should be a wide one”), the margin of appreciation will play 
only a limited role.” 
 The approach adopted in ASLEF takes into account the views of national parliaments to a “healthy” extent 
(in giving it special weight) when it comes to setting out a general policy to be contrasted with decisions on 
the basic rights of individuals (in the context of their individual applications) which, according to the above, 
would require a limited role for the margin of appreciation. In the Evans case the majority grants a wide 
margin of appreciation, relying heavily on general policy issues, and extends this wide margin of apprecia-
tion to the detailed rules the State lays down in order to achieve a balance between the competing public 
and private interests (see paragraphs 81-82 of the judgment and paragraph 4 in fine of our joint dissenting 
opinion). Just like most cases before this Court, the Evans case is not a case about general policy only; it is 
a case about important individual interests. In our view, the majority has placed excessive weight on such 
general policy issues forming merely the background to this case (see section 3 (The margin of apprecia-
tion), in particular paragraph 81) and has not undertaken a sufficient ad hoc balancing exercise in section 4 
(Compliance with Article 8, paragraphs 83-92).
3  R. St. J. Macdonald, “The Margin of Appreciation”, in The European System for the Protection of Human 
Rights, (R. St. J. Macdonald et al. [eds.], 1993), 83, at pp. 84 and 124, quoted by E. Brems, “The Margin 
of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights”, Zeitschrift für auslän-
disches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 1996, at p. 313. See also the critical appraisal of the “margin of 
appreciation” theory by M. R. Hutchinson, “The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the European Court of 
Human Rights”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1996, 638-50. 
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4 Thlimmenos v. Greece [GC], no. 34369/97, ECHR 2000-IV.
5 C. Packer, “Defining and Delineating the Right to Reproductive Choice”, Nordic Journal of International 
Law, 1998, pp. 77–95, at p. 95.
14. Concerning Article 14 of the Convention we would like to say the following:
It could be that for the purposes of Article 14 the closest comparator is an infertile man, 
which was the example given by the trial judge, Wall J (paragraph 23). However, even 
this comparison does not illustrate the whole complexity of the instant case. It is recog-
nised by those international institutions with a specific mandate to focus on the rights 
of women that it is justified and necessary to address “the health rights of women from 
the perspective of women’s needs and interests in view of distinctive features and factors 
which differ for women in comparison to men, such as: (a) biological factors ..., such as 
their ... reproductive function ... (CEDAW General Recommendation No. 24 (20th ses-
sion, 1999))”. A woman is in a different situation as concerns the birth of a child, includ-
ing where the legislation allows for artificial fertilisation methods. We believe therefore 
that the proper approach in the instant case was that adopted under Article 14 in the 
case Thlimmenos v Greece, recognising that different situations require different treat-
ment4. We see the circumstances of the applicant in this light not least because of the 
excessive physical and emotional burden and effects5 caused by her condition, and it is on 
this basis that we voted for a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8.
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[…]
procedure
1. The case originated in an application (no. 31276/05) against the Republic of Portugal 
by which a foundation under Dutch law, Women on Waves, and two associations under 
Portuguese law, Clube Safo and Não te Prives, Grupo de Defesa dos Direitos Sexuais (“ the 
applicants”), seized the Court on August 18, 2005 by virtue of article 34 of the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”).
[…]
3. The applicants alleged, especially, that the prohibition of entry in the Portuguese 
territorial waters pronounced against the ship chartered by the first applicant breached 
their liberty of association and of expression. 
the factS
i. the circumStanceS of the caSe
[…]
7. The three applicant associations have as a goal, amongst others, the promotion of 
the debate on reproductive rights. In this context, the second and third applicants invited 
the first applicant to Portugal to advocate in favor of the decriminalization of the voluntary 
interruption of pregnancy in that country. To this effect, the first applicant chartered a ship, 
the Borndiep, which left Amsterdan with destination to the Portuguese port of Figueira da 
Foz. Once arrived, the applicants’ goal was to organize, on board the Borndiep, meetings, 
seminars and practical workshops on the prevention of sexually transmissible diseases, fam-
ily planning and the decriminalization of the voluntary interruption of pregnancy.
8. On August 27, 2004, while the Borndiep was approaching the Portuguese territorial 
waters, the Secretary of State to the Sea delivered a ministerial decree prohibiting the 
entry of the ship into the territorial waters (…)
9. This decision was immediately communicated to the captain of the Borndiep by fax. 
On the same day, a warship of the Portuguese marine positioned itself near the Borndiep 
to prevent it from entering the Portuguese territorial waters.
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10.  On September 1st 2004, the three applicants – along with a certain number of 
physical persons – placed before the administrative tribunal of Coimbra, a claim (intima-
ção) aimed at the protection of their fundamental rights. (…) The applicants saw in the 
said prohibition a breach of their rights to freedom of expression, assembly and demon-
stration, as well as a violation of the principle of communitarian law of free movement of 
persons.
11. By a decision of the 6th of September 2004, the administrative tribunal rejected the 
request.
[…]
the Law
i. on the aLLeged vioLation of articLeS 10 and 11 of the 
convention
20. The applicants allege that the prohibition of entry of the Borndiep in the Portuguese 
territorial waters breaches articles 10 and 11 of the Convention, worded as follows:
Article 10
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom 
to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interfer-
ence by public authority  (…)
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, 
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are pre-
scribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society(…) for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals (…)
Article 11
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of as-
sociation with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the 
protection of his interests.
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as 
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society (…) for the preven-
tion of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals  (…)”
[…]
76
H
ea
lth
 an
d 
Re
pr
od
uc
tiv
e R
ig
ht
s
B. On the merits
2. The Court’s Assessment
 a) On the applicable article in this case
28. The Court immediately notes that in this particular case, the question of freedom of 
expression is difficultly separable from that of freedom of assembly. Moreover, the parties 
submitted arguments under the angle of both articles. Indeed, the protection of personal 
opinions, guaranteed by article 10, counts within the objectives of freedom of peaceful 
assembly as enshrined by article 11 of the Convention (Ezelin v. France, judgment of 26 
April 1991, , §37, series A nº 202). Taking into account the particular circumstances of 
the case, and notably the fact that the applicants’ grievances pertain mostly to the denial 
of the right to inform the public on their position with regard to the voluntary interrup-
tion of pregnancy and women’s rights in general, the Court considers more appropriate 
to examine the litigious situation under the angle of article 10 only.
 b) On the observance of article 10 of the Convention 
29. The Court immediately reminds the crucial importance of freedom of expression, 
which constitutes one of the prerequisites to the good functioning of democracy. It is 
also valuable and is particularly precious with regard to the communication of “ideas” or 
“information” which offend, shock or disturb the State or any fraction of the population. 
Such is required by pluralism, tolerance and the open-mindedness without which there is 
no “democratic society” (Open Door y Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, 29 March 1992, § 
71, series A nº 246-A).
30. The Court considers in the first place that there has been an interference with the 
applicants’ rights under the Convention. Indeed, the prohibition of entry of the ship in 
the Portuguese territorial waters prevented the concerned ones to transmit information 
and hold the planned meetings and demonstrations – which were supposed to be held 
on board – in the way that they considered the most efficient. It is noteworthy to recall to 
this effect that article 10 equally protects the mode of diffusion of the ideas and opinions 
in question (Thoma v. Luxemburg, nº 38432/97, § 45, CEDH 2001-III).
31. It remains to be determined if such an interference was “in accordance with the 
law”, inspired by one or many legitimate aims in the eyes of paragraph 2 of the articles 
in question and “necessary in a democratic society”.
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1. “In accordance with the law”
32. It is no controversy between the parties that the interference in this case was in 
accordance with the law, that is to say with article 19 – notably subparagraph g) of its 
paragraph 2 – and article 25 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
2. Legitimate aims
[…]
The Court accepts that the litigious interference was aimed towards the legitimate aims 
of the prevention of order and the protection of health, as invoked both by the Secretary 
of State to the Sea and by the administrative jurisdictions.
3. “Necessary in a democratic society”
[…]
39. In this respect, the Court recognizes in the first place that the applicants were not 
able to communicate their ideas and information in the way that the considered most 
adequate, by reason of the prohibition of entry of the Borndiep in the Portuguese territo-
rial sea. […]
The Court considers however that in certain situations, the method of diffusion of in-
formation and ideas that one wishes to communicate takes on such an importance that 
restrictions like the ones that were imposed in this case can affect in an essential way 
the substance of the ideas and information concerned. Such is notably the case when 
the concerned parties intend to carry out symbolic protest activities towards a legislation 
that they consider unjust or detrimental to the fundamental rights and freedoms. In this 
instance, not only was the content of the ideas defended by the applicants in question 
but also the fact that the activities chosen to communicate such ideas – like seminars and 
practical workshops for the prevention of sexually transmissible diseases, family planning 
and decriminalization of the voluntary interruption of pregnancy – would be held on 
board the ship in question, which took on a crucial importance for the applicants and 
corresponded to an activity carried out since a certain time by the first applicant in other 
European States.
[…]
W
omen on W
aves and others v. Portugal
78
H
ea
lth
 an
d 
Re
pr
od
uc
tiv
e R
ig
ht
s
41. Insofar as the Government alleged that the entry of the ship in question in the 
Portuguese territorial waters could have resulted in a infringement of the Portuguese 
legislation of the time on abortion, the Court does not in the facts of the case detect suf-
ficiently serious signs which would permit to think that the applicants had the intention 
of deliberately violating such legislation.
[…]
In any case, the Court observes that the Portuguese authorities had, on this particular 
point, other means which would have breached the applicants’ rights less than a total 
prohibition of entry against the ship: they could have, for example, seized the medicines 
in question. The Court reminds in this matter that the freedom to express opinion in the 
course of a peaceful assembly holds such an importance that it cannot suffer any limita-
tion in the insofar as the concerned one does not commit himself, on this occasion, a 
reprehensible act (Ezelin, aforementioned § 53).
[…]
43. (…) In this case, the State definitely had means to achieve the legitimate aims of pre-
vention of disorder and the protection of health other than the recourse to a total ban of 
entry of the Borndiep in its territorial waters, what is more by means of the dispatch of a 
warship against a civil ship. Such a radical measure inevitably produces a deterrent effect 
not only with regard to the applicants but also with regard to other persons wishing to com-
municate information and ideas contesting the established order (Baczkowski and others v. 
Poland, nº 1543/06, § 67, CEDH 2007-…). The interference in question did not respond to 
an “imperious social necessity” and cannot be seen as “necessary in a democratic society”.
44. In light of what precedes, the interference in question reveals to be disproportioned to 
the objectives pursued. Therefore, there has been a violation of article 10 of the Convention.
[…]
for theSe reaSonS, the court unanimouSLy
[…]
2. Holds that there has been a violation of article 10 of the Convention;
[…]
European Court 
of  Human Rights
K. H. and others v. Slovakia
Application Nº 32881/04
Judgment of  
April 28, 2009
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[…]
procedure
26. The case originated in an application (no. 32881/04) against the Slovak Republic 
lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by eight Slovak nationals, K.H., 
J.H., A.Č., J.Čo., J.Če., V.D., H.M. and V.Ž., on 30 August 2004. The President of the 
Chamber acceded to the applicants’ request not to have their names disclosed (Rule 47 
§ 3 of the Rules of Court).
[…]
3. The applicants alleged, in particular, that their rights under Articles 6 § 1, 8 and 13 
of the Convention had been infringed as a result of the failure by the domestic authorities 
to make photocopies of their medical records available to them.
[…]
the factS
i. the circumStanceS of the caSe
6. The applicants are eight female Slovakian nationals of Roma ethnic origin.
A. Background to the case
7. The applicants were treated at gynaecological and obstetrics departments in two 
hospitals in eastern Slovakia during their pregnancies and deliveries. Despite continuing 
to attempt to conceive, none of the applicants has become pregnant since their last stay 
in hospital, when they delivered via caesarean section. The applicants suspected that the 
reason for their infertility might be that a sterilisation procedure was performed on them 
during their caesarean delivery by medical personnel in the hospitals concerned. Several 
applicants had been asked to sign documents prior to their delivery or on discharge from 
the hospital but they were not sure of the content of those documents.
8. The applicants, together with several other Roma women, granted powers of at-
torney to lawyers from the Centre for Civil and Human Rights, a non-governmental or-
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ganisation based in Košice. The lawyers were authorised to review and photocopy the 
women’s medical records in order to obtain a medical analysis of the reasons for their in-
fertility and possible treatment. The applicants also authorised the lawyers to make pho-
tocopies of their complete medical records as potential evidence in future civil proceed-
ings for damages, and to ensure that such documents and evidence were not destroyed 
or lost. The photocopies were to be made by the lawyers with a portable photocopier at 
the expense of the Centre for Civil and Human Rights.
9. The applicants attempted to obtain access to their medical records in the respective 
hospitals through their authorised representative in August and September 2002. The 
lawyer unsuccessfully asked the management of the hospitals to allow her to consult and 
photocopy the medical records of the persons who had authorised her to do so.
10. On 11 October 2002 representatives of the Ministry of Health expressed the view 
that section 16(6) of the Health Care Act 1994 did not permit a patient to authorise 
another person to consult his or her medical records. The above provision was to be inter-
preted in a restrictive manner and the term “legal representative” concerned exclusively 
the parents of an underage child or a guardian appointed to represent a person who had 
been deprived of legal capacity or whose legal capacity had been restricted.
B. Civil proceedings
11. The applicants sued the hospitals concerned. They claimed that the defendants 
should be ordered to release their medical records to their authorised legal representative 
and to allow them to obtain a photocopy of the documents included in the records.
1. Action against the J. A. Reiman University Hospital in Prešov
12. Six applicants brought an action against the J.A. Reiman University Hospital (Fakult-
ná nemocnica J. A. Reimana) in Prešov (“the Prešov Hospital”) on 13 January 2003.
13. On 18 June 2003 the Prešov District Court delivered a judgment ordering the hos-
pital to permit the plaintiffs and their authorised representative to consult their medical 
records and to make handwritten excerpts thereof. The relevant part of the judgment 
became final on 15 August 2003 and enforceable on 19 August 2003.
14. With reference to section 16(6) of the Health Care Act 1994 the District Court 
dismissed the request to photocopy the medical documents. The court noted that the 
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records were owned by the medical institutions concerned and that such a restriction was 
justified with a view to preventing their abuse. It was not contrary to the plaintiffs’ rights 
and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention. The applicants appealed against that part 
of the judgment.
15. On 17 February 2004 the Regional Court in Prešov upheld the first-instance deci-
sion, according to which the applicants were not entitled to make photocopies of their 
medical files. There was no indication that the applicants’ right to have any future claim 
for damages determined in accordance with the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the 
Convention had been jeopardised. In particular, under the relevant law the medical in-
stitutions were obliged to submit the required information to, inter alia, the courts, for 
example in the context of civil proceedings concerning a patient’s claim for damages.
2. Action against the Health Care Centre in Krompachy
16. H.M. and V.Ž., the two remaining applicants, brought an identical action against the 
Health Care Centre (Nemocnica s poliklinikou) in Krompachy (“the Krompachy Hospital”) 
on 13 January 2003.
[…]
19. On 24 March 2004 the Regional Court in Košice upheld the first-instance decision 
to reject the claim concerning the photocopying of the medical records.
C. Constitutional proceedings
1. Complaint of 24 May 2004
[…]
23. On 8 December 2004 the Constitutional Court (Third Chamber) rejected the com-
plaint. It found no appearance of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in the 
proceedings leading to the Regional Court’s judgment of 17 February 2004. As to the 
alleged violation of Article 8 of the Convention, the Constitutional Court held that the 
Regional Court had correctly applied section 16(6) of the Health Care Act of 1994 and 
that a fair balance had been struck between the conflicting interests. Reference was 
made to the explanatory report to that Act. Furthermore, Article 8 of the Con vention did 
not encompass a right to make photocopies of medical documents.
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2. Complaint of 25 June 2004
24. On 25 June 2004 the remaining two applicants lodged a similar complaint under 
Article 127 of the Constitution alleging a violation of, inter alia, Articles 6 § 1 and 8 of the 
Convention as a result of the conduct of the representatives of the Krompachy Hospital and 
in the proceedings leading to the Košice Regional Court’s judgment of 24 March 2004.
25. On 27 October 2004 the Constitutional Court (Second Chamber) rejected the com-
plaint as being premature. The decision stated that the plaintiffs had lodged an appeal 
on points of law against the part of the Regional Court’s judgment by which the first-
instance decision to grant their claim for access to medical records had been overturned.
D. Subsequent developments
26. Subsequently seven applicants were able to access their files and to make photo-
copies thereof under the newly introduced Health Care Act 2004 (…) in circumstances 
which are set out in the decision on the admissibility of the present application.
27. As regards the eighth applicant, Ms J. H., the Prešov Hospital only provided her with 
a simple record of a surgical procedure indicating that surgery had been performed on 
her and that she had been sterilised during the procedure. On 22 May 2006 the Direc-
tor of the Prešov Hospital informed the applicant that her complete medical file had not 
been located and that it was considered lost. On 31 May 2007 the Ministry of Health 
admitted that the Prešov Hospital had violated the Health Care Act 2004 in that it had 
failed to ensure the proper keeping of the medical file of Ms J. H.
[…]
the Law
i. aLLeged vioLation of articLe 8 of the convention
[…]
B. The Court’s assessment
44. The complaint in issue concerns the exercise by the applicants of their right of ef-
fective access to information concerning their health and reproductive status. As such 
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it is linked to their private and family lives within the meaning of Article 8 (see, mutatis 
mutandis, Roche v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 32555/96, § 155, ECHR 2005-X, with 
further reference).
45. The Court reiterates that, in addition to the primarily negative undertakings in Ar-
ticle 8 of the Convention, there may be positive obligations inherent in effective respect 
for one’s private life. In determining whether or not such a positive obligation exists, it 
will have regard to the fair balance that has to be struck between the general interest of 
the community and the competing interests of the individual concerned, the aims in the 
second paragraph of Article 8 being of a certain relevance (see, for example, Gaskin v. 
the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, § 42, Series A no. 160).
[…]
47. Bearing in mind that the exercise of the right under Article 8 to respect for one’s 
private and family life must be practical and effective (see, for example, Phinikaridou v. 
Cyprus, no. 23890/02, § 64, ECHR 2007-... (extracts), with further reference), the Court 
takes the view that such positive obligations should extend, in particular in cases like 
the present one where personal data are concerned, to the making available to the data 
subject of copies of his or her data files.
48. It can be accepted that it is for the file holder to determine the arrangements for copy-
ing personal data files and whether the cost thereof should be borne by the data subject. 
However, the Court does not consider that data subjects should be obliged to specifically 
justify a request to be provided with a copy of their personal data files. It is rather for the 
authorities to show that there are compelling reasons for refusing this facility.
49. The applicants in the present case obtained judicial orders permitting them to consult 
their medical records in their entirety, but they were not allowed to make copies of them 
under the Health Care Act 1994. The point to be determined by the Court is whether in that 
respect the authorities of the respondent State complied with their positive obligation and, 
in particular, whether the reasons invoked for such a refusal were sufficiently compelling to 
outweigh the Article 8 right of the applicants to obtain copies of their medical records.
[…]
52. The national courts mainly justified the prohibition on making copies of medical re-
cords by the need to protect the relevant information from abuse. The Government relied 
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on the Contracting States’ margin of appreciation in similar matters and considered that 
the Slovak authorities had complied with their obligations under Article 8 by allowing 
the applicants or their representatives to study all the records and to make handwritten 
excerpts thereof.
53. The arguments put forward by the domestic courts and the Government are not 
sufficiently compelling, with due regard to the aims set out in the second paragraph of 
Article 8, to outweigh the applicants’ right to obtain copies of their medical records.
54. In particular, the Court does not see how the applicants, who had in any event been 
given access to the entirety of their medical files, could abuse information concerning 
their own persons by making photocopies of the relevant documents.
55. As to the argument relating to possible abuse of the information by third persons, 
the Court has previously found that protection of medical data is of fundamental im-
portance to a person’s enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private and family life 
as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention and that respecting the confidentiality of 
health data is a vital principle in the legal systems of all the Contracting Parties to the 
Convention (see I. v. Finland, no. 20511/03, § 38, 17 July 2008).
[…]
57. The fact that the Health Care Act 2004 repealed the relevant provision of the Health 
Care Act 1994 and explicitly provides for the possibility for patients or persons authorised 
by them to make copies of medical records is in line with the above conclusion. That 
legislative change, although welcomed, cannot affect the position in the case under 
consideration.
58. There has therefore been a failure to fulfil the positive obligation to ensure effective 
respect for the applicants’ private and family lives in breach of Article 8 of the Convention.
ii. aLLeged vioLation of articLe 6 of the convention
59. The applicants complained that their right of access to a court had been violated as 
a result of the refusal to provide them with copies of their medical records. They relied on 
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which in its relevant part provides:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations (...) everyone is entitled to a 
(...) hearing (...) by [a] ... tribunal (...)”
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60. The applicants argued that they had been barred from having effective access to 
their medical records and from securing the evidence included in those records by means 
of photocopies. Having copies of the files was important for later civil litigation concern-
ing any possible claims for damages on their part and for compliance with the burden of 
proof, which would be incumbent on the applicants as plaintiffs.
[…]
65. The Court accepts the applicants’ argument that they had been in a state of uncer-
tainty as regards their health and reproductive status following their treatment in the two 
hospitals concerned and that obtaining the relevant evidence, in particular in the form 
of photocopies, was essential for an assessment of the position in their cases from the 
perspective of effectively seeking redress before the courts in respect of any shortcomings 
in their medical treatment.
66. The protection of a person’s rights under Article 6 requires, in the Court’s view, that 
the guarantees of that provision should extend to a situation where, like the applicants in 
the present case, a person has, in principle, a civil claim but considers that the evidential 
situation resulting from the legal provisions in force prevents him or her from effectively 
seeking redress before a court or renders the seeking of such judicial protection difficult 
without appropriate justification.
67. It is true that the statutory bar at the material time on the making available of copies 
of the records did not entirely bar the applicants from bringing a civil action on the basis of 
information obtained in the course of the consultation of their files. However, the Court con-
siders that section 16(6) of the Health Care Act 1994 imposed a disproportionate limitation 
on their ability to present their cases to a court in an effective manner. It is relevant in this 
respect that the applicants considered the original form of the records, which could not be 
reproduced manually and which, in accordance with the above-cited provision, could not be 
made available to either the applicants or the courts (compare and contrast in this connection 
the McGinley and Egan case (cited above, § 90)), decisive for the determination of their cases.
68. When examining the facts of the case under Article 8 of the Convention the Court 
has found no sufficiently strong justification for preventing the applicants from obtaining 
copies of their medical records. For similar reasons, that restriction cannot be considered 
compatible with an effective exercise by the applicants of their right of access to a court.
69. There has therefore been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
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[…]
for theSe reaSonS, the court
1. Holds unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention;
2. Holds by a majority that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Conven-
tion;
[…]. 

European Court  
of Human Rights
A, B and C v. Ireland
Application Nº 25579/05 
Judgment of  
Decembre 16, 2010
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[…]
procedure
1. The case originated in an application (no. 25579/05) against Ireland lodged with 
the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Irish nationals, Ms A and Ms B, and 
by a Lithuanian national, Ms C, (“the applicants”), on 15 July 2005. The President of the 
Chamber acceded to the applicants’ request not to have their names disclosed (Rule 47 
§ 3 of the Rules of Court).
[…]
3. The first two applicants principally complained under Article 8 about, inter alia, the 
prohibition of abortion for health and well-being reasons in Ireland and the third appli-
cant’s main complaint concerned the same Article and the alleged failure to implement 
the constitutional right to an abortion in Ireland in the case of a risk to the life of the 
woman.
[…]
the factS
11. The applicants reside in Ireland and are women over 18 years of age.
[…]
i. the circumStanceS of the caSe
A. The first applicant (A)
13. On 28 February 2005 the first applicant travelled to England for an abortion as she 
believed that she was not entitled to an abortion in Ireland. She was 9½ weeks pregnant.
14. She had become pregnant unintentionally, believing her partner to be infertile. At 
the time she was unmarried, unemployed and living in poverty. She had four young 
children. The youngest was disabled and all children were in foster care as a result of 
problems she had experienced as an alcoholic. She had a history of depression during 
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her first four pregnancies, and was battling depression at the time of her fifth pregnancy. 
During the year preceding her fifth pregnancy, she had remained sober and had been in 
constant contact with social workers with a view to regaining custody of her children. 
She considered that a further child at that moment of her life (with its attendant risk of 
post-natal depression and to her sobriety) would jeopardise her health and the successful 
reunification of her family. She decided to travel to England to have an abortion.
15. Delaying the abortion for three weeks, the first applicant borrowed the minimum 
amount of money for treatment in a private clinic and travel from a money lender (650 eu-
ros, “EUR”) at a high interest rate. She felt she had to travel to England alone and in secrecy, 
without alerting the social workers and without missing a contact visit with her children.
16. She travelled back to Ireland by plane the day after the abortion for her contact visit 
with her youngest child. While she had initially submitted that she was afraid to seek 
medical advice on return to Ireland, she subsequently clarified that, on the train returning 
from Dublin she began to bleed profusely, and an ambulance met the train. At a nearby 
hospital she underwent a dilation and curettage. She claims she experienced pain, nau-
sea and bleeding for weeks thereafter but did not seek further medical advice.
17. Following the introduction of the present application, the first applicant became 
pregnant again and gave birth to her fifth child. She is struggling with depression, has 
custody of three of her children and two (including the disabled child) remain in care. She 
maintained that an abortion was the correct decision for her in 2005.
B. The second applicant (B)
18. On 17 January 2005 the second applicant travelled to England for an abortion be-
lieving that she was not entitled to an abortion in Ireland. She was 7 weeks pregnant.
19. The second applicant became pregnant unintentionally. She had taken the “morn-
ing-after pill” and was advised by two different doctors that there was a substantial risk 
of an ectopic pregnancy (a condition which cannot be diagnosed until 6-10 weeks of 
pregnancy). She was certain of her decision to travel to England for an abortion since she 
could not care for a child on her own at that time of her life. She waited several weeks 
until the counselling centre in Dublin opened after Christmas. She had difficulty meeting 
the costs of the travel and, not having a credit card, used a friend’s credit card to book the 
flights. She accepted that, by the time she travelled to England, it had been confirmed 
that it was not an ectopic pregnancy.
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20. Once in England she did not list anyone as her next of kin or give an Irish address so 
as to be sure her family would not learn of the abortion. She travelled alone and stayed 
in London the night before the procedure to avoid missing her appointment as well as 
the night of the procedure, as she would have arrived back in Dublin too late for public 
transport and the medication rendered her unfit to drive home from Dublin airport. The 
clinic advised her to inform Irish doctors that she had had a miscarriage.
21. On her return to Ireland she started passing blood clots and two weeks later, being 
unsure of the legality of having travelled for an abortion, sought follow-up care in a clinic 
in Dublin affiliated to the English clinic.
C. The third applicant (C)
22. On 3 March 2005 the third applicant had an abortion in England believing that she 
could not establish her right to an abortion in Ireland. She was in her first trimester of 
pregnancy at the time.
23. Prior to that, she had been treated for 3 years with chemotherapy for a rare form 
of cancer. She had asked her doctor before the treatment about the implications of her 
illness as regards her desire to have children and was advised that it was not possible to 
predict the effect of pregnancy on her cancer and that, if she did become pregnant, it 
would be dangerous for the foetus if she were to have chemotherapy during the first 
trimester.
24. The cancer went into remission and the applicant unintentionally became pregnant. 
She was unaware of this fact when she underwent a series of tests for cancer, contra-
indicated during pregnancy. When she discovered she was pregnant, the first applicant 
consulted her General Practitioner (“GP”) as well as several medical consultants. She 
alleged that, as a result of the chilling effect of the Irish legal framework, she received 
insufficient information as to the impact of the pregnancy on her health and life and of 
her prior tests for cancer on the foetus.
25. She therefore researched the risks on the internet. Given the uncertainty about the 
risks involved, the third applicant travelled to England for an abortion. She maintained 
that she wanted a medical abortion (drugs to induce a miscarriage) as her pregnancy was 
at an early stage but that she could not find a clinic which would provide this treatment 
as she was a non-resident and because of the need for follow-up. She therefore alleged 
she had to wait a further 8 weeks until a surgical abortion was possible.
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26. On returning to Ireland after the abortion, the third applicant suffered complications of 
an incomplete abortion, including prolonged bleeding and infection. She alleges that doc-
tors provided inadequate medical care. She consulted her own GP several months after the 
abortion and her GP made no reference to the fact that she was visibly no longer pregnant.
[…]
the Law
113. The first two applicants complained under Articles 3, 8, 13 and 14 of the Conven-
tion about the prohibition of abortion in Ireland on health and well-being grounds.
The third applicant complained under Articles 2, 3, 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention* 
about the absence of legislative implementation of Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution 
which she argued meant that she had no appropriate means of establishing her right to 
a lawful abortion in Ireland on the grounds of a risk to her life.
i. admiSSibiLity
A. The relevant facts and scope of the case
[…]
3. The Court’s assessment
[…]
125. Accordingly, the Court finds that the first applicant travelled for an abortion for 
reasons of health and well-being, the second applicant for well-being reasons and the 
third applicant as she mainly feared her pregnancy constituted a risk to her life. While 
the Government’s use of the term “social reasons” is noted, the Court has considered it 
useful to distinguish between health (physical and mental) and other well-being reasons 
to describe why the applicants choose to obtain abortions.
* ed. These articles establish the right to life, the prohibition of torture, the right to respect for private and 
family life, the right to an effective remedy and the prohibition of discrimination, respectively. 
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[…]
B. Exhaustion of domestic remedies
[…]
3. The Court’s assessment
[…]
 a) The first and second applicants
[…]
147. (…)The Supreme Court then clarified, in the seminal X case, that the proper test for 
a lawful abortion in Ireland was as follows: if it was established as a matter of probability 
that there was “a real and substantial risk to the life, as distinct from the health, of the 
mother” (emphasis added) which could only be avoided by the termination of the preg-
nancy, a termination of a pregnancy was permissible in Ireland. The Supreme Court went 
on to accept that an established threat of suicide constituted a qualifying “real and sub-
stantial risk” to the life of the woman. Subsequent amendments to the Constitution did 
not extend the grounds for a lawful abortion in Ireland. None of the domestic case law 
subsequent to the X case, opened by the parties to this Court, concerned the right to an 
abortion in Ireland for reasons of health and well-being nor could they be considered to 
indicate any potential in this argument: the cases of “C” and of D(A Minor) concerned a 
suicide risk and a minor’s right to travel abroad for an abortion, respectively; and the case 
of MR v. TR concerned the question of whether the constitutional notion of “unborn” 
included an embryo fertilised extra-uterine.
[…]
152. For these reasons, the Court considers that it has not been demonstrated that the 
first and second applicants had an effective domestic remedy available to them as regards 
their complaint about a lack of abortion in Ireland for reasons of health and/or well-
being. The Court is not, therefore, required to address the parties’ additional submissions 
concerning the timing, speed, costs and confidentiality of such domestic proceedings.
[…]
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 b) The third applicant
154. The third applicant feared her pregnancy constituted a risk to her life and com-
plained under Article 8 about the lack of legislation implementing the constitutional right 
to an abortion in the case of such a risk. She argued that she therefore had no effective 
procedure by which to establish her qualification for a lawful abortion in Ireland and that 
she should not be required to litigate to do so.
155. In those circumstances, the Court considers that the question of the need for the 
third applicant to exhaust judicial remedies is inextricably linked, and therefore should be 
joined, to the merits of her complaint under Article 8 of the Convention (Tysiąc v. Poland, 
no. 5410/03 (dec.) 7 February 2006).
[…]
E. The Court’s conclusion on the admissibility of the applications
166. Accordingly, no ground having been established for declaring inadmissible the ap-
plicants’ complaints under Article 8 or the associated complaints under Articles 13 and 
14 of the Convention, the Court declares these complaints admissible and the remainder 
of the application inadmissible.
ii. aLLeged vioLation of articLe 8 of the convention
167. The first and second applicants complained under Article 8 about the restrictions 
on lawful abortion in Ireland which meant that they could not obtain an abortion for 
health and/or well-being reasons in Ireland and the third applicant complained under the 
same Article about the absence of any legislative implementation of Article 40.3.3 of the 
Constitution.
[…]
E. The Court’s assessment
1. Whether Article 8 applied to the applicants’ complaints
212. The Court recalls that the notion of “private life” within the meaning of Article 8 of 
the Convention is a broad concept which encompasses, inter alia, the right to personal 
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autonomy and personal development (see Pretty v. the United Kingdom, cited above, 
§ 61). It concerns subjects such as gender identification, sexual orientation and sexual life 
(for example, Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 22 October 1981, Series A 
no. 45, pp. 18-19, § 41; and Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v. the United Kingdom, judg-
ment of 19 February 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-I, p. 131, § 36), 
a person’s physical and psychological integrity (Tysiąc v. Poland judgment, cited above, 
§ 107) as well as decisions both to have and not to have a child or to become genetic 
parents (Evans v. the United Kingdom [GC], cited above, § 71).
213. The Court has also previously found, citing with approval the case-law of the former 
Commission, that legislation regulating the interruption of pregnancy touches upon the 
sphere of the private life of the woman, the Court emphasising that Article 8 cannot 
be interpreted as meaning that pregnancy and its termination pertain uniquely to the 
woman’s private life as, whenever a woman is pregnant, her private life becomes closely 
connected with the developing foetus. The woman’s right to respect for her private life 
must be weighed against other competing rights and freedoms invoked including those 
of the unborn child (Tysiąc v. Poland judgment, cited above, § 106; and Vo v. France (…), 
cited above, §§ 76, 80 and 82).
214. While Article 8 cannot, accordingly, be interpreted as conferring a right to abortion, 
the Court finds that the prohibition in Ireland of abortion where sought for reasons of 
health and/or well-being about which the first and second applicants complained, and 
the third applicant’s alleged inability to establish her qualification for a lawful abortion 
in Ireland, come within the scope of their right to respect for their private lives and ac-
cordingly Article 8. The difference in the substantive complaints of the first and second 
applicants, on the one hand, and that of the third applicant on the other, requires sepa-
rate determination of the question whether there has been a breach of Article 8 of the 
Convention.
[…]
2. The first and second applicants
 a) Positive or negative obligations under Article 8 of the Convention?
216. While there are positive obligations inherent in effective respect for private life (see 
paragraphs 244-246 below), the Court considers it appropriate to analyse the first and 
second applicants’ complaints as concerning negative obligations, their core argument 
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being that the prohibition in Ireland of abortion where sought for health and/or well-
being reasons disproportionately restricted their right to respect for their private lives. The 
Court has previously noted, citing with approval the case-law of the former Commission 
in Bruggemann and Scheuten v. Germany, that not every regulation of the termination of 
pregnancy constitutes an interference with the right to respect for the private life of the 
mother (Vo v. France (…), cited above, § 76). Nevertheless, having regard to the broad 
concept of private life within the meaning of Article 8 including the right to personal 
autonomy and to physical and psychological integrity (see paragraphs 212-214 above), 
the Court finds that the prohibition of the termination of the first and second applicants’ 
pregnancies sought for reasons of health and/or well being amounted to an interference 
with their right to respect for their private lives. The essential question which must be de-
termined is whether the prohibition is an unjustified interference with their rights under 
Article 8 of the Convention.
[…]
218. To determine whether this interference entailed a violation of Article 8, the Court must 
examine whether or not it was justified under the second paragraph of that Article namely, 
whether the interference was “in accordance with the law” and “necessary in a democratic 
society” for one of the “legitimate aims” specified in Article 8 of the Convention.
 b) Was the interference “in accordance with the law”?
[…]
220. The Court recalls that an impugned interference must have some basis in domestic 
law, which law must be adequately accessible and be formulated with sufficient preci-
sion to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct, he or she being able - if need be with 
appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the 
consequences which a given action may entail (for example, Silver and others v. the 
United Kingdom, 25 March 1983, §§ 86-88, Series A no. 61).
221. The Court considers that the domestic legal provisions constituting the interference 
were clearly accessible. Having regard to paragraphs 147-149 above, the Court also con-
siders that it was clearly foreseeable that the first and second applicants were not entitled 
to an abortion in Ireland for health and/or well-being reasons.
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 c) Did the interference pursue a legitimate aim?
[…]
226. In light of the above, the Court does not consider that the limited opinion polls on 
which the first and second applicants relied (…) are sufficiently indicative of a change 
in the views of the Irish people, concerning the grounds for lawful abortion in Ireland, 
as to displace the State’s opinion to the Court on the exact content of the requirements 
of morals in Ireland (Handyside v. the United Kingdom judgment and further references 
cited at 221 above). Accordingly, the Court finds that the impugned restrictions in the 
present case, albeit different from those at issue in the Open Door case, were based on 
profound moral values concerning the nature of life which were reflected in the stance of 
the majority of the Irish people against abortion during the 1983 referendum and which 
have not been demonstrated to have relevantly changed since then.
227. The Court concludes that the impugned restriction therefore pursued the legitimate 
aim of the protection of morals of which the protection in Ireland of the right to life of 
the unborn was one aspect.
228. The Court does not therefore consider it necessary to determine whether these 
are moral views stemming from religious or other beliefs or whether the term “others” 
in Article 8 § 2 extends to the unborn (Open Door, cited above, § 63; and Vo v. France 
[GC] (…), § 85). The first and second applicants’ submissions to the effect that the abor-
tion restrictions in pursuance of that aim are ineffective and their reliance on the moral 
viewpoint of international bodies fall to be examined below under the necessity of the 
interference (Open Door, (…) § 76).
 d) Was the interference “necessary in a democratic society”?
229. In this respect, the Court must examine whether there existed a pressing social need 
for the measure in question and, in particular, whether the interference was proportion-
ate to the legitimate aim pursued, regard being had to the fair balance which has to be 
struck between the relevant competing interests in respect of which the State enjoys a 
margin of appreciation (Open Door, § 70; Odièvre v. France [GC], no. 42326/98, § 40, 
ECHR 2003-III; and Evans v. the United Kingdom [GC], § 75).
230. Accordingly, and as underlined at paragraph 213 above, in the present cases the 
Court must examine whether the prohibition of abortion in Ireland for health and/or well-
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being reasons struck a fair balance between, on the one hand, the first and second ap-
plicants’ right to respect for their private lives under Article 8 and, on the other, profound 
moral values of the Irish people as to the nature of life and consequently as to the need 
to protect the life of the unborn.
[…]
233. There can be no doubt as to the acute sensitivity of the moral and ethical issues 
raised by the question of abortion or as to the importance of the public interest at stake. 
A broad margin of appreciation is, therefore, in principle to be accorded to the Irish State 
in determining the question whether a fair balance was struck between the protection 
of that public interest, notably the protection accorded under Irish law to the right to life 
of the unborn, and the conflicting rights of the first and second applicants to respect for 
their private lives under Article 8 of the Convention.
234. However, the question remains whether this wide margin of appreciation is nar-
rowed by the existence of a relevant consensus.
The existence of a consensus has long played a role in the development and evolution of 
Convention protections beginning with Tyrer v. the United Kingdom (25 April 1978, § 31, 
Series A no. 26), the Convention being considered a “living instrument” to be interpreted 
in the light of present-day conditions. Consensus has therefore been invoked to justify 
a dynamic interpretation of the Convention (Marckx v. Belgium, judgment of 13 June 
1979, Series A no. 31, § 41; Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 22 October 
1981, Series A no. 45, § 60; Soering v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, 
Series A no. 161, § 102; L. and V. v. Austria, nos. 39392/98 and 39829/98, § 50, ECHR 
2003-I and Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], cited above, § 85).
235. In the present case, and contrary to the Government’s submission, the Court consid-
ers that there is indeed a consensus amongst a substantial majority of the Contracting 
States of the Council of Europe towards allowing abortion on broader grounds than ac-
corded under Irish law. In particular, the Court notes that the first and second applicants 
could have obtained an abortion on request (according to certain criteria including gesta-
tional limits) in some 30 such States. The first applicant could have obtained an abortion 
justified on health and well-being grounds in approximately 40 Contracting States and 
the second applicant could have obtained an abortion justified on well-being grounds 
in some 35 Contracting States. Only 3 States have more restrictive access to abortion 
services than in Ireland namely, a prohibition on abortion regardless of the risk to the 
100
H
ea
lth
 an
d 
Re
pr
od
uc
tiv
e R
ig
ht
s
woman’s life. Certain States have in recent years extended the grounds on which abor-
tion can be obtained (…). Ireland is the only State which allows abortion solely where 
there is a risk to the life (including self-destruction) of the expectant mother. Given this 
consensus amongst a substantial majority of the Contracting States, it is not necessary to 
look further to international trends and views which the first two applicants and certain 
of the third parties argued also leant in favour of broader access to abortion.
236. However, the Court does not consider that this consensus decisively narrows the 
broad margin of appreciation of the State.
237. Of central importance is the finding in the above-cited Vo case, referred to above, that 
the question of when the right to life begins came within the States’ margin of apprecia-
tion because there was no European consensus on the scientific and legal definition of the 
beginning of life, so that it was impossible to answer the question whether the unborn was 
a person to be protected for the purposes of Article 2. Since the rights claimed on behalf of 
the foetus and those of the mother are inextricably interconnected (see the review of the 
Convention case law at paragraphs 75-80 in the above-cited Vo v. France [GC] judgment), 
the margin of appreciation accorded to a State’s protection of the unborn necessarily trans-
lates into a margin of appreciation for that State as to how it balances the conflicting rights 
of the mother. It follows that, even if it appears from the national laws referred to that 
most Contracting Parties may in their legislation have resolved those conflicting rights and 
interests in favour of greater legal access to abortion, this consensus cannot be a decisive 
factor in the Court’s examination of whether the impugned prohibition on abortion in Ire-
land for health and well-being reasons struck a fair balance between the conflicting rights 
and interests, notwithstanding an evolutive interpretation of the Convention (Tyrer v. the 
United Kingdom, § 31; and Vo v. France [GC], § 82, (…)).
238. It is indeed the case that this margin of appreciation is not unlimited. The prohibition 
impugned by the first and second applicants must be compatible with a State’s Convention 
obligations and, given the Court’s responsibility under Article 19 of the Convention, the 
Court must supervise whether the interference constitutes a proportionate balancing of 
the competing interests involved (Open Door, § 68). A prohibition of abortion to protect 
unborn life is not therefore automatically justified under the Convention on the basis of 
unqualified deference to the protection of pre-natal life or on the basis that the expectant 
mother’s right to respect for her private life is of a lesser stature. Nor is the regulation of 
abortion rights solely a matter for the Contracting States, as the Government maintained 
relying on certain international declarations (…). However, and as explained above, the 
Court must decide on the compatibility with Article 8 of the Convention of the Irish State’s 
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prohibition of abortion on health and well-being grounds on the basis of the above-de-
scribed fair balance test to which a broad margin of appreciation is applicable.
239. From the lengthy, complex and sensitive debate in Ireland (…) as regards the con-
tent of its abortion laws, a choice has emerged. Irish law prohibits abortion in Ireland for 
health and well-being reasons but allows women, in the first and second applicants’ posi-
tion who wish to have an abortion for those reasons (…), the option of lawfully travelling 
to another State to do so.
On the one hand, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution re-
moved any legal impediment to adult women travelling abroad for an abortion and to 
obtaining information in Ireland in that respect. Legislative measures were then adopted 
to ensure the provision of information and counselling about, inter alia, the options avail-
able including abortions services abroad, and to ensure any necessary medical treatment 
before, and more particularly after, an abortion. The importance of the role of doctors 
in providing information on all options available, including abortion abroad, and their 
obligation to provide all appropriate medical care, notably post-abortion, is emphasised 
in CPA work and documents and in professional medical guidelines (…). The Court has 
found that the first two applicants did not demonstrate that they lacked relevant infor-
mation or necessary medical care as regards their abortions (…).
On the other hand, it is true that the process of travelling abroad for an abortion was psy-
chologically and physically arduous for the first and second applicants, additionally so for the 
first applicant given her impoverished circumstances (…). While this may not have amount-
ed to treatment falling within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention (paragraph 164 
above), the Court does not underestimate the serious impact of the impugned restriction on 
the first and second applicants. It may even be the case, as the first two applicants argued, 
that the impugned prohibition on abortion is to a large extent ineffective in protecting the 
unborn in the sense that a substantial number of women take the option open to them in 
law of travelling abroad for an abortion not available in Ireland: it is not possible to be more 
conclusive, given the disputed nature of the relevant statistics provided to the Court (…).
[…]
241. Accordingly, having regard to the right to lawfully travel abroad for an abortion with 
access to appropriate information and medical care in Ireland, the Court does not con-
sider that the prohibition in Ireland of abortion for health and well-being reasons, based 
as it is on the profound moral views of the Irish people as to the nature of life (paragraphs 
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222-227 above) and as to the consequent protection to be accorded to the right to life 
of the unborn, exceeds the margin of appreciation accorded in that respect to the Irish 
State. In such circumstances, the Court finds that the impugned prohibition in Ireland 
struck a fair balance between the right of the first and second applicants to respect for 
their private lives and the rights invoked on behalf of the unborn.
 e) The Court’s conclusion as regards the first and second applicants
242. It concludes that there has been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention as re-
gards the first and second applicants.
3. The third applicant
[…]
 a) Does her complaint fall to be examined under the positive or negative 
 obligations of Article 8 of the Convention?
[…]
245. The Court has previously found States to be under a positive obligation to secure 
to its citizens their right to effective respect for their physical and psychological integrity 
(Glass v. the United Kingdom, no. 61827/00, §§ 74-83, ECHR 2004-II; Sentges v. the 
Netherlands (dec.) no. 27677/02, 8 July 2003; Pentiacova and others v. Moldova (dec.), 
no. 14462/03, ECHR 2005-...; Nitecki v. Poland (dec.), no. 65653/01, 21 March 2002; 
Odièvre v. France [GC], (…), § 42). In addition, these obligations may involve the adop-
tion of measures, including the provision of an effective and accessible means of pro-
tecting the right to respect for private life (Airey v. Ireland, 9 October 1979, § 33, Series 
A no. 32; McGinley and Egan v. the United Kingdom, 9 June 1998, § 101, Reports of 
Judgments and Decisions 1998-III; and Roche v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 32555/96, 
§ 162, ECHR 2005-X) including both the provision of a regulatory framework of adjudica-
tory and enforcement machinery protecting individuals’ rights and the implementation, 
where appropriate, of specific measures in an abortion context (Tysiąc v. Poland judg-
ment, (…), § 110).
246. Accordingly, the Court considers that the third applicant’s complaint falls to be ana-
lysed under the positive aspect of Article 8. In particular, the question to the determined 
by the Court is whether there is a positive obligation on the State to provide an effective 
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and accessible procedure allowing the third applicant to establish her entitlement to a 
lawful abortion in Ireland and thereby affording due respect to her interests safeguarded 
by Article 8 of the Convention.
 b) General principles applicable to assessing a State’s positive obligations
247. The principles applicable to assessing a State’s positive and negative obligations 
under the Convention are similar. Regard must be had to the fair balance that has to 
be struck between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a 
whole, the aims in the second paragraph of Article 8 being of a certain relevance (Gaskin 
v. the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, § 42, Series A no. 160; and Roche v. the United 
Kingdom [GC], (…), § 157).
248. The notion of “respect” is not clear cut especially as far as positive obligations are 
concerned: having regard to the diversity of the practices followed and the situations 
obtaining in the Contracting States, the notion’s requirements will vary considerably from 
case to case (Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], cited above, § 72).
Nonetheless, certain factors have been considered relevant for the assessment of the con-
tent of those positive obligations on States. Some factors concern the applicant: the impor-
tance of the interest at stake and whether “fundamental values” or “essential aspects” of 
private life are in issue (X and Y v. the Netherlands, 26 March 1985, § 27, Series A no. 91; 
and Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, § 49, Series A no. 160); and the impact on 
an applicant of a discordance between the social reality and the law, the coherence of the 
administrative and legal practices within the domestic system being regarded as an impor-
tant factor in the assessment carried out under Article 8 (B. v. France, 25 March 1992, § 
63, Series A no. 232-C; and Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], cited above, 
§§ 77-78). Some factors concern the position of the State: whether the alleged obligation 
is narrow and defined or broad and indeterminate (Botta v. Italy, 24 February 1998, § 35, 
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-I); and the extent of any burden the obligation 
would impose on the State (Rees v. the United Kingdom, 17 October 1986, §§ 43-44, Se-
ries A no. 106; Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], (…), §§ 86-88).
249. As in the negative obligation context, the State enjoys a certain margin of apprecia-
tion (see, among other authorities, Keegan v. Ireland, judgment of 26 May 1994, Series 
A no. 290, § 49). While a broad margin of appreciation is accorded to the State as to 
the decision about the circumstances in which an abortion will be permitted in a State 
(paragraphs 231-238 above), once that decision is taken the legal framework devised for 
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this purpose should be “shaped in a coherent manner which allows the different legiti-
mate interests involved to be taken into account adequately and in accordance with the 
obligations deriving from the Convention” (S.H. and others v. Austria, no. 57813/00, § 
74, 1 April 2010).
 c) Application of the general principles to the third applicant’s case
250. The third applicant had a rare form of cancer. When she discovered she was preg-
nant she feared for her life as she believed that her pregnancy increased the risk of her 
cancer returning and that she would not obtain treatment for that cancer in Ireland 
while pregnant (see paragraph 125 above). The Court considers that the establishment 
of any such relevant risk to her life caused by her pregnancy clearly concerned funda-
mental values and essential aspects of her right to respect for her private life (X and Y v. 
the Netherlands, 26 March 1985, (…), § 27 and paragraph 248 above). Contrary to the 
Government’s submissions, it is not necessary for the applicant to further substantiate 
the alleged medical risk, her complaint concerning as it did the absence of any effective 
domestic procedure for establishing that risk.
[…]
252. In the first place, the Court has examined the only non-judicial means on which the 
Government relied namely, the ordinary medical consultation process between a woman 
and her doctor.
253. However, the Court has a number of concerns as to the effectiveness of this consul-
tation procedure as a means of establishing the third applicant’s qualification for a lawful 
abortion in Ireland.
It is first noted that the ground upon which a woman can seek a lawful abortion in 
Ireland is expressed in broad terms: Article 40.3.3, as interpreted by the Supreme Court 
in the X case, provides that an abortion is available in Ireland if it is established as a 
matter of probability that there is a real and substantial risk to the life, as distinct from 
the health, of the mother, including a risk of self harm, which can only be avoided by 
a termination of the pregnancy (the X case, cited at paragraphs 39-44 above). While 
a constitutional provision of this scope is not unusual, no criteria or procedures have 
been subsequently laid down in Irish law, whether in legislation, case law or otherwise, 
by which that risk is to be measured or determined, leading to uncertainty as to its 
precise application. Indeed, while this constitutional provision (as interpreted by the 
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Supreme Court in the X case) qualified sections 58 and 59 of the earlier 1861 Act (see 
paragraph 145 above), those sections have never been amended so that, on their face, 
they remain in force with their absolute prohibition on abortion and associated serious 
criminal offences thereby contributing to the lack of certainty for a woman seeking a 
lawful abortion in Ireland.
Moreover, whether or not the broad right to a lawful abortion in Ireland for which Article 
40.3.3 provides could be clarified by Irish professional medical guidelines as suggested by 
the Government (and see the High Court judgment in MR v. TR and others, at paragraph 97 
above), the guidelines do not in any event provide any relevant precision as to the criteria 
by which a doctor is to assess that risk. The Court cannot accept the Government’s argu-
ment that the oral submissions to the Committee on the Constitution, and still less obstetric 
guidelines on ectopic pregnancies from another State, could constitute relevant clarification 
of Irish law. In any event, the three conditions noted in those oral submissions as accepted 
conditions requiring medical intervention to save a woman’s life (pre-eclampsia, cancer of 
the cervix and ectopic pregnancies) were not pertinent to the third applicant’s case.
Furthermore, there is no framework whereby any difference of opinion between the wom-
an and her doctor or between different doctors consulted, or whereby an understandable 
hesitancy on the part of a woman or doctor, could be examined and resolved through a 
decision which would establish as a matter of law whether a particular case presented a 
qualifying risk to a woman’s life such that a lawful abortion might be performed.
254. Against this background of substantial uncertainty, the Court considers it evident 
that the criminal provisions of the 1861 Act would constitute a significant chilling factor 
for both women and doctors in the medical consultation process, regardless of whether 
or not prosecutions have in fact been pursued under that Act. Both the third applicant 
and any doctor ran a risk of a serious criminal conviction and imprisonment in the event 
that a decision taken in medical consultation, that the woman was entitled to an abor-
tion in Ireland given the risk to her life, was later found not to accord with Article 40.3.3 
of the Constitution. Doctors also risked professional disciplinary proceedings and serious 
sanctions. The Government have not indicated whether disciplinary action has ever been 
taken against a doctor in this regard. The Review Group Report 1996, the Green Paper 
1999 and the Fifth Progress Report on Abortion 2000 each expressed concerns about the 
lack of legal protection for medical personnel. As to the Government’s reliance on the C 
case, doctors consulted by women such as the third applicant were not in the same legal 
situation as those in the C case who were providing opinions as regards a rape victim who 
was a suicide risk, a situation falling clearly within the ambit of the X case.
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255. Accordingly, and referring also to McCarthy J.’s judgment in the X case (…), the 
Court does not consider that the normal process of medical consultation could be consid-
ered an effective means of determining whether an abortion may be lawfully performed 
in Ireland on the ground of a risk to life.
[…]
258. The Court does not consider that the constitutional courts are the appropriate fora 
for the primary determination as to whether a woman qualifies for an abortion which 
is lawfully available in a State. In particular, this process would amount to requiring the 
constitutional courts to set down on a case by case basis the legal criteria by which 
the relevant risk to a woman’s life would be measured and, further, to resolve through 
evidence, largely of a medical nature, whether a woman had established that qualifying 
risk. However, the constitutional courts themselves have underlined that this should not 
be their role. Contrary to the Government’s submission, McCarthy J. in the X case clearly 
referred to prior judicial expressions of regret that Article 40.3.3 had not been imple-
mented by legislation and went on to state that, while the want of that legislation would 
not inhibit the courts from exercising their functions, it was reasonable to find that, when 
enacting that Amendment, the people were entitled to believe that legislation would be 
introduced so as to regulate the manner in which the right to life of the unborn and the 
right to life of the mother could be reconciled. In the view of McCarthy J., the failure to 
legislate was no longer just unfortunate, but it was “inexcusable” (…). The High Court 
in the “C” case (…) referred to the same issue more succinctly, finding that it would be 
wrong to turn the High Court into a “licensing authority” for abortions.
259. In addition, it would be equally inappropriate to require women to take on such 
complex constitutional proceedings when their underlying constitutional right to an 
abortion in the case of a qualifying risk to life was not disputable (the Green Paper 1999, 
(…)). The D v. Ireland decision is distinguishable for the reasons set out at paragraph 148 
above and, notably, because D’s constitutional right to an abortion in Ireland in the case 
of a fatal foetal abnormality was an open question.
260. Furthermore, it is not clear how the courts would enforce a mandatory order requiring 
doctors to carry out an abortion. The Government’s statistical material provided in response 
to the Court’s question (…) concerned public acute hospitals and ectopic pregnancies only 
and thereby revealed a lack of knowledge on the part of the State as to, inter alia, who car-
ries out lawful abortions in Ireland and where. It is also not clear on what basis a declaration 
of unconstitutionality of the provisions of the 1861 Act could have been made since those 
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provisions have been already qualified by Article 40.3.3 and since the third applicant did 
not seek a right to abortion extending beyond the parameters of that Article.
261. Thirdly, the Court’s findings as regards the 2003 Act outlined at paragraph 150 
above are equally applicable to the third applicant. In addition, since her complaint does 
not concern a lack of information but rather the lack of a decision-making process, it is 
not necessary to examine whether she had any remedy to exhaust in this regard, in par-
ticular, in respect of the 1995 Act.
[…]
263. Consequently, the Court considers that neither the medical consultation nor litiga-
tion options relied on by the Government constituted effective and accessible proce-
dures which allowed the third applicant to establish her right to a lawful abortion in 
Ireland. The Court is not, therefore, required to address the parties’ additional submis-
sions concerning the timing, speed, costs and confidentiality of such domestic proceed-
ings.
264. The Court considers that the uncertainty generated by the lack of legislative im-
plementation of Article 40.3.3, and more particularly by the lack of effective and acces-
sible procedures to establish a right to an abortion under that provision, has resulted in 
a striking discordance between the theoretical right to a lawful abortion in Ireland on 
grounds of a relevant risk to a woman’s life and the reality of its practical implementa-
tion (Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], (…) at §§ 77-78; and S. H. and 
others v. Austria, (…), at § 74. See also the Commissioner for Human Rights, paragraph 
110 above).
[…]
 d) The Court’s conclusion as regards the third applicant
267. In such circumstances, the Court rejects the Government’s argument that the third 
applicant failed to exhaust domestic remedies. It also concludes that the authorities failed 
to comply with their positive obligation to secure to the third applicant effective respect 
for her private life by reason of the absence of any implementing legislative or regulatory 
regime providing an accessible and effective procedure by which the third applicant could 
have established whether she qualified for a lawful abortion in Ireland in accordance with 
Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution.
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268. Accordingly, the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Con-
vention.
[…]
for theSe reaSon, the courtS
[…]
4. Holds by eleven votes to six that there has been no violation of Article 8 of the 
Convention, or of Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 8, as regards the first and 
second applicants;
5. Holds unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention, 
and that no separate issue arises under Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 8, as 
regards the third applicant;
[…]
Joint partLy diSSenting opinion of JudgeS rozakiS, tuLkenS, 
fura, hirveLä, maLinverni and poaLeLungi
[…]
2. Let us make clear, from the outset, that the Court was not called upon in this case 
to answer the difficult question of “when life begins”. This was not the issue before the 
Court, and undoubtedly the Court is not well equipped to deal effectively with it. The issue 
before the Court was whether, regardless of when life begins – before birth or not – the 
right to life of the foetus can be balanced against the right to life of the mother, or her right 
to personal autonomy and development, and possibly found to weigh less than the latter 
rights or interests. And the answer seems to be clear: there is an undeniably strong con-
sensus among European States – and we will come back to this below – to the effect that, 
regardless of the answer to be given to the scientific, religious or philosophical question of 
the beginning of life, the right to life of the mother, and, in most countries’ legislation, her 
well-being and health, are considered more valuable than the right to life of the foetus.
This seems to us a reasonable stance for European legislation and practice to take, given 
that the values protected – the rights of the foetus and the rights of a living person – 
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are, by their nature, unequal: on the one hand there are the rights of a person already 
participating, in an active manner, in social interaction, and on the other hand there 
are the rights of a foetus within the mother’s body, whose life has not been definitively 
determined as long as the process leading to the birth is not yet complete, and whose 
participation in social interaction has not even started. In Convention terms, it can also 
be argued that the rights enshrined in that text are mainly designed to protect individuals 
against State acts or omissions while the former participate actively in the normal every-
day life of a democratic society.
Consequently, we believe that the majority erred when it inappropriately conflated in 
paragraph 237 of the judgment the question of the beginning of life (and as a conse-
quence the right to life), and the States’ margin of appreciation in this regard, with the 
margin of appreciation that States have in weighing the right to life of the foetus against 
the right to life of the mother or her right to health and well-being.
3. When we come to the proportionality test which the Court should properly apply 
in the circumstances of the case, there are two elements which should be taken into 
consideration and which weigh heavily in determining whether the interference with the 
private life of the two applicants was justified: the first is the existence of a European 
consensus in favour of allowing abortion; the second is the sanctions provided for by Irish 
law in cases of abortions performed for health or well-being reasons in breach of the 
prohibition on abortion in the territory of Ireland.
[…]
6. Yet in the case before us a European consensus (and, indeed, a strong one) exists. 
We believe that this will be one of the rare times in the Court’s case-law that Strasbourg 
considers that such consensus does not narrow the broad margin of appreciation of the 
State concerned; the argument used is that the fact that the applicants had the right “to 
lawfully travel abroad for an abortion with access to appropriate information and medical 
care in Ireland” suffices to justify the prohibition of abortion in the country for health and 
well-being reasons, “based as it is on the profound moral views of the Irish people as to 
the nature of life” (paragraph 241 in limine).
7. We strongly disagree with this finding. Quite apart from the fact, as we have em-
phasised above, that such an approach shifts the focus of this case away from the core 
issue, which is the balancing of the right to life of the foetus against the right to health 
and well-being of the mother, and not the question of when life begins or the margin 
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of appreciation afforded to States on the latter issue, the majority bases its reasoning on 
two disputable premises: first, that the fact that Irish law allows abortion for those who 
can travel abroad suffices to satisfy the requirements of the Convention concerning appli-
cants’ right to respect for their private life; and, second, that the fact that the Irish people 
have profound moral views as to the nature of life impacts on the European consensus 
and overrides it, allowing the State to enjoy a wide margin of appreciation.
8. On the first premise, the Court’s argument seems to be circular. The applicants’ 
complaints concern their inability to have an abortion in their country of residence and 
they consider, rightly, that travelling abroad to have an abortion is a process which is not 
only financially costly but also entails a number of practical difficulties well illustrated in 
their observations. Hence, the position taken by the Court on the matter does not truly 
address the real issue of unjustified interference in the applicants’ private life as a result 
of the prohibition of abortion in Ireland.
9. As to the second premise, it is the first time that the Court has disregarded the exis-
tence of a European consensus on the basis of “profound moral views”. Even assuming 
that these profound moral views are still well embedded in the conscience of the majority 
of Irish people, to consider that this can override the European consensus, which tends 
in a completely different direction, is a real and dangerous new departure in the Court’s 
case-law. A case-law which to date has not distinguished between moral and other be-
liefs when determining the margin of appreciation which can be afforded to States in 
situations where a European consensus is at hand.
[…]
11. From the foregoing analysis it is clear that in the circumstances of the case there has 
been a violation of Article 8 with regard to the first two applicants.
European Court  
of Human Rights
R. R. v. Poland
Application Nº 27617/04 
Judgment of 
May 26, 2011
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[…]
procedure
1. The case originated in an application (no. 27617/04) against the Republic of Poland 
lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Polish national, Ms R.R. (“the 
applicant”), on 30 July 2004. The President of the Chamber acceded to the applicant’s 
request not to have her name disclosed (Rule 47 § 3 of the Rules of Court).
[…]
3. The applicant alleged that the circumstances of her case had given rise to violations of 
Article 8 of the Convention. She also invoked Article 3 of the Convention. The applicant fur-
ther complained under its Article 13 that she did not have an effective remedy at her disposal.
[…]
the factS
i.  the circumStanceS of the caSe
6. The applicant was born in 1973.
7. Early in December 2001 the applicant visited Dr S.B. in a hospital in T., in the region 
covered by the then Małopolska Regional Medical Insurance Fund (replaced later by the 
countrywide National Health Fund). Having performed an ultrasound scan, Dr S.B. esti-
mated that the applicant was in the 6th or 7th week of pregnancy.
8. On 2 January 2002, in the 11th week of her pregnancy, the applicant – who was at 
that time 29 years old, was married and had two children – was registered as a pregnant 
patient in her local clinic.
9. On 23 January and 20 February 2002 ultrasound scans were performed, in the 14th 
and 18th weeks of the applicant’s pregnancy. On the latter date Dr S.B. estimated that 
it could not be ruled out that the foetus was affected with some malformation and in-
formed the applicant thereof. The applicant told him that she wished to have an abortion 
if the suspicion proved true.
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[…]
28. Genetic test (amniocentesis) was performed there on 26 March 2002, in the 23rd 
week of pregnancy, and the applicant was told that she had to wait two weeks for the 
results.
[…]
30. The applicant was discharged from the Łódź hospital on 28 March 2002. Before 
the results were available, on 29 March 2002 the applicant, increasingly desperate as by 
then she was very afraid that the foetus was suffering from severe genetic abnormalities, 
reported to the T. hospital, where she submitted a written request for an abortion. Dr 
G.S. told her that he could not take such a decision himself. He had to speak with the 
consultant.
31. By a letter of 29 March 2002 the applicant requested the hospital in T. to terminate 
the pregnancy, referring to the provisions of the 1993 Act. She requested that in case of 
a negative reply it should be made in writing “as soon as possible”.
32. On 3 April 2002 the applicant went to that hospital again and was told that the 
consultant could not see her because he was ill. The visit was rescheduled for 10 April 
2002. On the same day she wrote a letter of complaint to the director of the T. hospital, 
submitting that she had not received adequate treatment and that she felt that the doc-
tors were intentionally postponing all decisions in her case so that she would be unable 
to obtain an abortion within the time-limit provided for by law.
33. On 9 April 2002 she again requested doctors at the T. hospital to carry out an abor-
tion. She referred to the results of the genetic tests which she had received on that date. 
The certificate, established by Professor K.Sz., confirmed that the karyotype indicated the 
presence of Turner syndrome. The certificate further read:
“A chromosomal aberration and an ultrasound image were established, indicating 
the presence of congenital defects which can have a serious impact on the child’s 
normal development. Further handling of the case under the provisions of the 1993 
law on termination of pregnancy can be envisaged. A relevant decision should be 
taken with due regard to the parents’ opinion”.
The doctors in the T. hospital refused to carry out an abortion, Dr G.S. telling her 
that it was too late by then as the foetus was able at that stage to survive outside 
the mother’s body.
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[…]
37. On 11 July 2002 the applicant gave birth to a baby girl affected with Turner syndrome.
38. On 31 July 2002 the applicant requested the prosecuting authorities to institute crimi-
nal proceedings against the persons involved in handling her case. She alleged serious fail-
ure on the part of the doctors, acting as public agents, to safeguard her interests protected 
by law, on account of their failure to perform timely prenatal examinations. As a result, 
the applicant had been denied information on the foetus’ condition and, consequently, 
divested of the possibility to decide for herself whether or not she wished to terminate her 
pregnancy in the conditions provided for by law, and she had been forced to continue it.
[…]
41. The applicant appealed, complaining, inter alia, that the prosecuting authorities had 
failed to address the critical issue of whether, in the circumstances of the case, genetic 
tests should have been carried out in order to obtain a diagnosis of the foetus’ condition. 
Instead the investigation had focused on whether or not the applicant had a right to an 
abortion under the applicable law.
42. Ultimately, on 2 February 2004, the competent court upheld the decision of the pros-
ecuting authorities. The court held that doctors employed in public hospitals did not have 
the quality of “public servants”, which in the circumstances of the case was a necessary 
element for the commission of the criminal offence of breach of duty by a public servant.
43. On 11 May 2004 the applicant filed a civil lawsuit with the Kraków Regional Court 
against doctors S.B., G.S. and K.R. and against the Krakow and T. hospitals. She argued 
that the doctors dealing with her case had unreasonably procrastinated in their decision on 
her access to genetic tests and had thereby failed to provide her with reliable and timely 
information about the foetus’ condition. They had also failed to establish the foetus’ condi-
tion in time for her to make an informed decision as to whether or not to terminate the 
pregnancy. As a result of an unjustified delay in obtaining relevant information she had 
been divested of the possibility of exercising an autonomous choice as to her parenthood.
The applicant further argued that the laws in force authorised abortion in specific situ-
ations. However, that right had been denied her as a result of difficulties in obtaining 
timely access to genetic tests and the lengthy delay before she had ultimately obtained 
such access.
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(…)
The applicant argued that the circumstances in which the determination of her access to 
genetic testing had been decided had breached her personal rights and dignity and had 
deeply humiliated her. No regard had been had to her views and feelings.
She also claimed compensation from Dr S.B. for hostile and disparaging statements 
about her character and conduct which he had made in a press interview about her 
case. He had disclosed to the public details about her and the foetus’ health covered by 
medical secret and told the journalist that the applicant and her husband were bad and 
irresponsible parents.
[…]
46. On 19 October 2005 the Kraków Regional Court awarded the applicant PLN 10,000 
against S.B., finding that in a press interview published in November 2003 he had dis-
closed information relating to the applicant’s health and private life in connection with 
her pregnancy. He had also made disrespectful and hurtful comments about the appli-
cant’s conduct and personality.
47. The court dismissed the remaining claims which she had lodged against doctors 
G.S. and K.R. and against the hospitals. (…)
48. On 12 December 2005 the applicant appealed. She submitted that (…)In her case doc-
tors S.B., K.R. and G.S. had been of the view that genetic tests were relevant to establishing 
the foetus’ condition, but had not given her the necessary referral. (…)The doctors had tried 
to shift the responsibility for the way in which her case had been handled to the applicant, 
despite the obvious fact that the fundamental responsibility for the proper handling of a 
medical case lay with them as health professionals. The doctors had also been well aware, 
as shown by the evidence which they had given, that the applicant had been desperate, in 
reaction to information that the foetus might be affected with a genetic disorder.
49. The applicant submitted that the doctors’ conduct had breached the law, in particu-
lar section 2 (a) of the 1993 Act in so far as it imposed on the authorities an obligation 
to ensure unimpeded access to prenatal information and testing, in particular in cases of 
increased risk or suspicion of a genetic disorder or development problem, or of an incurable 
life-threatening ailment. The applicant had therefore had such a right, clearly provided for 
by the applicable law, but the defendants had made it impossible for her to enjoy that right.
R. R. v. Poland
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50. On 28 July 2006 the Kraków Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and 
upheld the first-instance judgment, endorsing the conclusions of the lower court.
51. On 11 July 2008 the Supreme Court allowed her cassation appeal (…)
The Supreme Court observed that the applicant’s claim was two-pronged: it was based 
firstly on the failure to refer her for genetic testing and, secondly, on the breach of her 
right to take an informed decision which resulted from this failure.
[…]
54. The Supreme Court considered that there were therefore good reasons to accept that 
the doctors dealing with the applicant’s case had breached her personal rights within the 
meaning of Article 24 of the Civil Code and her patient’s rights guaranteed by the Medical 
Institutions Act. They had been aware that only genetic testing was capable of determining 
the foetus’ genetic situation, but had still refused a referral; instead they had sent her for 
various tests carried out in a hospital setting which were not relevant to such a diagnosis.
Moreover, the lower courts had erred in their finding that the applicant had not suffered 
non-pecuniary damage as a result of the doctors’ acts. Such damage had been caused by 
the distress, anxiety and humiliation she had suffered as a result of the manner in which 
her case had been handled.
55. (…)The lower courts had erred in that they had found that there was no adequate 
causal link between the doctors conduct in the applicant s case and the fact that she 
had not had access to legal abortion. In this respect the court noted that there had been 
enough time between the 18th week of the pregnancy, when the suspicions had arisen, 
and the 22nd, when the time-limit for legal abortion had expired, to carry out genetic 
testing. When the tests had finally been carried out, the applicant had received the results 
two weeks later. The tests should therefore have been carried out immediately after the 
suspicions had arisen, but instead, as a result of procrastination on the part of doctors 
S.B., G.S. and K.R., they had ultimately been conducted much later.
[…]
57. Hence, the judgment had to be quashed and the case remitted for re-examination 
in its entirety.
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58. On 30 October 2008 the Kraków Court of Appeal gave a judgment.(…)
[…]
61. (…) The defendants had been aware that time was of the essence in the availability 
of legal abortion, but had failed to accelerate their decision-taking. The hospitals were 
liable for the negligent acts of their employees in so far as it was their duty to provide the 
applicant with full information about any genetic disorder of the foetus and how it might 
affect its development and to do so in time for her to prepare herself for the prospect of 
giving birth to a child with a genetic disorder.
[…]
63. Having regard to the defendants’ failure to respect the applicant’s rights, the court 
awarded the applicant PLN 5,000 against T. Hospital of St. Lazarus and PLN 10,000 
against Kraków University Hospital, and dismissed the remainder of her appeal.
[…]
the Law
90. The applicant complained that the facts of the case had given rise to a breach of 
Article 3 of the Convention which, insofar as relevant, reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to ... inhuman or degrading treatment... ”
91. The applicant further complained that the facts of the case had given rise to a 
breach of Article 8 of the Convention. Her right to respect for her private life and her 
psychological and moral integrity had been violated by the authorities’ failure to provide 
her with access to genetic tests in the context of her uncertainty as to whether the foetus 
was affected with a genetic disorder and also by the absence of a comprehensive legal 
framework to guarantee her rights.
Article 8 of the Convention, insofar as relevant, reads as follows:
“1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private ... life ...
2.  There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
R. R. v. Poland
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country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or mor-
als, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
[…]
ii. the meritS
[…]
A. Third parties’ submissions
1. Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest at-
tainable standard of physical and mental health, the office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights
122. Because the decision to continue or terminate a pregnancy had a profound effect 
on a woman’s private life, including her physical and moral integrity, any interference 
with this decision must be analysed in light of the woman’s right to privacy. This was 
true regardless of whether the interference directly affected the woman’s access to legal 
abortion or affected it indirectly, by denying her the prerequisite healthcare she needed 
in order to make a decision regarding continuation or termination of the pregnancy. 
Numerous international conventions broadly recognised a woman’s right to the highest 
attainable standard of health, including access to appropriate reproductive care. Privacy 
was particularly important in the case of sexual and reproductive healthcare, which must 
be provided in a manner consistent with women’s rights to personal autonomy.
123. Access to prenatal genetic examinations touched upon reproductive health-related 
aspects of the right to privacy. Access to information was particularly important in the 
context of health, as individuals cannot make meaningful healthcare decisions without 
access to health-related information. Accurate knowledge of an individual’s health status 
was necessary to enable that individual to understand her health care options and protect 
her bodily integrity by deciding which health care treatment she would avail herself of.
124. This right to information applied with regard to a woman’s own reproductive sta-
tus, knowledge of which was particularly important if women were to be empowered 
to preserve their bodily integrity by making reproductive health care decisions. Pregnant 
women might need access to prenatal examinations in order to obtain accurate informa-
tion about their own health and the health of their foetus, particularly where there were 
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other indications of genetic malformation. Genetic examinations were often the most 
reliable method for detecting foetal genetic defects.
125. States must allow individuals to make health care decisions in an active and in-
formed manner. Genetic examinations were one important source of information on foe-
tal health. Obstructing access to examinations necessary to make reproductive decisions 
interfered with women’s reproductive health care decision-making. Without information 
about whether a foetus was healthy or severely malformed, a woman could not make 
crucial decisions regarding prenatal treatment or whether to carry the foetus to term. 
When a country permitted abortion in cases of foetal genetic defect, women must have 
access to prenatal genetic examinations in order to exercise their right to a legal abortion.
126. One way in which States interfered with a woman’s right to decide on a legal abor-
tion was to make such abortions unavailable in practice. The Human Rights Committee 
had expressed concern regarding States that professed to grant women access to legal 
abortion but allowed practices to continue that interfered with actual access to abortion 
services.
127. Where a State allowed providers to conscientiously object to providing health services, 
it must ensure that it had other adequate procedures in place to safeguard women’s ability 
to effectively exercise their rights under Article 8 of the Convention, including the right to 
an abortion where legal and the right to information regarding their health status.
[…]
B. Alleged violation of Article 3 of the Convention
[…]
2. The Court’s assessment
 a) General principles
148. According to the Court’s well-established case-law, ill-treatment must attain a mini-
mum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this 
minimum level of severity is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such 
as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the 
sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among many other authorities, Price v. the 
R. R. v. Poland
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United Kingdom, no. 33394/96, § 24, ECHR 2001-VII; Kupczak v. Poland, no. 2627/09, 
§ 58, 25 January 2011; Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no. 54810/00, § ..., ECHR 2006-IX).
149. Treatment has been held by the Court to be “inhuman” because, inter alia, it was 
premeditated, was applied for hours at a stretch and caused either actual bodily injury 
or intense physical and mental suffering (see Labita, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, 
§ 120, ECHR 2000-IV).
150. Treatment has been considered “degrading” when it was such as to arouse in its 
victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them 
(see, among many other authorities, Iwańczuk v. Poland, no. 25196/94, § 51, 15 Novem-
ber 2001; Wiktorko v. Poland, no. 14612/02, § 45, 31 March 2009).
151. Although the purpose of such treatment is a factor to be taken into account, 
in particular whether it was intended to humiliate or debase the victim, the absence 
of any such purpose does not inevitably lead to a finding that there has been no violation 
of Article 3. For example, the Court has found violations of that provision in many cases 
where the authorities dealt with requests to provide information of crucial importance 
for the applicants, for example about the whereabouts and fate of their missing rela-
tives, disclosing a callous disregard for their vulnerability and distress (see, among many 
other authorities, Kukayev v. Russia, no. 29361/02, §§ 102-106; 15 November 2007; 
Takhayeva and others v. Russia, no. 23286/04, §§ 102-104, 18 September 2008).
152. Moreover, it cannot be excluded that the acts and omissions of the authorities in 
the field of health care policy may in certain circumstances engage their responsibility 
under Article 3 by reason of their failure to provide appropriate medical treatment (see, 
for example, Powell v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 45305/99, ECHR 2000-V).
 b) Application of the principles to the circumstances of the case
153. Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes that the re-
sults of the ultrasound scan carried out in the 18th week of the applicant’s pregnancy 
confirmed the likelihood that the foetus was affected with an unidentified malformation 
(see paragraph 9 above). Following that scan the applicant feared that the foetus was 
affected with a genetic disorder and that, in the light of the results of subsequent scans 
her fears cannot be said to have been without foundation. She tried, repeatedly and with 
perseverance, through numerous visits to doctors and through her written requests and 
complaints, to obtain access to genetic tests which would have provided her with infor-
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mation confirming or dispelling her fears; to no avail. For weeks she was made to believe 
that she would undergo the necessary tests. She was repeatedly sent to various doctors, 
clinics and hospitals far from her home and even hospitalised for several days for no clear 
clinical purpose (see paragraph 20 above). The Court finds that the determination of 
whether the applicant should have access to genetic testing, recommended by doctors 
in light of the findings of the second ultrasound scan, was marred by procrastination, 
confusion and lack of proper counselling and information given to the applicant.
Ultimately, it was only by following the advice given by Professor K.Sz., the only doctor 
who was sympathetic to her plight, that the applicant obtained admission to a hospital in 
Łódź by means of subterfuge. She reported to that hospital as an emergency patient and 
finally had the tests conducted in the 23rd week of her pregnancy, on 26 March 2002. 
The applicant obtained the results on 9 April 2002, two weeks later.
[…]
156. In this connection, the Court cannot but note that the 1993 Act determining the 
conditions permitting termination of pregnancy expressly and unequivocally provides, 
and provided at the relevant time, for the State’s obligation to ensure unimpeded access 
to prenatal information and testing. Section 2 (a) of this Act imposed such an obligation 
on the State and local administration in particular in cases of suspicion of genetic disorder 
or development problems. This obligation covered all cases in which such suspicion arose 
in respect of a pregnancy, with no distinction whatsoever being drawn in the Act based 
on the severity of the suspected ailment (see paragraph 66 above).
157. The Court further observes that the Medical Profession Act clearly provides and 
provided at the material time for a general obligation for doctors to give patients 
comprehensible information about their condition, the diagnosis, the proposed and 
possible diagnostic and therapeutic methods, the foreseeable consequences of a deci-
sion to have recourse to them or not, the possible results of the therapy and about the 
prognosis (see paragraph 74 above). Likewise, the Medical Institutions Act, applicable 
at the material time, provided for patients’ right to obtain comprehensive information 
on their health (see paragraph 72 above). Hence, there was an array of unequivocal 
legal provisions in force at the relevant time specifying the State’s positive obligations 
towards pregnant women regarding their access to information about their health and 
that of the foetus.
[…]
R. R. v. Poland
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159. The Court notes that the applicant was in a situation of great vulnerability. Like 
any other pregnant woman in her situation, she was deeply distressed by information 
that the foetus could be affected with some malformation. It was therefore natural that 
she wanted to obtain as much information as possible so as to find out whether the 
initial diagnosis was correct, and if so, what was the exact nature of the ailment. She 
also wanted to find out about the options available to her. As a result of the procras-
tination of the health professionals as described above, she had to endure weeks of 
painful uncertainty concerning the health of the foetus, her own and her family’s future 
and the prospect of raising a child suffering from an incurable ailment. She suffered 
acute anguish through having to think about how she and her family would be able 
to ensure the child’s welfare, happiness and appropriate long-term medical care. Her 
concerns were not properly acknowledged and addressed by the health professionals 
dealing with her case. The Court emphasises that six weeks elapsed between 20 Febru-
ary 2002 when the first ultrasound scan gave rise, for the first time, to a suspicion re-
garding the foetus’ condition and 9 April 2002 when the applicant finally obtained the 
information she was seeking, confirmed by way of genetic testing. No regard was had 
to the temporal aspect of the applicant’s predicament. She obtained the results of the 
tests when it was already too late for her to make an informed decision on whether to 
continue the pregnancy or to have recourse to legal abortion as the time limit provided 
for by section 4 (a) paragraph 2 had already expired.
160. The Court is further of the view that the applicant’s suffering, both before the 
results of the tests became known and after that date, could be said to have been 
aggravated by the fact that the diagnostic services which she had requested early on 
were at all times available and that she was entitled as a matter of domestic law to avail 
herself of them.
It is a matter of great regret that the applicant was so shabbily treated by the doctors 
dealing with her case. The Court can only agree with the Polish Supreme Court’s view 
that the applicant had been humiliated (see paragraph 54 above).
161. The Court is of the view that the applicant’s suffering reached the minimum thresh-
old of severity under Article 3 of the Convention.
[…]
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C. Alleged violation of Article 8 of the Convention
[…]
3. The Court’s assessment
 a) Applicability of Article 8 of the Convention
[…]
180. The Court reiterates that “private life” is a broad concept, encompassing, inter alia, 
the right to personal autonomy and personal development (see, among many other au-
thorities, Bensaid v. the United Kingdom, no. 44599/98, § 47, ECHR 2001-I). The Court 
has held that the notion of personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the 
interpretation of its guarantees (see Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346/02, § 61, 
ECHR 2002-III). The notion of private life concerns subjects such as gender identification, 
sexual orientation and sexual life (Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 22 Octo-
ber 1981, Series A no. 45, pp. 18-19, § 41, and Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v. the United 
Kingdom, judgment of 19 February 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-I, p. 
131, § 36) a person’s physical and psychological integrity (Tysiąc v. Poland, cited above, 
§ 107, ECHR 2007-IV). The Court has also held that the notion of private live applies to 
decisions both to have or not to have a child or to become parents (Evans v. the United 
Kingdom [GC], no. 6339/05, § 71, ECHR 2007-IV).
181. The Court has previously found, citing with approval the case-law of the former 
Commission, that the decision of a pregnant woman to continue her pregnancy or not 
belongs to the sphere of private life and autonomy. Consequently, also legislation regu-
lating the interruption of pregnancy touches upon the sphere of private life, since when-
ever a woman is pregnant her private life becomes closely connected with the developing 
foetus ( Eur.Comm. HR, Bruggeman and Scheuten v. Germany, cited above; Boso v.Italy 
(dec.), no. 50490/99, ECHR 2002-VII; Vo v. France [GC], no. 53924/00, § 76, ECHR 2004-
VIII; Tysiąc, cited above, §§ 106-107; A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], no. 25579/05, § 212, 
16 December 2010). It is also clear from an examination of these cases that the issue has 
always been determined by weighing up various, and sometimes conflicting, rights or 
freedoms claimed by a mother or a father in relation to one another or vis-à-vis the foetus 
(Vo v. France, cited above, § 82).
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182. The Court concludes that Article 8 of the Convention is applicable to the circum-
stances of the case.
 b) General principles
183. The essential object of Article 8 is to protect the individual against arbitrary interfer-
ence by public authorities. Any interference under the first paragraph of Article 8 must 
be justified in terms of the second paragraph, namely as being “in accordance with the 
law” and “necessary in a democratic society” for one or more of the legitimate aims 
listed therein. According to settled case-law, the notion of necessity implies that the in-
terference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular that it is proportionate 
to one of the legitimate aims pursued by the authorities (see, among other authorities, 
Olsson v. Sweden (No. 1), judgment of 24 March 1988, Series A no. 130, § 67).
184. In addition, there may also be positive obligations inherent in effective “respect” for 
private life. These obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure 
respect for private life even in the sphere of relations between individuals, including both 
the provision of a regulatory framework of adjudicatory and enforcement machinery pro-
tecting individuals’ rights and the implementation, where appropriate, of specific mea-
sures (see, among other authorities, X and Y v. the Netherlands, judgment of 26 March 
1985, Series A no. 91, p. 11, § 23).
185. The Court has previously found States to be under a positive obligation to secure 
to its citizens their right to effective respect for their physical and psychological integ-
rity (Glass v. the United Kingdom, no. 61827/00, §§ 74-83, ECHR 2004-II; Sentges v. 
the Netherlands (dec.) no. 27677/02, 8 July 2003; Pentiacova and others v. Moldova 
(dec.), no. 14462/03, ECHR 2005-...; Nitecki v. Poland (dec.), no. 65653/01, 21 March 
2002; Odièvre v.France [GC], cited above, § 42). In addition, these obligations may 
involve the adoption of measures, including the provision of an effective and acces-
sible means of protecting the right to respect for private life (Airey v. Ireland, 9 October 
1979, § 33, Series A no. 32, McGinley and Egan v. the United Kingdom, 9 June 1998, 
§ 101, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-III; and Roche v. the United Kingdom 
[GC], no. 32555/96, § 162, ECHR 2005-X) including both the provision of a regulatory 
framework of adjudicatory and enforcement machinery protecting individuals’ rights 
and the implementation, where appropriate, of specific measures in the context of 
abortion (Tysiąc v. Poland , cited above, § 110; A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], cited above, 
§ 245).
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186. The Court has already held that the issue of when the right to life begins comes 
within the margin of appreciation which the Court generally considers that States should 
enjoy in this sphere, notwithstanding an evolutive interpretation of the Convention, a 
“living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions” 
(see, among many other authorities, E.B. v. France [GC], no. 43546/02, § 92, ECHR 
2008-...). The reasons for that conclusion are that the issue of such protection has not 
been resolved within the majority of the Contracting States themselves and that there 
is no European consensus on the scientific and legal definition of the beginning of life 
(Vo v. France, cited above, § 82). However, the Court considers that there is indeed a 
consensus amongst a substantial majority of the Contracting States of the Council of 
Europe towards allowing abortion and that most Contracting Parties have in their leg-
islation resolved the conflicting rights of the foetus and the mother in favour of greater 
access to abortion (see (A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], cited above, 16 December 2010, §§ 
235 and 237).
Since the rights claimed on behalf of the foetus and those of the mother are inextrica-
bly interconnected, the margin of appreciation accorded to a State’s protection of the 
unborn necessarily translates into a margin of appreciation for that State as to how it 
balances the conflicting rights of the mother. In the absence of such common approach 
regarding the beginning of life, the examination of national legal solutions as applied to 
the circumstances of individual cases is of particular importance also for the assessment 
of whether a fair balance between individual rights and the public interest has been 
maintained (see also, for such an approach, A, B, and C cited above, § 214).
187. Moreover, as in the negative obligation context, the State enjoys a certain margin of 
appreciation (see, among other authorities, Keegan v. Ireland, judgment of 26 May 1994, 
Series A no. 290, § 49). While a broad margin of appreciation is accorded to the State 
as regards the circumstances in which an abortion will be permitted in a State, once that 
decision is taken the legal framework devised for this purpose should be “shaped in a 
coherent manner which allows the different legitimate interests involved to be taken into 
account adequately and in accordance with the obligations deriving from the Conven-
tion” (A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], cited above, § 249).
188. The Court notes the applicant’s submission that the failure to allow her timely access 
to prenatal genetic tests had amounted to an interference with her rights guaranteed 
by Article 8. Furthermore, the Court has found that prohibition of the termination of 
pregnancies sought for reasons of health and /or well-being amounted to an interference 
R. R. v. Poland
126
H
ea
lth
 an
d 
Re
pr
od
uc
tiv
e R
ig
ht
s
with the applicants’ right to respect for their private lives (see A., B., and C. v. Ireland, 
cited above, § 216).
However, in the present case the Court is confronted with a particular combination of a 
general right of access to information about one’s health with the right to decide on the 
continuation of pregnancy. Compliance with the State’s positive obligation to secure to 
their citizens their right to effective respect for their physical and psychological integrity 
may necessitate, in turn, the adoption of regulations concerning access to information 
about an individual’s health (Guerra and others v. Italy, 19 February 1998, § 60, Reports 
1998-I; Roche v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 32555/96, § 155, ECHR 2005-X; K.H. and 
others v. Slovakia, no. 32881/04, §§ 50-56, ECHR 2009-... (extracts)). Hence, and since the 
nature of the right to decide on the continuation of pregnancy is not absolute, the Court 
is of the view that the circumstances of the present case are more appropriately examined 
from the standpoint of the respondent State’s positive obligations arising under this provi-
sion of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Tysiąc v. Poland, cited above, § 108).
189. The boundaries between the State’s positive and negative obligations under this 
provision do not lend themselves to precise definition. The applicable principles are none-
theless similar. In both the negative and positive contexts regard must be had to the fair 
balance that has to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and of 
the community as a whole; and in both contexts the State enjoys a certain margin of ap-
preciation (see, among other authorities, Keegan v. Ireland, judgment of 26 May 1994, 
Series A no. 290, p. 19, § 49; and Róńański v. Poland, no. 55339/00, § 61, 18 May 2006). 
While the State regulations on abortion relate to the traditional balancing of privacy 
and the public interest, they must – in case of a therapeutic abortion – be also assessed 
against the positive obligations of the State to secure the physical integrity of mothers-
to-be (see Tysiąc v. Poland, cited above, § 107).
190. The notion of “respect” is not clear-cut, especially as far as those positive obliga-
tions are concerned: having regard to the diversity of the practices followed and the 
situations obtaining in the Contracting States, the notion’s requirements will vary consid-
erably from case to case. Nonetheless, in assessing the positive obligations of the State 
it must be borne in mind that the rule of law, one of the fundamental principles of a 
democratic society, is inherent in all the Articles of the Convention (see, e.g., Armonienń 
v. Lithuania, no. 36919/02, § 38, 25 November 2008; Zehnalová and Zehnal v. the Czech 
Republic (dec.), no. 38621/97, ECHR 2002-V). Compliance with requirements imposed 
by the rule of law presupposes that the rules of domestic law must provide a measure 
of legal protection against arbitrary interferences by public authorities with the rights 
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safeguarded by the Convention (see Malone v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 2 Au-
gust 1984, Series A no. 82, p. 32, § 67; Segerstedt-Wiberg and others v. Sweden, no. 
62332/00, § 76, ECHR 2006-VII).
191. Finally, the Court reiterates that in the assessment of the present case it should be 
borne in mind that the Convention is intended to guarantee not rights that are theoreti-
cal or illusory but rights that are practical and effective (see Airey v. Ireland, judgment of 
9 October 1979, Series A no. 32, p. 12-13, § 24). Whilst Article 8 contains no explicit pro-
cedural requirements, it is important for the effective enjoyment of the rights guaranteed 
by this provision that the relevant decision-making process is fair and such as to afford 
due respect for the interests safeguarded by it. What has to be determined is whether, 
having regard to the particular circumstances of the case and notably the nature of the 
decisions to be taken, an individual has been involved in the decision-making process, 
seen as a whole, to a degree sufficient to provide her or him with the requisite protection 
of their interests (see, mutatis mutandis, W. v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 8 July 
1987, Series A no. 121, pp. 28-29, §§ 62 and 64). The Court has already held that in 
the context of access to abortion a relevant procedure should guarantee to a pregnant 
woman at least a possibility to be heard in person and to have her views considered. The 
competent body or person should also issue written grounds for its decision (see Tysiąc v. 
Poland, cited above, § 117).
 c) Compliance with Article 8 of the Convention
192. When examining the circumstances of the present case, the Court cannot overlook 
its general national context. It notes that the 1993 Act specifies situations in which abor-
tion is allowed. A doctor who terminates a pregnancy in breach of the conditions speci-
fied in that Act is guilty of a criminal offence punishable by up to three years’ imprison-
ment (see paragraph 70 above).
193. The Court has already found that the legal restrictions on abortion in Poland, taken 
together with the risk of their incurring criminal responsibility under Article 156 § 1 of the 
Criminal Code, can well have a chilling effect on doctors when deciding whether the re-
quirements of legal abortion are met in an individual case (see Tysiąc v. Poland, no. 5410/03, 
§ 116, ECHR 2007-IV). It further notes that in the circumstances of the present case this was 
borne out also by the fact that the T. hospital’s lawyer was asked to give an opinion on steps 
to be taken with a view to ensuring that the conditions of the 1993 Act as to the availability 
of abortion were respected. The Court is of the view that provisions regulating the availabil-
ity of lawful abortion should be formulated in such a way as to alleviate this chilling effect.
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194. The Court further notes that in its fifth periodical report to the ICCPR Committee, 
relevant for the assessment of the circumstances obtaining at the relevant time, the Pol-
ish Government acknowledged, inter alia, that there had been deficiencies in the manner 
in which the 1993 Act had been applied in practice (see paragraph 84 above). It further 
notes the concern expressed by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women as regards access by women in Poland to reproductive health services 
and to lawful abortion (see paragraph 86 above).
195. The Court notes that in its judgment in the case Tysiąc v. Poland, referred to above, 
it highlighted the importance of procedural safeguards in the context of the implemen-
tation of the 1993 Act in situations where a pregnant woman had objective grounds 
for fearing that pregnancy and delivery would have a serious negative impact on her 
health. In that case the Court held that Polish law did not contain any effective proce-
dural mechanisms capable of determining whether the conditions existed for obtaining 
a lawful abortion on the grounds of danger to the mother’s health which the pregnancy 
might present, or of addressing the mother’s legitimate fears (see Tysiąc v. Poland, cited 
above, §§ 119 – 124, ECHR 2007-IV).
196. The Court discerns certain differences between the issues concerned in the Tysiąc 
v. Poland case and those to be examined in the context of the present case, where the 
applicant persistently but unsuccessfully sought access to prenatal genetic testing. It was 
not access to abortion as such which was primarily in issue, but essentially timely ac-
cess to a medical diagnostic service that would, in turn, make it possible to determine 
whether the conditions for lawful abortion obtained in the applicant’s situation or not. 
Hence, the starting point for the Court’s analysis is the question of an individual’s access 
to information about her or his health.
197. The right of access to such information falling within the ambit of the notion 
of private life can be said to comprise, in the Court’s view, on the one hand, a right 
to obtain available information on one’s condition. The Court further considers that 
during pregnancy the foetus’ condition and health constitute an element of the preg-
nant woman’s health (see Eur. Comm. HR, Bruggeman and Schouten v. Germany, cited 
above, § 59, mutatis mutandis). The effective exercise of this right is often decisive for 
the possibility of exercising personal autonomy, also covered by Article 8 of the Con-
vention (Pretty v. the United Kingdom, cited above, § 61, ECHR 2002-III) by deciding, 
on the basis of such information, on the future course of events relevant for the indi-
vidual’s quality of life (e.g. by refusing consent to medical treatment or by requesting a 
given form of treatment).
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The significance of timely access to information concerning one’s condition applies with 
particular force to situations where rapid developments in the individual’s condition occur 
and his or her capacity to take relevant decisions is thereby reduced. In the same vein, 
in the context of pregnancy, the effective access to relevant information on the mother’s 
and foetus’ health, where legislation allows for abortion in certain situations, is directly 
relevant for the exercise of personal autonomy.
198. In the present case the essential problem was precisely that of access to medical 
procedures, enabling the applicant to acquire full information about the foetus’ health.
While the Convention does not guarantee as such a right to free medical care or to spe-
cific medical services, in a number of cases the Court has held that Article 8 is relevant to 
complaints about insufficient availability of health care services (Nitecki v. Poland (dec.), 
cited above; Pentiacova and others v. Moldova (dec.), cited above). The present case dif-
fers from cases where the applicants complained about denial of or difficulties in obtain-
ing access to certain health services for reasons of insufficient funding or availability. The 
Court has already found that it has not been argued, let alone shown, that there were 
any objective reasons why the genetic tests were not carried out immediately after the 
suspicions as to the foetus’ condition had arisen but only after a lengthy delay (…). The 
difficulties the applicant experienced seem to have been caused, in part, by reticence on 
the part of certain doctors involved to issue a referral, and also by a certain organisa-
tional and administrative confusion in the health system at the material time as to the 
procedure applicable in cases of patients seeking services available outside their particular 
region of the then Medical Insurance Fund and the modalities of reimbursement between 
the regions of costs incurred in connection with such services.
199. The Court emphasises the relevance of the information which the applicant sought 
to obtain by way of genetic testing to the decision concerning continuation of her preg-
nancy. The 1993 Act allows for an abortion to be carried out before the foetus is capable 
of surviving outside the mother’s body if prenatal tests or other medical findings indicate 
a high risk that the foetus will be severely and irreversibly damaged or suffer from an 
incurable life-threatening ailment. Hence, access to full and reliable information on the 
foetus’ health is not only important for the comfort of the pregnant woman but also a 
necessary prerequisite for a legally permitted possibility to have an abortion to arise.
200. In this context, the Court reiterates its finding made in the case of Tysiąc v. Poland 
that once the State, acting within the limits of the margin of appreciation, referred to 
above, adopts statutory regulations allowing abortion in some situations, it must not 
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structure its legal framework in a way which would limit real possibilities to obtain it. 
In particular, the State is under a positive obligation to create a procedural framework 
enabling a pregnant woman to exercise her right of access to lawful abortion (Tysiąc v. 
Poland, no. 5410/03, §§ 116 - 124, ECHR 2007-IV). In other words, if the domestic law 
allows for abortion in cases of foetal malformation, there must be an adequate legal and 
procedural framework to guarantee that relevant, full and reliable information on the 
foetus’ health is available to pregnant women.
201. In the present case, the Court reiterates that six weeks elapsed from the date when 
the first concerns arose regarding the foetus’ health until their confirmation by way of 
genetic tests (see also paragraph 152 above).
202. The Court stresses that it is not its function to question doctors’ clinical judgment 
(see Glass v. the United Kingdom, cited above). It is therefore not for the Court to em-
bark on any attempt to determine the severity of the condition with which the doctors 
suspected that the foetus was affected, or whether that suspected condition could have 
been regarded as entitling the applicant to a legal abortion available under the provisions 
of section 4 (a) of that Act. In the Court’s view this is wholly irrelevant for the assessment 
of the case at hand, given that the legal obligation to secure access to pre-natal genetic 
testing arose under the provisions of the 1993 Act regardless of the nature and severity 
of the suspected condition (…).
203. The Court observes that the nature of the issues involved in a woman’s decision to 
terminate a pregnancy is such that the time factor is of critical importance. The proce-
dures in place should therefore ensure that such decisions are taken in good time. The 
Court is of the view that there was ample time between week 18 of the pregnancy, when 
the suspicions first arose, and week 22, the stage of pregnancy at which it is generally 
accepted that the foetus is capable of surviving outside the mother’s body and regarded 
as time-limit for legal abortion, to carry out genetic testing. The Court notes that the Su-
preme Court criticised the conduct of the medical professionals who had been involved 
in the applicant’s case and the procrastination shown in deciding whether to give the 
applicant a referral for genetic tests. Such a critical assessment on the part of the highest 
domestic judicial authority is certainly, in the Court’s view, of relevance for the overall as-
sessment of the circumstances of the case.
204. As a result, the applicant was unable to obtain a diagnosis of the foetus’ condition, 
established with the requisite certainty, by genetic tests within the time-limit for abortion 
to remain a lawful option for her.
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205. In so far as the Government argued that in the present case access to genetic test-
ing was closely linked, to the point of being identical, with access to abortion (…), the 
Court observes that prenatal genetic tests serve various purposes and they should not 
be identified with encouraging pregnant women to seek an abortion. Firstly, they can 
simply dispel the suspicion that the foetus was affected with some malformation; sec-
ondly, a woman carrying the foetus concerned can well choose to carry the pregnancy 
to term and have the baby; thirdly, in some cases (although not in the present one), 
prenatal diagnosis of an ailment makes it possible to embark on prenatal treatment; 
fourthly, even in the event of a negative diagnosis, it gives the woman and her family 
time to prepare for the birth of a baby affected with an ailment, in terms of counsel-
ling and coping with the stress occasioned by such a diagnosis. Furthermore, the Court 
emphasises that the 1993 Act clearly provides for a possibility of abortion in cases of 
certain malformations. It is not in dispute that some of these malformations could only 
be detected by way of prenatal genetic tests. Therefore the Government’s argument 
has failed to convince the Court.
206. In so far as the Government referred in their submissions to the right of physi-
cians to refuse certain services on grounds of conscience and referred to Article 9 of the 
Convention, the Court reiterates that the word “practice” used in Article 9 § 1 does not 
denote each and every act or form of behaviour motivated or inspired by a religion or 
a belief (see Pichon and Sajous v. France (dec.), no. 49853/99, ECHR 2001-X). For the 
Court, States are obliged to organise the health services system in such a way as to en-
sure that an effective exercise of the freedom of conscience of health professionals in the 
professional context does not prevent patients from obtaining access to services to which 
they are entitled under the applicable legislation.
207. The Court further observes that the Government referred to the Ordinance of the 
Minister of Health of 22 January 1997 (see paragraph 68 above), arguing that it provided 
for a procedure governing decisions on access to abortion. However, the Court has al-
ready held that this Ordinance did not provide for any procedural framework to address 
and resolve controversies between the pregnant woman and her doctors or between the 
doctors themselves as to the availability of lawful abortion in an individual case (see Tysiąc 
v. Poland, cited above, § 121).
208. The Court concludes that it has not been demonstrated that Polish law as applied to 
the applicant’s case contained any effective mechanisms which would have enabled the 
applicant to seek access to a diagnostic service, decisive for the possibility of exercising 
her right to take an informed decision as to whether to seek an abortion or not.
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209. In so far as the Government relied on the instruments of civil law as capable of ad-
dressing the applicant’s situation, the Court has already held, in the context of the case 
of Tysiąc v. Poland, cited above, that the provisions of the civil law as applied by the Polish 
courts did not afford the applicant a procedural instrument by which she could have fully 
vindicated her right to respect for her private life. The civil law remedy was solely of a ret-
roactive and compensatory character. The Court was of the view that such retrospective 
measures alone were not sufficient to provide appropriate protection of personal rights 
of a pregnant woman in the context of a controversy concerning the determination of 
access to lawful abortion and emphasised the vulnerability of the woman’s position in 
such circumstances (see Tysiąc v. Poland, no. 5410/03, § 125, ECHR 2007-IV). Given the 
retrospective nature of compensatory civil law, the Court fails to see any grounds on 
which to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
It therefore considers that it had not been demonstrated that Polish law contained any 
effective mechanisms which would have enabled the applicant to have access to the 
available diagnostic services and to take, in the light of their results, an informed decision 
as to whether to seek an abortion or not.
210. Consequently, the Court considers that neither the medical consultation nor litiga-
tion options relied on by the Government constituted effective and accessible procedures 
which would have allowed the applicant to establish her right to a lawful abortion in 
Poland. The uncertainty generated by the lack of legislative implementation of Article 
4 (a) 1.2 of the 1993 Family Planning Act, and more particularly by the lack of effective 
and accessible procedures to establish a right to an abortion under that provision, has 
resulted in a striking discordance between the theoretical right to a lawful abortion in 
Poland on grounds referred to in this provision and the reality of its practical implementa-
tion (Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], cited above, at §§ 77-78; and S. H. 
and others v. Austria, cited above, at § 74, mutatis mutandis; A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], 
no. 25579/05, §§ 263-264, 16 December 2010).
211. Having regard to the circumstances of the case as a whole, it cannot therefore be 
said that, by putting in place legal procedures which make it possible to vindicate her 
rights, the Polish State complied with its positive obligations to safeguard the applicant’s 
right to respect for her private life in the context of controversy over whether she should 
have had access to, firstly, prenatal genetic tests and subsequently, an abortion, had the 
applicant chosen this option for her.
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212. The Court therefore dismisses the Government’s preliminary objection concerning 
civil litigation as an effective remedy. Furthermore, the Court, having regard to the cir-
cumstances of the case seen as a whole, has already found insufficient the award made 
by the domestic courts in the civil proceedings for the violations alleged by the applicant 
(…). Accordingly, it dismisses also the Government’s preliminary objection that the ap-
plicant had lost her status of a victim of a breach of Article 8 of the Convention.
213. The Court reiterates that effective implementation of Article 4 (a) 1.2 of the 1993 
Family Planning Act would necessitate ensuring to pregnant women access to diagnostic 
services which would make it possible for them to establish or dispel a suspicion that 
the foetus may be affected with ailments. The Court has already found that in the pres-
ent case it has not been established that such services were unavailable. Moreover, an 
effective implementation of the provisions of the 1993 Act cannot, in the Court’s view, 
be considered to impose a significant burden on the Polish State since it would amount 
to rendering operational a right to abortion already accorded in that Act in certain nar-
rowly defined circumstances, including in certain cases of foetal malformation (A, B and 
C v. Ireland [GC], cited above, § 261, mutatis mutandis). While it is not for this Court to 
indicate the most appropriate means for the State to comply with its positive obligations 
(Airey v. Ireland judgment, § 26; cited above), the Court notes that the legislation in many 
Contracting States has specified the conditions governing effective access to a lawful 
abortion and put in place various implementing procedural and institutional procedures 
(Tysiąc v. Poland judgment, § 123).
214. The Court concludes that the authorities failed to comply with their positive obliga-
tions to secure to the applicant effective respect for her private life and that there has 
therefore been a breach of Article 8 of the Convention.
[…]
for theSe reaSon, the courtS
[…]
2. Holds by six votes to one that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention;
3. Holds by six votes to one that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention;
[…]. 
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[…]
viewS under articLe 7, paragraph 3, of the optionaL 
protocoL
1.1 The author of the communication dated 12 February 2004, is Ms. A. S., a Hungar-
ian Roma woman, born on 5 September 1973. She claims to have been subjected to 
coerced sterilization by medical staff at a Hungarian hospital. The author is represented 
by the European Roma Rights Center, an organization in special consultative status with 
the Economic and Social Council, and the Legal Defense Bureau for National and Ethnic 
Minorities, an organization in Hungary. The Convention and its Optional Protocol entered 
into force for the State party on 3 September 1981 and 22 March 2001, respectively.
The facts as presented by the author
2.1 The author is the mother of three children. On 30 May 2000, she was examined 
by a doctor and found to be pregnant, the delivery date estimated to be 20 December 
2000, during that time, she followed antenatal treatment and attended all the sched-
uled appointments with the district nurse and gynecologist. On 20 December 2000, 
the author reported to the maternity ward of Fehérgyarmat Hospital. She was exam-
ined and found to be 36 to 37 weeks pregnant and was asked to return when she went 
into labour.
2.2 On 2 January 2001, the author went into labour pain and her amniotic fluid broke. 
This was accompanied by heavy bleeding. She was taken to Fehérgyarmat Hospital, one 
hour’s drive by ambulance. While examining the author, the attending physician found 
that the foetus (the term “embryo” is used) had died in her womb and informed her that 
a caesarean section needed to be performed immediately in order to remove the dead 
foetus. While on the operating table, the author was asked to sign a form consenting 
to the caesarean section. She signed this as well as a barely legible note that had been 
hand-written by the doctor and added to the bottom of the form, which read:
“Having knowledge of the death of the embryo inside my womb I firmly request my 
sterilization [a Latin term unknown to the author was used]. I do not intend to give 
birth again; neither do I wish to become pregnant.” 
The attending physician and the midwife signed the same form. The author also signed 
statements of consent for a blood transfusion and for anaesthesia.
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2.3 Hospital records show that within 17 minutes of the ambulance arriving at the hos-
pital, the caesarean section was performed, the dead foetus and placenta were removed 
and the author’s fallopian tubes were tied. Before leaving the hospital the author asked 
the doctor for information on her state of health and when she could try to have another 
baby. It was only then that she learned the meaning of the word “sterilization”. The 
medical records also revealed the poor health condition of the author when she arrived 
at the hospital. She felt dizzy upon arrival, was bleeding more heavily than average and 
was in a state of shock.
2.4 The author states that the sterilization has had a profound impact on her life for 
which she and her partner have been treated medically for depression. She would never 
have agreed to the sterilization as she has strict Catholic religious beliefs that prohibit 
contraception of any kind, including sterilization. Furthermore, she and her partner live 
in accordance with traditional Roma customs — where having children is said to be a 
central element of the value system of Roma families.
2.5 On 15 October 2001, a lawyer with the Legal Defense Bureau for National and Eth-
nic Minorities, filed a civil claim on behalf of the author against Fehérgyarmat Hospital, 
inter alia, requesting that the Fehérgyarmat Town Court find the hospital in violation 
of the author’s civil rights. She also claimed that the hospital had acted negligently by 
sterilizing the author without obtaining her full and informed consent. Pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary damages were sought.
2.6 On 22 November 2002, the Fehérgyarmat Town Court rejected the author’s claim, 
despite a finding of some negligence on the part of the doctors, who had failed to com-
ply with certain legal provisions, namely, the failure to inform the author’s partner of the 
operation and its possible consequences as well as to obtain the birth certificates of the 
author’s live children. The Court reasoned that the medical conditions for sterilization 
prevailed in the author’s case and that she had been informed about her sterilization and 
given all relevant information in a way in which she could understand it. The Court also 
found that the author had given her consent accordingly. The Court further viewed as 
a “partial extenuating circumstance towards the defendant’s negligence the fact that, 
with the author’s consent, the doctors performed the sterilization with special dispatch 
simultaneously with the Caesarean section”.
2.7 On 5 December 2002, the lawyer filed an appeal on behalf of the author before the 
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg County Court against the decision of the Fehérgyarmat Town Court.
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2.8 On 12 May 2003, the author’s appeal was rejected. The appellate court found that 
although article 187, paragraph 4 (a), of Hungary’s Act on Health Care allowed for the 
exceptional performance of the sterilization, the operation was not of a life-saving char-
acter, and therefore, the sterilization procedure should have been subject to the informed 
consent of the author. The appellate court further found that the doctors acted negli-
gently in failing to provide her with detailed information (about the method of the op-
eration, of the risks of its performance and of the alternative procedures and methods, 
including other options of birth control) and that the written consent of the author could 
not in and of itself exclude the hospital’s liability. The appellate court, however, turned 
down the appeal on the ground that the author had failed to prove a lasting handicap 
and its causal relationship with the conduct of the hospital. The appellate court reasoned 
that the performed sterilization was not a lasting and irreversible operation inasmuch as 
the tying of fallopian tubes can be terminated by plastic surgery on the tubes and the 
likelihood of her becoming pregnant by artificial insemination could not be excluded. 
Based on her failure to prove that she had lost her reproductive capacity permanently 
and its causal relationship to the conduct of the doctors, the appellate court dismissed 
the appeal.
[…]
iSSueS and proceedingS before the committee
[…]
Consideration of the merits
11.1 The Committee has considered the present communication in light of all the infor-
mation made available to it by the author and by the State party, as provided in article 7, 
paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol. 
11.2 According to Article 10 (h) of the Convention: 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women in order to ensure to them equal rights with men in the field of education 
and in particular to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women:
(…)
h) Access to specific educational information to help to ensure the health and well 
being of families, including information and advice on family planning.
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With respect to the claim that the State party violated article 10 (h) of the Convention by 
failing to provide information and advice on family planning, the Committee recalls its gen-
eral recommendation No. 21 on equality in marriage and family relations, which recognizes 
in the context of “coercive practices which have serious consequences for women, such as 
forced … sterilization” that informed decision-making about safe and reliable contracep-
tive measures depends upon a woman having “information about contraceptive measures 
and their use, and guaranteed access to sex education and family planning services”. The 
Committee notes the State party’s arguments that the author was given correct and ap-
propriate information at the time of the operation, during prenatal care and during her 
three previous pregnancies as well as its argument that, according to the decision of the 
lower court, the author had been in a condition in which she was able to understand the 
information provided. On the other hand, the Committee notes the author’s reference to 
the judgment of the appellate court, which found that the author had not been provided 
with detailed information about the sterilization, including the risks involved and the con-
sequences of the surgery, alternative procedures or contraceptive methods. The Commit-
tee considers that the author has a right protected by article 10 (h) of the Convention to 
specific information on sterilization and alternative procedures for family planning in order 
to guard against such an intervention being carried out without her having made a fully 
informed choice. Furthermore, the Committee notes the description given of the author’s 
state of health on arrival at the hospital and observes that any counselling that she received 
must have been given under stressful and most inappropriate conditions. Considering all 
these factors, the Committee finds a failure of the State party, through the hospital person-
nel, to provide appropriate information and advice on family planning, which constitutes a 
violation of the author’s right under article 10 (h) of the Convention.
11.3 Article 12 of the Convention reads:
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality 
of men and women, access to healthcare services, including those related to family 
planning.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article, States Parties shall 
ensure to women appropriate services in connexion with pregnancy, confinement 
and the post-natal period, granting free services where necessary, as well as ad-
equate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation.
With regard to the question of whether the State party violated the author’s rights under 
article 12 of the Convention by performing the sterilization surgery without obtaining her 
informed consent, the Committee takes note of the author’s description of the 17 minute 
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timespan from her admission to the hospital up to the completion of two medical proce-
dures. Medical records revealed that the author was in a very poor state of health upon 
arrival at the hospital; she was feeling dizzy, was bleeding more heavily than average and 
was in a state of shock. During those 17 minutes, she was prepared for surgery, signed 
the statements of consent for the caesarean section, the sterilization, a blood transfu-
sion and anaesthesia and underwent two medical procedures, namely, the caesarean 
section to remove the remains of the dead foetus and the sterilization. The Committee 
further takes note of the author’s claim that she did not understand the Latin term for 
sterilization that was used on the barely legible consent note that had been handwritten 
by the doctor attending to her, which she signed. The Committee also takes note of the 
averment of the State party to the effect that, during those 17 minutes, the author was 
given all appropriate information in a way in which she was able to understand it. The 
Committee finds that it is not plausible that during that period of time hospital personnel 
provided the author with thorough enough counseling and information about steriliza-
tion, as well as alternatives, risks and benefits, to ensure that the author could make a 
well-considered and voluntary decision to be sterilized. The Committee also takes note 
of the unchallenged fact that the author enquired of the doctor when it would be safe to 
conceive again, clearly indicating that she was unaware of the consequences of steriliza-
tion. According to article 12 of the Convention, States parties shall “ensure to women 
appropriate services in connexion with pregnancy, confinement, and the post-natal pe-
riod”. The Committee explained in its general recommendation No. 24 on women and 
health that “[A]cceptable services are those that are delivered in a way that ensures
that a woman gives her fully informed consent, respects her dignity (…)” The Committee 
further stated that “States parties should not permit forms of coercion, such as non-con-
sensual sterilization (…) that violate women’s rights to informed consent and dignity”. 
The Committee considers in the present case that the State party has not ensured that 
the author gave her fully informed consent to be sterilized and that consequently the 
rights of the author under article 12 were violated. 
11.4 Article 16, paragraph 1 e) of the Convention states: 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall 
ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women:
(…)
e) The same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of 
their children and to have access to the information, education and means to enable 
them to exercise these rights; 
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As to whether the State party violated the rights of the author under article 16, para-
graph 1 e) of the Convention, the Committee recalls its general recommendation No. 19 
on violence against women in which it states that“[C]ompulsory sterilization ...adversely 
affects women’s physical and mental health, and infringes the right of women to decide 
on the number and spacing of their children”. The sterilization surgery was performed on 
the author without her full and informed consent and must be considered to have per-
manently deprived her of her natural reproductive capacity. Accordingly, the Committee 
finds the author’s rights under article 16, paragraph 1 e) to have been violated.
11.5 Acting under article 7, paragraph 3 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women is of the view that the facts before it reveal 
a violation of articles 10 h), 12 and 16, paragraph 1 e) of the Convention and makes the 
following recommendations to the State party:
I. Concerning the author of the communication: provide appropriate compensation 
to Ms. A. S. commensurate with the gravity of the violations of her rights.
II. General:
• Take further measures to ensure that the relevant provisions of the Convention 
and the pertinent paragraphs of the Committee’s general recommendations Nos. 
19, 21 and 24 in relation to women’s reproductive health and rights are known and 
adhered to by all relevant personnel in public and private health centres, including 
hospitals and clinics.
• Review domestic legislation on the principle of informed consent in cases of steril-
ization and ensure its conformity with international human rights and medical stan-
dards, including the Convention of the Council of Europe on Human Rights and Bio-
medicine (“the Oviedo Convention”) and World Health Organization guidelines. In 
that connection, consider amending the provision in the Public Health Act whereby 
a physician is allowed “to deliver the sterilization without the information procedure 
generally specified when it seems to be appropriate in given circumstances”.
• Monitor public and private health centres, including hospitals and clinics, which 
perform sterilization procedures so as to ensure that fully informed consent is being 
given by the patient before any sterilization procedure is carried out, with appropri-
ate sanctions in place in the event of a breach.
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[…]
viewS under articLe 7, paragraph 3, of the optionaL 
protocoL
1. The author of the Communications, dated 30 November 2007, is Maria de Lourdes 
da Silva Pimentel, mother of Alyne da Silva Pimentel Teixeira (deceased), acting in her 
own name and on behalf of the family of the deceased. They are represented by the 
Center for Reproductive Rights and Advocacia Cidada pelos Direítos Humanos1. They 
claim that Alyne da Silva Pimentel Teixeira is a victim of a violation by the State party of 
her right to life and health under articles 2 and 12 of the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms if Discrimination against Women.
[…]
The Convention and its Optional Protocol entered into force for the State party on 2 
March 1984 and 28 September 2002, respectively.
The Facts as presented by the author
2.1 Alyne da Silva Pimentel Teixeira, a Brazilian national of African descent, was born 
on 29 September 1974. She was married and had a daughter, A.S.P., who was born on 
2 November 1997.
2.2 On 11 November 2002, Ms. da Silva Pimentel Teixeira went to the Casa de Saúde 
Nossa Senhora da Glória de Belford Roxo (the health centre) suffering from severe nausea 
and abdominal pain. She was in her sixth month of pregnancy at the time. The attending 
obstetrician-gynaecologist prescribed anti-nausea medication, vitamin B12 and a local 
medication for vaginal infection, scheduled routine blood and urine test for 13 Novem-
ber 2002 as a precautionary measure and sent Ms. da Silva Pimentel Teixeira home. She 
began to take the prescribed medications immediately.
1. The Committee received amicus curiae briefs from the Latin American and Caribbean Committee for the 
Defence of Women’s Rights, the Internacional Commission of Jurists and Amnesty International, providing 
general information with regard to the right to the health and maternal mortality in Brazil and drawing at-
tention to the international obligations of States. 
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2.3 Between 11 and 13 November 2002, Ms. da Silva Pimentel Teixeira’s condition 
worsened considerably and on 13 November 2002, she went to the health centre to-
gether with her mother in order to see if the obstetrician-gynaecologist could see her 
before her scheduled blood and urine analysis. The obstetrician-gynaecologist examined 
her and admitted her at 8.25 a.m. to the health centre.
2.4 Another doctor examined Ms. da Silva Pimentel Teixeira in the maternity ward and 
could not detect a foetal heartbeat. By 11 a.m., an ultrasound had confirmed this.
2.5 The doctors at the health centre informed Ms. da Silva Pimentel Teixeira that she 
needed to be given medication to induce the delivery of the stillborn foetus and began to 
induce labour at about 2 p.m. By 7.55 p.m., Ms. da Silva Pimentel Teixeira had delivered 
the stillborn, 27-week-old foetus. She became disoriented immediately afterwards.
2.6 On 14 November 2002, some 14 hours after the delivery, Ms. da Silva Pimen-
tel Teixeira underwent curettage surgery to remove parts of the placenta and after-
birth, after which her condition continued to worsen (severe haemorrhaging, vomit-
ing blood, low blood pressure, prolonged disorientation and overwhelming physical 
weakness, inability to ingest food). Her mother and husband did not visit the health 
centre that day because they relied on assurances given by phone that Ms. da Silva 
Pimentel Teixeira was well.
2.7 The author submits that on 15 November 2002, Ms. da Silva Pimentel Teixeira be-
came more disoriented, her blood pressure remained low, she continued to vomit, had 
difficulty breathing and she continued haemorrhaging. Staff of the health centre per-
formed an abdominal puncture but found no blood. Ms. da Silva Pimentel Teixeira re-
ceived oxygen, Cimetidina, Mannitol, Decadron and antibiotics. The doctors explained to 
her mother that her symptoms were consistent with those of a woman who had never 
received prenatal care and that she needed a blood transfusion; at that point she called 
Ms. da Silva Pimentel Teixeira’s husband, who then went to the health centre. At 1.30 
p.m. staff asked Ms. da Silva Pimentel Teixeira’s mother for the prenatal medical records 
because they could not locate any at the health centre.
2.8 The doctors at the health centre contacted both public and private hospitals with 
superior facilities in order to transfer Ms. da Silva Pimentel Teixeira. Only the municipal 
Hospital Geral de Nova Iguaçu had available space but refused to use its only ambulance 
to transport her at that hour. Her mother and husband were unable to secure a private 
ambulance and Ms. da Silva Pimentel Teixeira waited in critical condition for eight hours, 
146
H
ea
lth
 an
d 
Re
pr
od
uc
tiv
e R
ig
ht
s
with manifested clinical symptoms of coma for the last two hours, to be transported by 
ambulance to the hospital.
2.9 When Ms. da Silva Pimentel Teixeira arrived at the hospital with two doctors and her 
husband at 9.45 p.m. on 15 November 2002, she was hypothermic, has acute respira-
tory distress and presented a clinical picture compatible with disseminated intravascular 
coagulation. Her blood pressure dropped to zero and she had to be resuscitated. The 
hospital placed her in makeshift area in the emergency room hallway because there were 
no available beds.
2.10 The medical attendants did not bring her medical records to the hospital. Instead, 
they provided the treating physician with a brief oral account of her symptoms.
2.11 On 16 November 2002, Ms. da Silva Pimentel Teixeira’s mother visited her. She was 
pale and had blood on her mouth and on her clothes. The hospital staff sent Ms. da Silva 
Pimentel Teixeira’s mother to the health centre to retriever her medical records. At the 
centre, she was questioned as to why she wanted the records and made to wait for them.
2.12 Ms. da Silva Pimentel Teixeira died at 7 p.m. on 16 November 2002. An autopsy 
found the official cause of death to be digestive haemorrhage. According to the doctors, 
this resulted from the delivery of the stillborn foetus.
2.13 On 17 November 2002, at the request of the hospital, Ms. da Silva Pimentel Teix-
eira’s mother again went to the health centre to retrieve her daughter’s medical docu-
ments. The doctors at the health centre told her that the foetus had been dead in the 
womb for several days and that this had caused the death.
2.14 On 11 February 2003, Ms. da Silva Pimentel Teixeira’s husband2 filed a claim against 
the health-care system for material and moral damages.
[…]
2. The case file has contradictory information as to who exactly filed the civil claim on 11 February 2003. In 
some places it mentions the mother of the deceased while in other places it mentions her husband.
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Issues and proceedings before the Committee
Consideration of admissibility
6.1 In accordance with rule 64 of its rules of procedure, the Committee shall decide 
whether the communications is admissible or inadmissible under the Optional Protocol 
to the Convention. Pursuant to rule 72, paragraph 4, of its rules of procedure, it shall do 
so before considering the merits of the communications.
6.2 While noting the State party’s argument that the civil claim of the family of the 
deceased was still pending and that a judgment was expected in July 2008, the Commit-
tee considers that the State has not provided adequate and convincing explanations of 
some of the issues raised by the author, namely the delay in the appointment of medical 
expert(s) and delay in the trial and judgments, which remain pending up to now. The 
Committee also notes the lack of a comprehensive explanation why the two applications 
of tutela antecipada presented on 11 February 2003 and 16 September 2003 were re-
jected. The Committee is of the opinion that the aforementioned delays cannot be attrib-
uted to the complexity of the case or the number of defendants and concludes that the 
eight-year delay that has elapsed since the claim was filed, despite the statement of the 
State party that it would be decided in July 2008, constitutes an unreasonably prolonged 
delay within the meaning of article 4, paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol.
6.3 The Committee considers that the author’s allegations relating to the violations of 
articles 2 and 12 of the Convention have been sufficiently substantiated for purposes of 
admissibility. All other admissibility criteria having been met, the Committee declares the 
communications admissible and proceeds to its examination on the merits.
Consideration of the merits
7.1 The Committee has considered the present communications in the light of all the 
information made available to it by the author and by the State party, as provided for in 
article 7, paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol.
7.2 The author claims that Ms. da Silva Pimentel Teixeira’s death constitutes a violation 
of her right to life and health, under articles 2 and 12, in conjunction with article 1, of 
the Convention, as the State party did not ensure appropriate medical treatment in con-
nection with pregnancy and did not ensure appropriate medical treatment in connection 
with pregnancy and did not provide timely emergency obstetric care, hence infringing 
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the right to non-discrimination based on gender, race and socio-economic background. 
In order to review these allegations the Committee first has to consider whether the 
death was “maternal”. It will then consider whether the obligations under article 12, 
paragraph 2, of the Convention, according to which State parties shall ensure to women 
appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal pe-
riod, have been met in this case. Only alter these considerations will the Committee 
review the other alleged violations of the Convention.
7.3 Although the State party argued that Ms. da Silva Pimentel Teixeira’s death was 
non-maternal and that probable cause of her death was digestive haemorrhage, the 
Committee notes that the sequence of events described by the author and not contested 
by the State party, as well as expert opinion provided by the author, indicate that her 
death was indeed linked to obstetric complications related to pregnancy. Her complaints 
of severe nausea and abdominal pain during her sixth month of pregnancy were ig-
nored by the health centre, which failed to perform an urgent blood and urine tests to 
ascertain whether the foetus had died. The tests were done two days later, which led 
to a deterioration of Ms. da Silva Pimentel Teixeira’s condition. The Committee recalls 
its general recommendation No. 24, in which it states that it is the duty of State parties 
to ensure women’s right to safe motherhood and emergency obstetric services, and to 
allocate to these services the maximum extent of available resources21. It also states that 
measures to eliminate discrimination against women are considered to be inappropriate 
in a health-care system which lacks services to prevent, detect and treat illnesses specific 
to women22. In the light of these observations, the Committee also rejects the argument 
of the State party that the communications did not contain a casual link between Ms. da 
Silva Pimentel Teixeira’s gender and the possible medical errors committed, but that the 
claims concerned a lack of access to medical care related to pregnancy. The Committee 
therefore is of the view that the death of Ms. da Silva Pimentel Teixeira must be regarded 
as maternal.
7.4 The Committee also notes the author’s allegation concerning the poor quality of the 
health services provided to her daughter, which not only included the failure to perform a 
blood and urine test, but also the fact that the curettage surgery was only carried out 14 
hours after labour was induced in order to remove the afterbirth and placenta, which had 
not been fully expelled during the process of delivery and could have caused the haem-
21. Para. 27 NOTA 21
22. Para. 11 NOTA 22
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orrhaging and ultimately death. The surgery was done in the health center, which was 
not adequately equipped, and her transfer to the municipal hospital took eight hours, as 
the hospital refused to provide its only ambulance to transport her, and her family was 
not able to secure a private ambulance. It also notes that her transfer to the municipal 
hospital without her clinical history and information on her medical background was 
ineffective, as she was left largely unattended in a makeshift area in the hallway of the 
hospital for 21 hours until she died. The State party did not deny the inappropriate-
ness of the service nor refute any of these facts. Instead it admitted that Ms. da Silva 
Pimentel Teixeira’s vulnerable condition required individualized medical treatment, which 
was not forthcoming due to a potential failure in the medical assistance provided by a 
private health institution, caused by professional negligence, inadequate infrastructure 
and lack of professional preparedness. The Committee therefore concludes that Ms. da 
Silva Pimentel Teixeira has not been ensured appropriate services in connection with her 
pregnancy.
7.5 The State party argued that the inappropriateness of the service is not imputable 
to it, but to the private health-care institution. It stated that the allegations revealed a 
number of poor medical practices attributable to a private institution that led to Ms. da 
Silva Pimentel Teixeira’s death. It acknowledged shortcomings in the system used to con-
tract private health services and, by extension, the inspection and control thereof. The 
Committee therefore notes that the State is directly responsible for the action of private 
institutions when it outsources its medical services, and that furthermore, the State al-
ways maintains the duty to regulate and monitor private health-care institutions. In line 
with article 2(e) of the Convention, the State party has a due diligence obligation to take 
measures to ensure that the activities of private actors in regard to health policies and 
practices are appropriate. In this particular case, the State party’s responsibility is strongly 
anchored in the Brazilian Constitution (articles 196-200) which affirms the right to health 
as a general human right. The Committee therefore concludes that the State party has 
failed to fulfil its obligations under article 12, paragraph 2, of the Convention.
7.6 The Committee notes that the author claims that the lack of access to quality medi-
cal care during delivery is a systematic problem in Brazil, especially with regard to the 
way human resources are managed in the Brazilian health system. The Committee also 
takes note of the argument of the State party that specific medical care was not denied 
because of an absence of public policies and measures within the State party, as there 
are a number of policies in place to address the specific needs of women. The Com-
mittee refers to its general recommendation No. 28 (2010) on the core obligations of 
States parties under article 2 of the Convention and notes that the policies of the State 
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party must be action- and result- oriented as well as adequately funded23. Furthermore, 
the policy must ensure that there are strong and focused bodies within the executive 
branch to implement such policies. The lack of appropriate maternal health services in 
the State party that clearly fails to meet the specific, distinctive health needs and interests 
of women not only constitutes a violation of article 12, paragraph 2, of the Convention, 
but also discrimination against women under article12, paragraph 1, and article 2 of the 
Convention. Furthermore, the lack of appropriate maternal health services has a differ-
ential impact on the right to life of women.
7.7 The Committee notes the author’s claim that Ms. da Silva Pimentel Teixeira suf-
fered from multiple discrimination, being a woman of African descent and on the basis 
of her socio-economic background. In this regard, the Committee recalls its concluding 
observations on Brazil, adopted on 15 August 2007, where it noted the existence of de 
facto discrimination against women, especially women from the most vulnerable sectors 
of society such as women of African descent. It also noted that such discrimination was 
exacerbated by regional, economic and social disparities. The Committee also recalls its 
general recommendation No. 28 (2010) on the core obligations of States parties under 
article 2 of the Convention, recognizing that discrimination against women based on sex 
and gender is inextricably linked to other factors that affect women, such a race, ethnic-
ity, religion or belief, health, status, age, class, cast, and sexual orientation and gender 
identity. The Committee notes that the State party did not rule out that discrimination 
might have contributed to some extent, but not decisively, to the death of the author’s 
daughter. The State party also acknowledged that the convergence or association of the 
different elements described by the author may have contributed to the failure to provide 
necessary and emergency care to her daughter, resulting in her death. In such circum-
stances, the Committee concludes that Ms. da Silva Pimentel Teixeira was discriminated 
against, not only on the basis of her sex, but also on the basis of her status as a woman 
of African descent and her socio-economic background.
7.8 With regard to the author’s claim under articles 12 and 2 (c) of the Convention that 
the State party failed to put into place a system to ensure effective judicial protection and 
to provide adequate judicial remedies, the Committee notes that no proceedings have 
been initiated in order to establish the responsibility of those in charge of providing medi-
cal care to Ms. da Silva Pimentel Teixeira. Furthermore, the civil action, which was filed 
in February 2003 by the family of the deceased is still pending, despite the contention of 
the State party that judgement was expected in July 2008.  In addition, the two requests 
23. Para. 28 NOTA 23
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for tutela antecipeda, a judicial mechanism which could have been used to avoid unwar-
ranted delays in the judicial decision, were denied. In such circumstances, the Commit-
tee considers that the State party failed to comply with its obligation to ensure effective 
judicial action and protection.
7.9 The Committee recognizes the moral damage caused to the author by the death of 
her daughter, as well as the moral an material damage suffered by the daughter of the 
deceased who has been abandoned by her father and lives with the author in precarious 
conditions.
Recommendations
8. Acting under article 7, paragraph 3, of the Optional Protocol to the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and in light of all 
the above considerations, the Committee is of the view that the State party violated its 
obligations under article 12 (in relation to access to health), article 2 (c) (in relation to 
access to justice), and article 2 (e) (in relation to the State party’s due diligence obligation 
to regulate the activities of private health service providers), in conjunction with article 1, 
of the Convention, read together with general recommendations Nos. 24 and 28, and 
makes the following recommendations to the States party:
1. Concerning the author and the family of Ms. da Silva Pimentel Teixeira:
Provide appropriate reparation, including adequate financial compensation, to the 
author and to the daughter of Ms. da Silva Pimentel Teixeira commensurate with 
the gravity of the violations against her;
2. General:
(a) Ensure women’s right to safe motherhood and affordable access for all women 
to adequate emergency obstetric care, in line with general recommendation No. 24 
(1999) on women and health;
(b) Provide adequate professional training for health workers, especially on women’s 
reproductive health rights, including quality medical treatment during pregnancy 
and delivery, as well as timely emergency obstetric care;
(c) Ensure access to effective remedies in cases where women’s reproductive health 
rights have been violated and provide training for the judiciary and for law enforce-
ment personnel;
(d) Ensure that private health care facilities comply with relevant national and Inter-
national standards on reproductive health care;
(e) Ensure that adequate sanctions are imposed on health professionals who violate 
women’s reproductive health rights; and
Alyne da Silva Pimentel Teixeira (deceased) v. Brazil
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(f) Reduce preventable maternal deaths through the implementation of the National 
Pact for the Reduction of Maternal Mortality at state and municipal levels, including 
by establishing maternal mortality committees where they still do not exist, in line 
with the recommendations in its concluding observations for Brazil, adopted on 15 
August 2007 (CEDAW/BRA/CO/6)
[…]
Committee on the  
Elimination of Discrimination  
against Women
L.C. v. Peru
Communication Nº 22/2009
Views adopted 
on 17 October 2011
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[…]
viewS under articLe 7, paragraph 3, of the optionaL 
protocoL
1. The author of the communication, dated 18 June 2009, is T. P.F. She is submitting 
the communication on behalf of her daughter, L. C., a Peruvian citizen born 2 April 1993. 
The author laims that her daughter has been a victim of violation by Peru of articles 1, 2 
(c) and (f), 3, 5, 12 and 16 (e) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination against Women. The author and her daughter are represented by the Centre 
for Reproductive Rights and the Centre for the Promotion and Protection of Sexual and 
Reproductive Rights2 .The Convention entered into force in Peru on 13 October 1982 and 
the Optional Protocol  on 10 July 2001. 
The facts as presented by the author 
2.1 L. C. lives in Ventanilla District, Callao Province. In 2006, when she was 13 years old, 
she began to be sexually abused by J. C. R., a man about 34 years old. As a result, she 
became pregnant and, in a state of depression, attempted suicide on 31 March 2007 by 
jumping from a building. She was taken to Daniel Alcides Carrion public hospital, where 
she was diagnosed with “vertebromedullar cervical trauma, cervical luxation and com-
plete medullar section”, with “a risk of permanent disability” and “risk of deterioration 
of cutaneous integrity resulting from physical immobility”.
2.2 The damage to the spinal column, in addition to other medical problems, caused 
paraplegia of the lower and upper limbs requiring emergency surgery. The head of the 
Neurosurgery Department recommended surgery in order to prevent the injuries she suf-
fered from worsening and eaving her disabled. As a result, the intervention was sched-
uled for 12 April 2007.
2.3 On 4 April the hospital performed a psychological evaluation of L. C., in the course 
of which she revealed hat the sexual abuse she had suffered and her fear of being preg-
nant were the auses of her suicide attempt. The following day a gynaecological exami-
2. The Committee received an amicus brief from the International Commission of Jurists on the access  to an 
effective remedy, as well as comments from the Health Equity and Law Clinic of the Faculty of Law, Univer-
sity of Toronto, on the concept of multiple discrimination.
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nation was performed, confirming the pregnancy. The daily status reports on the health 
of L. C. from 2 to 12 April 2007 recorded the risk both of developing infections and of 
failing to avoid deterioration of her skin owing to the condition of total paralysis and 
deterioration of her physical mobility. 
2.4 On the scheduled day of the surgery, the author was informed that it had been 
postponed and that the doctor wished to meet with her the following day, 13 April 2007. 
At that meeting, the author was informed that the surgery had been postponed because 
of L. C.’s pregnancy. The author also notes that L. C. was diagnosed with moderate anxi-
ety-depression syndrome, for which she was given no treatment as it was contraindicated 
during pregnancy. 
2.5 On 18 April 2007, the author, after consulting with her daughter, requested the 
hospital officials to carry out a legal termination of the pregnancy in accordance with 
article 119 of the Penal Code3. In her request the author referred to the conversation 
she had on 13 April 2007 with the Head of the Neurosurgical Department in which he 
informed her that he could not operate L.C. due to her pregnancy. She alleged that the 
pregnancy seriously and permanently endangered the life, physical and psychological 
health and personal integrity of L.C. and the spinal surgery could not be performed if the 
pregnancy continued4.
2.6 Given the excessive delay by the hospital authorities in responding to the request, 
the author sought he assistance of the non-governmental organization “Centro de Pro-
mocion y Defense de los Derechos Sexuales y Reproductivos (PROMOSEX) (Centre for the 
Promotion and Protection of Sexual and Reproductive Rights) which, on 15 May 2007, 
brought the case to the attention of the office of the Deputy Defender for Women’s 
Rights in the Public Defender ’s Office. On 30 May 2007, 42 days  after having submit-
ted the request for a therapeutic abortion, the medical board of the hospital denied the 
request because it considered that the life of the patient was not in danger. 
2.7 The Deputy Defender requested a medical report from the High-Level Commission 
on Reproductive Health of the Medical College of Peru. After giving a description of 
the injuries that the girl had sustained the Commission, in a report dated 7 May 2007 
3 This provision states that “abortion shall not be punishable if performed by a doctor with the  consent of the 
pregnant woman or her legal representative, if any, when it is the only way to save the life of the mother or 
to avoid serious and permanent harm to her health”.
4. Copy of the request is contained in the file.  CEDAW/C/50/D/22/2009.
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indicated, inter alia, that due to L.C.’s age and neurological lesion a risk of complications 
during the delivery was to be expected. It concluded: “There are sufficient reasons to 
state that, if the pregnancy continues, there is grave risk to the girl’s physical and mental 
health; a therapeutic abortion, if requested by the subject, would therefore be justified”. 
2.8 On 7 June 2007, when L. C. was 16 weeks pregnant, the author submitted an appeal 
for a reconsideration of its opinion regarding the termination of the pregnancy to the hos-
pital medical board, attaching the report of the Medical College and stressing the serious 
and immediate risk to both the physical and mental health of the minor, the sole require-
ments established under the Penal Code to allow  the legal termination of pregnancy.   
2.9 On 16 June 2007, L. C. miscarried spontaneously. On 27 June 2007, the Director 
of the hospital responded to the request for reconsideration of the decision to terminate 
the pregnancy submitted by the author, stating that “it was not subject to appeal since 
those were decisions taken by the various specialists who had evaluated the minor”. 
2.10 On 11 July 2007, L. C. was operated on for her spinal injuries, almost three and one 
half months after it had been decided  that surgery was necessary. On 31 July 2007 she 
was discharged from the hospital. The relevant medical report noted that L. C. required 
intensive physical therapy and rehabilitation at the National Physical Medicine and Re-
habilitation Institute. However, that therapy did not start until 10 December 2007. Four 
months went by after the operation before the physical rehabilitation and psychological 
or psychiatric help she required began.
2.11 L. C. remained in the National Rehabilitation Institute for two months, but had to aban-
don her treatment for lack of means. Currently she is paralyzed from the neck down and has 
regained only partial movement in her hands. She depends on a wheelchair to get around 
and on others to meet all her needs. She has a catheter which must be changed five times 
a day under totally sterile conditions, which prevents her from attending school. The author 
states that the family’s situation is disastrous. She cannot work because L. C. requires con-
stant care, and the cost of the medicines and equipment she requires places a heavy burden 
on the family budget. The brothers of L. C. had to leave school in order to begin working. 
2.12 According to the author, no administrative recourse exists in the State party to re-
quest the legal termination of a pregnancy. Nor is there a protocol for care that indicates 
the procedure for requesting a legal abortion or ensuring the availability of this medical 
service, resources that would be appropriate in demanding the right and guaranteeing 
access to an essential medical service required only by women.
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2.13 The previous Peruvian Health Code established as a requirement in order to perform 
a therapeutic abortion that it must be performed by a doctor and be supported by two 
other doctors. However, the General Health Act currently in force (Act No. 26842 of 9 
July 1997) repealed that standard and created a legal vacuum since it does not include 
any regulations on access to the medical procedure of therapeutic abortion. Since that 
time, the practice has been subject to the discretion of the officials on duty.
2.14 According to the author, there is no appropriate judicial mechanism allowing ac-
cess to the courts to request termination of a pregnancy for therapeutic reasons, nor 
to provide full redress for a violation of this type. No remedy exists that operates with 
sufficient speed and effectiveness so that a woman can demand from the authorities 
the guarantee of her right to a legal abortion within the limited time period that cir-
cumstances require.
2.15 The remedy of amparo under the Constitution does not meet the necessary time 
frame to ensure effective action. Under the norms governing this proceeding, it takes 
somewhere between 62 and 102 days to reach a final decision, after all prior remedies 
have been exhausted. Furthermore, application for this remedy is subject to the exhaus-
tion of all prior remedies, in this case the hospital’s refusal to perform the abortion. In 
the case of L. C., that period exceeded the time period within which she could effectively 
enjoy that right without risking even more harm to her life and health. When the first 
refusal to perform the abortion was received she was already 16 weeks pregnant and, 
had the appeal been heard, she would have been 20 weeks pregnant by that time. There 
would have been no sense in applying for amparo after that point, since by the time that 
a final and enforceable decision would have been likely to be taken L. C. would have 
been more than 28 weeks pregnant. 
Furthermore, although the norms establish a procedure that in theory should take some-
where between 62 and 102 days, in reality, amparo proceedings generally take years to 
resolve. In this regard, the author recalls  the decision of the Human Rights Committee in 
the case of K.N.L.H. v. Peru, also concerning the refusal to perform a therapeutic abor-
tion on a woman pregnant with an anencephalic foetus, where the Committee did not 
consider the amparo proceeding to be an effective remedy that must be exhausted5.
[…]
5. See Communication No. 1153/2003, K.N.L.H.v. Peru, Viewsof 24 October 2005, para. 5.2.
L.C. v. Peru
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Issues and proceedings before the Committee  
Consideration of admissibility  
8.1 The Committee considered  the  admissibility of the communication, in accordance 
with articles 64 and 66 of its rules of procedure. In accordance  with article 4, paragraph 2, 
of the Optional Protocol, the Committee was satisfied that the same matter has not been 
nor is being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement
8.2 The State party maintains that the communication should be considered inadmis-
sible, in accordance with article 4, paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol, on the grounds 
of failure to exhaust domestic remedies. It noted in particular that the author had not 
applied for amparo and expressed disagreement with her view that the time necessary 
to obtain a decision under that remedy was not in keeping with the need to act with 
the greatest possible speed required by the situation of L. C. It stated that the case could 
have been decided at first instance; that in this days following it;and that there are excep-
tions to the requirement of exhaustion of previous remedies, for example in he event of 
irreparable harm. The State party also notes that the author could have initiated judicial 
proceedings to request compensation for damages and harm.
8.3 In response to those arguments, the author states that in the State party there is no 
administrative or judicial procedure that would have allowed L. C. to enjoy her right to 
receive the urgent medical care that her condition required. Concerning the application 
for amparo, there are various procedural problems that undermine the desired speed 
of this proceeding, for instance, the lack of legal deadlines for the judge to accept the 
application or to hold the oral hearing; that the system of service of legal documents 
is defective in the State party; and that there are no precedents of similar cases that 
were resolved promptly using  this recourse. She also states that when L. C. obtained a 
response from the hospital refusing the termination of pregnancy, 56 days had already 
gone by since the suicide attempt and that an additional wait to obtain a judicial decision 
obliging the hospital to perform the termination of pregnancy would have had the result 
of worsening her clinical condition. The author also rejects the idea that civil action could 
be considered an adequate remedy.
8.4 The Committee considers that, given the seriousness of L. C. ’s condition, the av-
enues pursued by the author, that is, the proceedings before the hospital authorities, 
were the appropriate onesunder domestic law. The Committee observes the following 
undisputed facts: that L.C. was hospitalized on 31 March 2007; that surgery was recom-
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mended by the Head of the Neurosurgical Department and scheduled to take place on 
12 April 2007; that on the scheduled date the operation was cancelled; that on 13 April 
2007, the author was informed by the Head of the Neurosurgical Department that L.C. 
could not be operated on account of her pregnancy; and that on 18 April 2007, the au-
thor addressed a written request to the medical authorities requesting the termination of 
the pregnancy. The medical board of the hospital decided on the request only on 30 May 
2007.On 7 June 2007, based on the report  of the Medical College of Peru dated 7 May 
2007 stating that there was a grave risk to L.C.’s health if the pregnancy continued, the 
author submitted to the hospital authorities an appeal for reconsideration of their deci-
sion. This request was decided only on 27 June 2007, after L.C. miscarried on 16 June 
2007. The decision indicated that it was not subject to appeal. The Committee considers 
that this procedure was too long and unsatisfactory. Furthermore, the Committee does 
not find it reasonable to require that,  in addition to the lengthy procedure before the 
medical authorities the author should have gon  to court to initiate a proceeding of an 
unpredictable duration. The unpredictability can be seen not only in the vagueness of 
the law itself regarding the deadlines established for amparo, but also by the fact that its 
speed cannot be demonstrated based on judicial precedent, as evident from the informa-
tion provided by the parties (…)The Committee considers that no appropriate legal pro-
cedure was available to the victim whichwould have allowed her access to a preventive, 
independent and enforceable decision. Consequently, the Committee concludes that the 
exception to the exhaustion of domestic remedies provided in article 4, paragraph 1, 
of the Optional Protocol, regarding the improbability that amparo would offer effective 
relief to the victim, is applicable in this case. In a similar manner, the Committee consid-
ers that civil action for compensation for damages and harm is also not a recourse that 
would offer the author an effective remedy, since in no case would it have been able  to 
prevent or redress the irreparable harm to the health of L. C.
8.5 There being no other obstacles to admissibility, the Committee finds the communi-
cation admissible and shall proceed to consider it on the merits.   
Consideration on the merits  
8.6 The Committee has considered the present communication in the light of all the 
information made available by the parties, in accordance with article 7, paragraph 1, of 
the Optional Protocol 
8.7 The Committee recalls that L.C. became pregnant at the age of 13 years as a result 
of repeated sexual abuse and thereafter attempted suicide in the State arty, where abor-
L.C. v. Peru
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tion on the grounds of rape or sexual abuse is not legally available. The Committee must 
decide if the refusal by the hospital to perform a therapeutic abortion on L. C. as provided 
under article 119 of the Penal Code, and if the delayed scheduling of her operation on 
the spine gave rise to a violation of her rights under the Convention. The author invokes 
in particular  articles 1, 2 (c) and (f), 3, 5, 12 and 16, paragraph 1(e) of the Convention.
8.8 The Committee takes note of the State party’s observation that the reason for the 
delay in the spinal surgery was not the pregnancy, but the existence of an infection in 
the area where the surgical incision should be made, as can be seen from the evaluation 
reports issued by the three meetings of the medical board, the first of which was held on 
24 April 2007. However, the Committee also notes the author ’s assertion that the opera-
tion  was initially scheduled for 12 April 2007, that the following day she was informed 
that the reason for the postponement was prevention of harm to the foetus and that the 
presence of an infection was noted for the first time only on 23 April 2007. The Commit-
tee considers that the State party has not disproved the author ’s allegations, therefore it 
starts from the assumption that there is a direct relationship between the withdrawal of 
the surgery, whose necessity cannot be questioned, and L. C. ’s pregnancy. 
8.9 The Committee will consider whether the facts, as established, constitute a violation 
of the rights of L. C. under articles 1, 2 (c) and (f), 3, 5, 12 and 16, paragraph 1(e) of the 
Convention. 
8.10 The author alleges that the facts constitute a violation of article 12 because the 
continuation of the pregnancy represented a threat to the physical and mental health of 
L. C. She also alleges a violation of article 5 because timely access to necessary medical 
treatment was made conditional on carrying to term an unwanted pregnancy, which 
fulfils the stereotype of placing L. C. ’s reproductive function above her right to health, 
life and a life of dignity. Article 16, paragraph 1(e) was also allegedly violated because she 
was deprived of her right to decide on the desired number of children.  
8.11 The Committee recalls the obligation of the State party under article 12, o take all 
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of health 
care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, access to health 
care services, including those related to family planning. It also recalls its general recom-
mendation No. 24, which, as an authoritative interpretation tool in relation to article 
12, states that “it is discriminatory for a State party to refuse to legally provide for the 
performance of certain reproductive health services for women” (para. 11). The recom-
mendation also states that: “the duty of State parties to ensure, on a basis of equality 
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between men and women, access to health-care services, information and education 
implies an obligation to respect, protect and fulfil women’s rights to health care. States 
parties have the responsibility to ensure that legislation and executive action and policy 
comply with these three obligations. They must also put in place a system which ensures 
effective judicial action. Failure to do so will constitute a violation of article 12.” (para. 
13).  
8.12 The Committee observes that the day after her admission to the hospital L. C. was 
diagnosed as risking permanent disability and a deterioration of cutaneous integrity due 
to physical immobility. Accordingly, the doctors scheduled surgery on her spine for 12 
April  2007. On that date the author was informed by the hospital authorities that the 
surgery would be postponed, and the next day she was informed orally that the reason 
was potential harm to the foetus. Up to 12 April 2007, the hospital did not report that 
L.C. was suffering from infection, nor any other circumstance that would have prevented 
the surgery. Over the following days, the medical condition of L. C. worsened and her 
cutaneous integrity, mobility and anxiety state deteriorated, until the presence of an ulcer 
with infected skin was noted in the medical report of 23 April 2007. From the informa-
tion contained in the file it is unquestionable that the surgery was necessary; that it 
should have been performed as early as possible as demonstrated by the fact that initially 
it had been scheduled for a few days after L. C.’s admission to the hospital; that after 12 
April 2007 complications arose in L. C.’s medical condition that caused postponement of 
the operation, which was not done until 11 July 2007; and that the doctors considered 
the pregnancy to be “high risk, leading to elevated maternal morbidity”. 
8.13 The Committee notes that the Peruvian Health Act No. 26842 of 9 July 1997 re-
pealed the procedure for therapeutic abortion and created a legal vacuum, since it does 
not provide for any procedure to request the therapeutic abortion allowed under article 
119 of the Penal Code.  
8.14 The Committee further notes that the reports of the medical board provided by the 
State party did not discuss the possible effects that the continuation of the pregnancy 
would have on the physical and mental health of the patient, despite the fact that, on the 
dates on which they were issued, the author ’s request for a therapeutic abortion under 
article 119 of the Penal Code was pending. Under this provision, therapeutic abortion is 
allowed to avoid serious and permanent harm to the health of the mother. Furthermore, 
the refusal to terminate the pregnancy by the doctors at the hospital contrasted with 
the opinion of the Medical College, which, on 7 May 2007, concluded that there were 
sufficient reasons to state that continuing the pregnancy would put the girl’s physical 
L.C. v. Peru
162
H
ea
lth
 an
d 
Re
pr
od
uc
tiv
e R
ig
ht
s
and mental health at serious risk, and therefore a therapeutic abortion was justified. The 
Committee further notes that the medical board of the hospital denied the termination 
of pregnancy because it considered that the life of L.C. was not in danger, but did not 
address the damage to her health, including her mental health, a right which is protected 
under the Peruvian Constitution.  
8.15 In view of the foregoing, the Committee considers that, owing to her condition as a 
pregnant woman, L. C. did not have access to an effective and accessible procedure allow-
ing her  to establish her entitlement to the medical services that her physical and mental 
condition required. Those services included both the spinal surgery and the therapeutic 
abortion. This  is even more serious considering that she was a minor and a victim of sexual 
abuse, as a result of which she attempted suicide. The suicide attempt is a demonstration 
of the amount of mental suffering she had experienced. The Committee therefore consid-
ers that the facts as described constitute a violation of the rights of L. C. under article 12 
of the Convention. The Committee also considers that the facts reveal a violation of article 
5 of the Convention, as the decision to postpone the surgery due to the pregnancy was 
influenced by the stereotype that protection of the foetus should prevail over the health of 
the mother. Having reached this conclusion, the Committee does not consider it necessary 
to rule on the possible violation of article 16, paragraph 1 (e) of the Convention. 
8.16 With regard to the allegations concerning the possible violation of articles 2 (c) and 
(f), the Committee recalls its jurisprudence, under which, although it recognizes that 
the Convention does not expressly refer to the right to a remedy, it considers that this 
right is implicit, in particular in article 2 (c), whereby States parties undertake to “estab-
lish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men and to ensure 
through competent national tribunals and other public institutions the effective protec-
tion of women against any act of discrimination12”. Furthermore, under article 2(f), and 
in conjunction with article 3, the State party is obliged to take all appropriate measures, 
including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws which constitute discrimination 
against women. The Committee observes that the hospital medical board delayed taking 
a decision on the request for an abortion submitted by the author for 42 days and the 
hospital director waited 20 days longer to respond to the request for reconsideration. 
Furthermore, as indicated earlier, the remedy of amparo did not constitute an effective 
legal remedy to protect the author ’s right to appropriate medical care. The Committee 
also notes the author’s allegations concerning the absence of laws and regulations in the 
12. Communication No. 18/2008, Vertido v. Philippines, Views of 16 July 2010, para. 8.3. 
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State party governing access to therapeutic abortion, resulting in a situation where each 
hospital determines arbitrarily, inter alia, what requirements are necessary, the procedure 
to be followed, the time frame for a decision and the importance to be placed on the 
views of the mother. These allegations have not been disproved by the State party. 
8.17 The Committee considers that, since the State party has legalized therapeutic abor-
tion, it must establish an appropriate legal framework that  allows women to exercise 
their right to it under conditions that guarantee the necessary legal security, both for 
those who have recourse to abortion and for the health professionals that must perform 
it. It is essential for this legal framework to include a mechanism for rapid decision-
making, with a view to limiting to the extent possible risks to the health of the pregnant 
mother, that her opinion be taken into account, that the decision be well-founded and 
that there is a right to appeal13. In the present case the Committee considers that L. C. 
could not benefit from a procedure for requesting a therapeutic abortion that met these 
criteria. In the light of the information contained in the file, the Committee believes, in 
particular, that the delay by the hospital authorities in deciding on the request had detri-
mental effects on her physical and mental health. Consequently, the Committee consid-
ers that an effective remedy was not available to L. C. and that the facts described give 
rise to a violation of article 2 (c) and (f) of the Convention.  
8.18 The Committee notes that the failure of the State party to protect women’s reproduc-
tive rights and establish legislation to recognize abortion on the grounds of sexual abuse 
and rape are facts that contributed to L.C.’s situation. The Committee also notes that the 
State party bears responsibility for the failure to recognize the risk of permanent disability 
of L.C. coupled with her pregnancy as a serious physical and mental health risk, and to 
provide her with appropriate medical services, namely a timely spinal surgery and a thera-
peutic abortion allowed in such cases under the Penal Code. L.C. has suffered considerable 
physical and mental pain Her family has also suffered both moral and material damages. 
After she miscarried on 16th June 2007, she had the spinal surgery on 11th July 2007, al-
most three and a half months after the Head of the Neurosurgery Department had recom-
mended emergency surgery. Although the medical reports noted that she needed intensive 
physical therapy and rehabilitation after the surgery, L.C. was only provided with the nec-
essary physical rehabilitation and psychological/psychiatric help, several months after the 
surgery, namely as from 10 December 2007. After spending two months in the National 
Rehabilitation Institute, due to lack of financial means, L.C. had to abandon the treatment. 
13 Along those lines, see the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case Tysiac v. Poland, 
paras. 116 to 118. 
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The Committee notes that L.C, a young girl of 16 (at the time of submission of the com-
munication) is paralyzed from the neck down save for some partial movement in her hands. 
She is in a wheelchair and needs constant care. She cannot pursue her education and her 
family is also living in precarious conditions. Her mother (the  author) who has to provide 
L.C. with constant care, cannot work. The cost of medicines and equipment required by 
L.C. has also placed a heavy undue financial burden on the family.  
9. Acting under the provisions of article 7, paragraph 3, of the Optional Protocol, the 
Committee considers that the State party has not complied with its obligations and has 
therefore violated the rights of L. C. established in articles 2 (c) and (f), 3, 5 and 12, to-
gether with article 1 of the Convention. The Committee therefore makes the following 
recommendations to the State party:  
(a) Concerning L. C.: provide reparation that include adequate compensation for mate-
rial and moral damages and measures of rehabilitation, commensurate with the gravity 
of the violation of her rights and the condition of her health, in order to ensure that she 
enjoys the best possible quality of life;
(b) General: 
(i)  Review its laws with a view to establish a mechanism for effective access to 
therapeutic abortion under conditions  that protect women’s physical and mental 
health and prevent further occurrences in the future of violations similar to the ones 
in the present case; 
(ii)  Take measures to ensure that the relevant provisions of the Convention and the 
Committee’s general recommendation No. 24 with regard to reproductive rights are 
known and observed in all health-care facilities. Such measures should include education 
and training programmes to encourage health providers to change their attitudes and 
behaviour in relation to adolescent women seeking reproductive health services and re-
spond to specific health needs related to sexual violence. They should also include guide-
lines or protocols to ensure health services are available and accessible in public facilities. 
(iii)  The State party should also review its legislation with a view to decriminalizing 
abortion when the pregnancy results from rape or sexual abuse; 
(iv)  The Committee reiterates the recommendation it made to the State party during 
the consideration of its sixth periodic report (CEDAW/C/PER/CO/6, para. 25), urging it to 
review its restrictive interpretation of therapeutic abortion in line with the Committee’s 
general recommendationNo. 24 and  the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action.  
[…]
Human Rights Committee
K.L. v. Peru
Communication Nº 1153/2003
Views adopted 
on 24 October 2005
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viewS under articLe 5 paragraph 4 of the optionaL protocoL 
1. The author of the communication is K.L., born in 1984, who claims to be a victim of 
a violation by Peru of articles 2, 3, 6, 7, 17, 24 and 26 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. She is represented by the organizations DEMUS, CLADEM and 
Center for Reproductive Law and Policy. The Optional Protocol entered into force for Peru 
on 3 October 1980.  
Factual background 
2.1 The author became pregnant in March 2001, when she was aged 17. On 27 June 
2001 she was given a scan at the Archbishop Loayza National Hospital in Lima, part of 
the Ministry of Health. The scan showed that she was carrying an anencephalic foetus. 
2.2 On 3 July 2001, Dr. Ygor Pérez Solf, a gynaecologist and obstetrician in the Arch-
bishop Loayza National Hospital in Lima, informed the author of the foetal abnormality 
and the risks to her life if the pregnancy continued. Dr. Pérez said that she had two op-
tions: to continue the pregnancy or to terminate it. He advised termination by means of 
uterine curettage. The author decided to terminate the pregnancy, and the necessary 
clinical studies were carried out, confirming the foetal abnormality. 
2.3 On 19 July 2001, when the author reported to the hospital together with her mother 
for admission preparatory to the operation, Dr. Pérez informed her that she needed to ob-
tain written authorization from the hospital director. Since she was under age, her mother 
requested the authorization. On 24 July 2001, Dr. Maximiliano Cárdenas Díaz, the hospital 
director, replied in writing that the termination could not be carried out as to do so would 
be unlawful, since under article 120 of the Criminal Code, abortion was punishable by a 
prison term of no more than three months when it was likely that at birth the child would 
suffer serious physical or mental defects, while under article 119, therapeutic abortion was 
permitted only when termination of the pregnancy was the only way of saving the life of 
the pregnant woman or avoiding serious and permanent damage to her health. 
2.4 On 16 August 2001, Ms. Amanda Gayoso, a social worker and member of the Peru-
vian association of social  workers, carried out an assessment of the case and concluded 
that medical intervention to terminate the pregnancy was advisable “since its continu-
ation would only prolong the distress and emotionalinstability of [K.L.] and her family”. 
However, no intervention took place owing to the refusal of the Health Ministry medical 
personnel. 
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2.5 On 20 August 2001, Dr. Marta B. Rondón, a psychiatrist and member of the Pe-
ruvian Medical Association, drew up a psychiatric report on the author, concluding that 
“the so-called principle of the welfare of the unborn child has caused serious harm to the 
mother, since she has unnecessarily been made to carry to term a pregnancy whose fatal 
outcome was known in advance, and this has substantially contributed to triggering the 
symptoms of depression, with its severe impact on the development of an adolescent and 
the patient’s future mental health”. 
2.6 On 13 January 2002, three weeks late with respect to the anticipated date of birth, 
the author gave birth to an anencephalic baby girl, who survived for four days, during 
which the mother had to breastfeed her. Following her daughter’s death, the author fell 
into a state of deep depression. This was diagnosed by the psychiatrist Marta B. Rondón. 
The author also states that she suffered from an inflammation of the vulva which re-
quired medical treatment. 
2.7 The author has submitted to the Committee a statement made by Dr. Annibal 
Faúdesand Dr. Luis Tavara, who are specialists from the association called Center for Re-
productive Rights, and who on 17 January 2003 studied the author’s clinical dossier and 
stated that anencephaly is a condition which is fatal to the foetus in all cases. Death im-
mediately follows birth in most cases. It also endangers the mother’s life. In their opinion, 
in refusing to terminate the pregnancy, the medical personnel took a decision which was 
prejudicial to the author. 
2.8 Regarding the exhaustion of domestic remedies, the author claims that this require-
ment is waived when judicial remedies available domestically are ineffective in the case 
in question, and she points out that the Committee has laid down on several occasions 
that the author has no obligation to exhaust a remedy which would prove ineffective. 
She adds that in Peru there is no administrative remedy which would enable a pregnancy 
to be terminated on therapeutic grounds, nor any judicial remedy functioning with the 
speed and efficiency required to enable a woman to require the authorities to guarantee 
her right to a lawful abortion within the limited period, by virtue of the special circum-
stances obtaining in such cases. She also states that her financial circumstances and 
those of her family prevented her from obtaining legal advice. 
2.9 The author states that the complaint is not being considered under any other pro-
cedure of international settlement. 
[…]
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Issues and proceedings before the Committee 
Consideration of admissibility 
5.1 In accordance with rule 93 of the rules of procedure, before examining the claims 
made in a communication, the Human Rights Committee must decide whether the com-
munication is admissible under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant. 
5.2 The Committee notes that, according to the author, the same matter has not been 
submitted under any other procedure of international investigation. The Committee also 
takes note of her arguments to the effect that in Peru there is no administrative remedy 
which would enable a pregnancy to be terminated on therapeutic grounds, nor any 
judicial remedy functioning with the speed and efficiency required to enable a woman 
to require the authorities to guarantee her right to  a lawful abortion within the limited 
period, by virtue of the special circumstances obtaining in such cases. The Committee 
recalls its jurisprudence to the effect that a remedy which had no chance of being suc-
cessful could not count as such and did not need to be exhausted for the  purposes of 
the Optional Protocol4. In the absence of a reply from the State party, due weigth must 
be given to the author’s allegations. Consequently, the Committee considers that the 
requirements of article 5, paragraph 2 (a) and (b), have been met.
5.3 The Committee considers that the author’s claims of alleged violations of articles 3 
and 26 of the Covenant have not been properly substantiated, since the author has not 
placed before the Committee any evidence relating to the events which might confirm 
any type of discrimination under the article in question. Consequently, the part of the 
complaint referring to articles 3 and 26 is declared inadmissible under article 2 of the 
Optional Protocol. 
5.4 The Committee notes that the author has claimed a violation of article 2 of the Cov-
enant. The Committee recalls its constant urisprudence to the effect that article 2 of the 
Covenant, which lays down general obligations for States, is accessory in nature and can-
not be invoked in isolation by individuals under the Optional Protocol5. Consequently, the 
complaint under article 2 will be analysed together with the author’s other allegations. 
4. In the absence of a reply from the State party, due weight must be given to the author’s allegations. Conse-
quently, the Committee considers that the requirements of article 5, paragraph 2 (a) and (b), have been met.
5. See Communication No. 802/1998, Andrew Rogerson v. Australia; Views adopte don 3 April 2002, para. 7.9
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5.5 Concerning the allegations relating to articles 6, 7, 17 and 24 of the Covenant, the 
Committee considers that  they are adequately substantiated for purposes of admissibil-
ity, and that they appear to raiseissues in connection with those provisions. Consequently, 
it turns to consideration of the substance of the complaint. 
Consideration of the merits 
6.1 The Human Rights Committee has considered the present complaint in the light of 
all the information received, in accordance with article 5, paragraph 1, of the Optional 
Protocol. 
6.2 The Committee notes that the author attached a doctor’s statement confirming that 
her pregnancy exposed her to a life-threatening risk. She also suffered severe psychologi-
cal consequences exacerbated by her status as a minor, as the psychiatric report of 20 
August 2001 confirmed. The Committee notes that the State party has not provided any 
evidence to challenge the above. It notes that the authorities were aware of the risk to 
the author’s life, since a gynaecologist and obstetrician in the same hospital had advised 
her to terminate the pregnancy, with the operation to be carried out in the same hospital. 
The subsequent refusal of the competent medical authorities to provide the service may 
have endangered the author’s life. The author states that no effective remedy was avail-
able to her to oppose that decision. In the absence of any information from the State 
party, due weight must be given to the author’s claims.
6.3 The author also claims that, owing to the refusal of the medical authorities to car-
ry out the therapeutic abortion, she had to endure the distress of seeing her daughter’s 
marked deformities and knowing that she would die very soon. This  was an experience 
which added further pain and distress to that which she had already borne during the 
period when she was obliged to continue with the pregnancy. The author attaches a 
psychiatric certificate dated 20 August 2001, which confirms the state of deep depres-
sion into which she fell and the severe consequences this caused, taking her age into 
account. The Committee notes that this situation could have been foreseen, since a 
hospital doctor had diagnosed anencephaly in the foetus, yet the hospital director 
refused termination. The omission on the part of the State in not enabling the author 
to benefit from a therapeutic abortion was, in the Committee’s  view, the cause of the 
suffering she experienced. The Committee has pointed out in its General Comment No. 
20 that the right set out in article 7 of the Covenant relates not only to physical pain 
but also to mental suffering, and that the protection is particularly important in the 
K.L. v. Peru
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case of minors6. In the absence of any information from the State party in this regard, 
due weight must be given to the author’s complaints. Consequently, the Committee 
considers that the facts before it reveal a violation of article 7 of the Covenant. In the 
light of  this finding the Committee does not consider it necessary in the circumstances 
to made a finding on article 6 of the Covenant. 
6.4 The author states that the State party, indenying her the opportunity to secure medi-
cal intervention to terminate the pregnancy, interfered arbitrarily in her private life. The 
Committee notes that a public-sector doctor told the author that she could either continue 
with the pregnancy or terminate it in accordance with domestic legislation allowing abor-
tions in cases of risk to the life of the mother. In the absence of any information from the 
State party, due weight must be given to the author’s claim that at the time of this informa-
tion, the conditions for a lawful  abortion as set out in the law were present. In the circum-
stances of the case, the refusal to act in accordance with the author’s decision to terminate 
her pregnancy was not justified and amounted to a violation of article 17 of the Covenant. 
6.5 The author claims a violation of article 24 of the Covenant, since she did not receive 
from the State party the special care she needed as a minor. The Committee notes the 
special vulnerability of the author as a minor girl. It further note that, in the absence of 
any information from the State party, due weight must be given to the author’s claim that 
she did not receive, during and after her pregnancy, the medical and psychological sup-
port necessary in the specific circumstances of her case. Consequently, the Committee 
considers that the facts before it reveal a violation of article 24 of the Covenant. 
6.6 The author claims to have been a victim of violation of articles 2 of the Covenant on 
the grounds that she lacked an adequate legal remedy. In the absence of information from 
the State party, the Committee considers that due weight must be given to the author’s 
claims as regards lack of an adequate legal remedy and consequently concludes that the 
facts before it also reveal a violation of article 2 in conjunction with articles 7, 17 and 24. 
7. The Human Rights Committee, acting under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional 
Protocol to the Covenant, is of the view that the facts before it disclose a violation of 
articles 2, 7, 17 and 24 of the Covenant. 
[…]
6. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20: Prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment (art. 7), 10 March 1992 (HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7, paras. 2 and 5). 
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appendix 
diSSenting opinion by committee member hipóLito SoLari-
yrigoyen 
My dissenting opinion on this communication - the majority not considering that article 
6 of the Covenant was violated - is based on the following grounds: 
Consideration of the merits 
The Committee notes that when the author was a minor, she and her mother were 
informed by the obstetric gynaecologist at Lima National Hospital, whom they  had con-
sulted because of the author’s pregnancy, that the foetus suffered from anencephaly 
which would inevitably cause its death at birth. The doctor told the author that she had 
two options: (1) continue the pregnancy, which would endanger her own life; or (2) ter-
minate the pregnancy by a therapeutic abortion. He recommended the second option.
Given this conclusive advice from the specialist who had told her of the risks to her life 
if the pregnancy continued, the author decided to follow his professional advice and 
accepted the second option. As a result, all the clinical tests needed to confirm the doc-
tor’s statements about the risks to the mother’s life of continuing the pregnancy and the 
inevitable death of the foetus at birth were performed. 
The author substantiated with medical and  psychological certificates all her claims about 
the fatal risk she ran if the pregnancy continued. In spite of the risk, the director of the 
public hospital would not authorize the therapeutic abortion which the law of the State 
party allowed, arguing that it would not be a therapeutic abortion but rather a voluntary 
and unfounded abortion punishable under the Criminal Code. The hospital director did not 
supply any legal ruling in support of his pronouncements outside his professional field or 
challenging the medical attestations to the serious risk to the mother’s life. Furthermore, 
the Committee may note that the State party has not submitted any evidence contradicting 
the statements and evidence upplied by the author. Refusing a therapeutic abortion not 
only endangered the author’s life but had grave consequences which the author has also 
substantiated to the Committee by means of valid supporting documents. 
It is not only taking a person’s life that violates article of the Covenant but also placing a 
person’s life in grave danger, as in this case. Consequently, I consider that the facts in the 
present case reveal a violation of article 6 of the Covenant. 
[Signed]: Hipólito Solari-Yrigoyen. 
K.L. v. Peru
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viewS under articLe 5, paragraph 4, of the optionaL 
protocoL
1. The author of the communication, dated 25 May 2007, is V.D.A., an Argentine 
national, who submits this communication on behalf of her daughter, L.M.R., born on 
4 May 1987. She claims that her daughter was the victim of violations by Argentina of 
articles 2, 3, 6, 7, 17 and 18 of the Covenant. The Optional Protocol entered into force 
for the State party on 8 November 1986. The author is represented by counsel.  
The facts as submitted by the author 
2.1 L.M.R. is a young woman living in Guernica, Buenos Aires province, who has a 
permanent mental impairment. She lives with her mother, V.D.A, attends a special school 
and receives neurological care. She has been diagnosed as having a mental age of be-
tween 8 and 10 years.  
2.2 In June 2006 the author took her daughter to Guernica Hospital because she said that 
she was feeling unwell. At the hospital she was found to be pregnant and the author re-
quested a termination. The hospitalstaff refused to perform the procedure and referred the 
patient to San Martín Hospital in La Plata, which is a public hospital. They also informed her 
that she needed to file a complaint with the police. On 24 June 2006 a complaint was filed 
against an uncle of L.M.R. who was suspected of having raped her. The author claims that 
Guernica Hospital had the resources necessary to perform the procedure, without needing 
to refer the case elsewhere, and that its refusal forced the family to travel 100 kilometres to 
the provincial capital and to incur the related costs and inconvenience. 
2.3 L.M.R. was approximately fourteen and a half weeks pregnant on her arrival at San 
Martín Hospital. She was admitted on 4 July 2006 and the hospital authorities requested 
an urgent meeting with the Bioethics Committee to solicit its opinion. Since this was 
a case of non-punishable abortion pursuant to article 86, paragraph 2 of the Criminal 
Code1, hospital staff began the pre-surgical examinations necessary for the procedure. 
1  This provision establishes the following: “Abortion performed by a licensed physician with the consentí of 
the pregnant woman is not punishable: (a) if performed to avoid endangering the mother’s life oe health 
and if this danger cannot be prevented by other means; and (2) if the pregnancy results from the rape or 
indecente assault of a woman with a mental disability. In such cases, the consent of her legal representati 
must be obtained for the termination.”
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The aforementioned provision gives female rape victims with a mental disability the right 
to terminate a pregnancy but does not set deadlines and does not specify the type of 
medical procedure to be used. In addition, it establishes no requirement for judicial au-
thorization of any form. The only requirements are that the disability should be diag-
nosed, that the victim’s legal representative should give consent and that the termination 
should be performed by a licensed physician. 
2.4 The hospital was issued with an injunction on all procedures and judicial proceed-
ings were initiated to prevent the abortion. The juvenile court judge ruled that a termi-
nation should be prohibited because she did not find it acceptable to repair a wrongful 
assault (sexual abuse) “with another wrongful assault against a new innocent victim, i.e. 
the unborn child”.  
2.5 The decision was confirmed on appeal by the Civil Court, which instructed the 
juvenile court judge to perform regular checks on L.M.R., accompanied by her mother, 
regarding the progress of her pregnancy and to monitor the health of the girl and her 
unborn child directly, on an ongoing basis, through the intermediary of the Under-secre-
tariat for Children. 
2.6 The decision was contested before the Supreme Court of Justice of Buenos Aires 
province, which overturned the contested decision on 31 July 2006 and ruled that the 
termination could proceed2. Consequently, the Court informed San Martín Hospital that 
the surgical procedure its staff were to perform was legal and did not require judicial au-
thorization. This ruling was issued almost a month and a half after the rape was reported 
and the termination of pregnancy was requested.  
2.7 Despite the ruling, San Martín Hospital and the family came under enormous pres-
sure from various sources opposed to the termination and the hospital refused to per-
form the procedure on the grounds that the pregnancy was too advanced (between 20 
and 22 weeks). With help from women’s organizations a new scan was performed in a 
private clinic on 10 August, revealing that the victim was 20.4 weeks pregnant.  
2 The Court ruled that: “(a) judicial authorization is not required for application of article 86.2 of the Crimi-
nal Code; (b) since the present case is not punishable under national legislation (…) no order prohibiting 
the surgical termination of the young girl’s pregnancy can be issued (…), provided that the decision to 
perform the procedure has been taken by medical professionals in accordance with best medical practice”. 
CCPR/C/101/D/1608/2007
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2.8 With support from women’s organizations, the family contacted various health cen-
tres and hospitals both in and outside the province, but none of them would agree to 
carry out a termination. However, the family managed to arrange an illegal termination 
on 26 August 2006. 
2.9 Press reports indicate that both the Rector of the Catholic University and the spokes-
person of the Corporation of Catholic Lawyers contributed to the pressure exerted on the 
family and the doctors. Threatening letters sent to the hospital were even made public 
without any authority taking action. 
[…]
Issues and proceedings before the Committee 
Consideration of admissibility 
8.1 Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Human Rights 
Committee must decide, in accordance with rule 93 of its rules of procedure, whether 
the communication is admissible under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant. 
8.2 As required under article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of the Optional Protocol, the Commit-
tee has ascertained that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure 
of international investigation or settlement. 
8.3 The Committee observes that, although the State party initially contended that the 
communication was inadmissible on the grounds of failure to exhaust domestic rem-
edies, in subsequent correspondence it agreed with the author that the injunction issued 
by the lower courts of Buenos Aires province in the case of L.M.R. constituted unlawful 
interference under article 86.2 of the Criminal Code. It also agreed with the author that 
several articles of the Covenant had been violated. Consequently, the Committee consid-
ers that there are no obstacles to consideration of the merits of the communication under 
article 5, paragraph 2 (b) of the Optional Protocol. 
8.4 The Committee takes note of the author’s claims that, because it lacked the mecha-
nisms that would have enabled L.M.R. to undergo a termination of pregnancy, the State 
party is responsible by omission for a violation of article 2 of the Covenant. The Commit-
tee recalls that, according to its established case law, article 2 of the Covenant constitutes 
a general undertaking on the part of the State and cannot be invoked in isolation by 
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individuals under the Optional Protocol. Consequently, the complaint under article 2 will 
be considered together with the claims made by the author under other articles of the 
Covenant5.
8.5 The Committee also notes the author’s claim that the impossibility of obtaining 
an abortion constituted a violation of the right to equality and non-discrimination es-
tablished under article 3 of the Covenant. In her opinion, the State’s failure to exercise 
due diligence in safeguarding a legal right to a procedure required solely by women 
resulted in discriminatory treatment of L.M.R. The Committee considers this allegation 
to be closely related to those made under other articles of the Covenant, and that they 
should therefore be considered together. 
8.6 The Committee notes the author’s claim that the facts described constitute a viola-
tion of L.M.R.’s right to life in that the State failed to adopt the measures and act with the 
due diligence necessary to ensure that L.M.R. could obtain a safe abortion and prevent 
the need for an unlawful, unsafe abortion. The Committee observes, however, that there 
is nothing in the case file to indicate that L.M.R.’s life was exposed to particular danger 
because of the nature of her pregnancy or the circumstances in which the termination 
was performed. Consequently, the Committee considers that this complaint is not sub-
stantiated and is therefore inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 
8.7 The author maintains that her daughter was subject to a violation of article 18 as a 
result of State inaction in the face of pressure and threats from Catholic groups and the 
hospital doctors’ conscientious objection. The State party denies that this article has been 
violated, on the grounds that the activities of specific groups are unconnected to the ac-
tions of its officials, and that the hospital’s refusal to perform the procedure was guided 
by medical considerations. In the circumstances, the Committee considers that the author 
has not adequately substantiated her complaint for purposes of admissibility and that the 
complaint must therefore be declared inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 
8.8 Concerning the allegations relating to articles 7 and 17 of the Covenant, the Com-
mittee considers that they were adequately substantiated for purposes of admissibility. 
8.9 In the light of the above, the Committee declares the communication admissible 
insofar as it raises issues under articles 2, 3, 7 and 17 of the Covenant. 
5 Communication No. 1153/2003, K.N.L.H. v. Peru, op. cit., paragraph 5.4. CCPR/C/101/D/1608/2007 GE.11-
42528  11.
L.M
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Consideration of the merits 
9.1 The Human Rights Committee has considered the present communication in the 
light of all information made available to it by the parties, as provided in article 5, para-
graph 1, of the Optional Protocol. 
9.2 The Committee takes note of the author’s allegation that forcing her daughter to 
continue her pregnancy, even though she should have enjoyed protection under article 
86.2 of the Criminal Code, constituted cruel and inhuman treatment. The State party as-
serts that, while forcing her to endure a pregnancy resulting from rape and undergo an 
illegal abortion could have been a contributing factor to the mental injury that the victim 
suffered, it did not constitute torture. The Committee  considers that the State party’s 
omission, in failing to guarantee L.M.R.’s right to a termination of pregnancy, as provided 
under article 86.2 of the Criminal Code, when her family so requested, caused L.M.R. 
physical and mental suffering constituting a violation of article 7 of the Covenant that 
was made especially serious by the victim’s status as a young girl with a disability. In this 
connection the Committee recalls its general comment No. 20 in which it states that the 
right protected in article 7 of the Covenant relates not only to acts that cause physical 
pain but also to acts that cause mental suffering6.
9.3 The Committee takes note of the author’s allegation that the facts described consti-
tuted arbitrary interference in L.M.R.’s private life. It also notes the State party’s acknowl-
edgement that the State’s unlawful interference, through the judiciary, in an issue that 
should have been resolved between the patient and her physician could be considered a 
violation of her right to privacy. In the circumstances, the Committee considers that the 
facts reveal a violation of article 17, paragraph 1 of the Covenant7.
9.4 The Committee takes note of the author’s allegations to the effect that, because 
it lacked the mechanisms that would have enabled L.M.R. to undergo a termination of 
pregnancy, the State party is responsible by omission for the violation of article 2 of the 
Covenant. The Committee observes that the judicial remedies sought at the domestic 
level to guarantee access to a termination of pregnancy were resolved favourably for 
L.M.R. by the Supreme Court ruling. However, to achieve this result, the author had to 
6 General comment No. 20: Prohibition of torture, or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment (art. 7), 10 March 1992, paragraph 5. See also K.N.L.H. v. Peru, op. cit., paragraph 6.3. 
7 K.N.L.H. v. Peru, op. cit., paragraph 6.4.
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appear before three separate courts, during which period the pregnancy was prolonged 
by several weeks, with attendant consequences for L.M.R.’s health that ultimately led the 
author to resort to illegal abortion. For these reasons, the Committee considers that the 
author did not have access to an effective remedy and the facts described constitute a 
violation of article 2, paragraph 3 in relation to articles 3, 7 and 17 of the Covenant. 
10. The Human Rights Committee, acting under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is of the view that the 
information before it reveals a violation of article 7, article 17 and article 2, paragraph 3 
in relation to articles 3, 7 and 17 of the Covenant. 
[…].
L.M
.R v. Argentina
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generaL recommendation nº 24 committee on the 
eLimination of diScrimination againSt women  
(cedaw/un)*.
Article 12: Women and health
1. The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, affirming that 
access to health care, including reproductive health is a basic right under the Convention 
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, determined at its 20th session, pursu-
ant to article 21, to elaborate a general recommendation on article 12 of the Convention.
[…]
8. Article 12:
“1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and 
women, access to health care services, including those related to family planning.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article, States Parties shall 
ensure to women appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement 
and the post-natal period, granting free services where necessary, as well as ad-
equate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation.”
States parties are encouraged to address the issue of women’s health throughout the 
woman’s lifespan. For the purposes of this general recommendation, therefore, women 
includes girls and adolescents. This general recommendation will set out the Committee’s 
analysis of the key elements of article 12.
Key elements
Article 12 (1)
[…]
11. Measures to eliminate discrimination against women are considered to be inappro-
priate if a health care system lacks services to prevent, detect and treat illnesses specific 
to women. It is discriminatory for a State party to refuse to legally provide for the perfor-
* ed. A/54/38/Rev.1, I.
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mance of certain reproductive health services for women. For instance, if health service 
providers refuse to perform such services based on conscientious objection, measures 
should be introduced to ensure that women are referred to alternative health providers.
12. States parties should report on their understanding of how policies and measures 
on health care address the health rights of women from the perspective of women’s 
needs and interests and how it addresses distinctive features and factors which differ for 
women in comparison to men, such as:
(a) Biological factors which differ for women in comparison with men, such as their 
menstrual cycle and their reproductive function and menopause. Another example 
is the higher risk of exposure to sexually transmitted diseases which women face;
(b) Socio-economic factors that vary for women in general and some groups of 
women in particular. For example, unequal power relationships between women 
and men in the home and workplace may negatively affect women’s nutrition and 
health. They may also be exposed to different forms of violence which can affect 
their health. Girl children and adolescent girls are often vulnerable to sexual abuse 
by older men and family members, placing them at risk of physical and psychologi-
cal harm and unwanted and early pregnancy. Some cultural or traditional practices 
such as female genital mutilation also carry a high risk of death and disability;
(c) Psychosocial factors which vary between women and men include depression 
in general and post-partum depression in particular as well as other psychological 
conditions, such as those that lead to eating disorders such as anorexia and bulimia;
(d) While lack of respect for the confidentiality of patients will affect both men and 
women, it may deter women from seeking advice and treatment and thereby ad-
versely affect their health and well-being. Women will be less willing, for that reason, 
to seek medical care for diseases of the genital tract, for contraception or for incom-
plete abortion and in cases where they have suffered sexual or physical violence.
[…]
14. The obligation to respect rights requires States parties to refrain from obstructing 
action taken by women in pursuit of their health goals (…)For example, States parties 
should not restrict women’s access to health services or to the clinics that provide those 
services on the ground that women do not have the authorization of husbands, partners, 
parents or health authorities, because they are unmarried1 or because they are women. 
1 http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm#25.
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Other barriers to women’s access to appropriate health care include laws that criminalize 
medical procedures only needed by women and that punish women who undergo those 
procedures.
[…]
18. The issues of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted disease are central to the 
rights of women and adolescent girls to sexual health. Adolescent girls and women in 
many countries lack adequat eaccess to information and services necessary to ensure 
sexual health. As a consequence of unequal power relations based on gender, women 
and adolescent girls are often unable to refuse sex or insist on safe and responsible sex 
practices. Harmful traditional practices, such as female genital mutilation, polygamy, as 
well as marital rape, may also expose girls and women to the rist of contracting HIV/
AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases. Women in prostitution are also particularly 
vulnerable to these diseases. States parties should ensure, without prejudice and dis-
crimination, the right to sexual health information, education and services for all women 
and girls, including those who have been trafficked, including those who have been 
trafficked, even if they are not legally resident in the country. In particular, States par-
ties should ensure the rights of female and male adolescents to sexual and reproductive 
health education by properly trained personnel in specially designed programmes that 
respect their rights to privacy and confidentiality.
[…]
20. Women have the right to be fully informed, by properly trained personnel, of their 
options in agreeing to treatment or research, including likely benefits and potential ad-
verse effects of proposed procedures and available alternatives.
[…]
22. States parties should also report on measures taken to ensure access to quality 
health care services, for example, by making them acceptable to women. Acceptable 
services are those which are delivered in a way that ensures that a woman gives her fully 
informed consent, respects her dignity, guarantees her confidentiality and is sensitive 
to her needs and perspectives. States parties should not permit forms of coercion, such 
as non-consensual sterilization, mandatory testing for sexually transmitted diseases or 
mandatory pregnancy testing as a condition of employment that violate women’s rights 
to informed consent and dignity.
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23. In their reports, States parties should state what measures they have taken to ensure 
timely access to the range of services which are related to family planning, in particular, 
and to sexual and reproductive health in general. Particular attention should be paid to 
the health education of adolescents, including information and counselling on all meth-
ods of family planning2.
[…]
Other relevant articles in the Convention
28. When reporting on measures taken to comply with article 12, States parties are 
urged to recognize its interconnection with other articles in the Convention that have 
a bearing on women’s health. Those articles include article 5 (b), which requires States 
parties to ensure that family education includes a proper understanding of maternity 
as a social function; article 10, which requires States parties to ensure equal access 
to education, thus enabling women to access health care more readily and reducing 
female students’ drop-out rates, which are often due to premature pregnancy; article 
10(h) which provides that States parties provide to women and girls specific educa-
tional information to help ensure the well-being of families, including information and 
advice on family planning; article 11, which is concerned, in part, with the protection 
of women’s health and safety in working conditions, including the safeguarding of the 
reproductive function, special protection from harmful types of work during pregnancy 
and with the provision of paid maternity leave; article 14 (2) (b), which requires States 
parties to ensure access for rural women to adequate health care facilities, including 
information, counselling and services in family planning, and (h), which obliges States 
parties to take all appropriate measures to ensure adequate living conditions, particu-
larly housing, sanitation, electricity and water supply, transport and communications, 
all of which are critical for the prevention of disease and the promotion of good health 
care; and article 16 (1) (e), which requires States parties to ensure that women have 
the same rights as men to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing 
of their children and to have access to information, education and means to enable 
them to exercise these rights. Article 16 (2) also proscribes the betrothal and marriage 
of children, an important factor in preventing the physical and emotional harm which 
arise from early childbirth.
2 http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm#26.
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Recommendations for government action
29. States parties should implement a comprehensive national strategy to promote 
women’s health throughout their lifespan. This will include interventions aimed at both 
the prevention and treatment of diseases and conditions affecting women, as well as 
responding to violence against women, and will ensure universal access for all women to 
a full range of high-quality and affordable health care, including sexual and reproductive 
health services.
[…]
31. States parties should also, in particular:
(…)
b) Ensure the removal of all barriers to women’s access to health services, education 
and information, including in the area of sexual and reproductive health, and, in 
particular, allocate resources for programmes directed at adolescents for the preven-
tion and treatment of sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS;
c) Prioritize the prevention of unwanted pregnancy through family planning and sex 
education and reduce maternal mortality rates through safe motherhood services 
and prenatal assistance. When possible, legislation criminalizing abortion could be 
amended to remove punitive provisions imposed on women who undergo abortion;
(…)
e) Require all health services to be consistent with the human rights of women, 
including the rights to autonomy, privacy, confidentiality, informed consent and 
choice;
(…). 
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SubStantive iSSueS ariSing in the impLementation of the 
internationaL covenant on economic, SociaL and 
cuLturaL rightS.
 generaL comment no. 14 (2000)
The right to the highest attainable standard of health (article 12 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)
1. Health is a fundamental human right indispensable for the exercise of other human 
rights. Every human being is entitled to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard 
of health conducive to living a life in dignity. The realization of the right to health may 
be pursued through numerous, complementary approaches, such as the formulation of 
health policies, or the implementation of health programmes developed by the World 
Health Organization (WHO), or the adoption of specific legal instruments. Moreover, the 
right to health includes certain components which are legally enforceable1.
2. The human right to health is recognized in numerous international instruments. 
Article 25.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms: “Everyone has the 
right to a standard of living adequate for the health of himself and of his family, including 
food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services”. The Internation-
al Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides the most comprehensive 
article on the right to health in international human rights law.  In accordance with article 
12.1 of the Covenant, States parties recognize “the right of everyone to the enjoyment 
of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health”, while article 12.2 enu-
merates, by way of illustration, a number of “steps to be taken by the States parties ... 
to achieve the full realization of this right”. Additionally, the right to health is recognized, 
inter alia, in article 5 (e) (iv) of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1965, in articles 
11.1 (f) and 12 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women of 1979 and in article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
of 1989.  Several regional human rights instruments also recognize the right to health, 
such as the European Social Charter of 1961 as revised (art. 11), the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights of 1981 (art. 16) and the Additional Protocol to the Ameri-
1 For example, the principle of non-discrimination in relation to health facilities, goods and services is legally 
enforceable in numerous national jurisdictions. 
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can Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 
1988 (art. 10).  Similarly, the right to health has been proclaimed by the Commission on 
Human Rights2, as well as in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 1993 
and other international instruments3.
3. The right to health is closely related to and dependent upon the realization of other 
human rights, as contained in the International Bill of Rights, including the rights to food, 
housing, work, education, human dignity, life, non-discrimination, equality, the prohibi-
tion against torture, privacy, access to information, and the freedoms of association, 
assembly and movement. These and other rights and freedoms address integral compo-
nents of the right to health.
4. In drafting article 12 of the Covenant, the Third Committee of the United Nations 
General Assembly did not adopt the definition of health contained in the preamble to 
the Constitution of WHO, which conceptualizes health as “a state of complete physical, 
mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity”.  How-
ever, the reference in article 12.1 of the Covenant to “the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health” is not confined to the right to health care. On the contrary, 
the drafting history and the Express wording of article 12.2 acknowledge that the right 
to health embraces a wide range of socio-economic factors that promote conditions 
in which people can lead a healthy life, and extends to the underlying determinants of 
health, such as food and nutrition, housing, access to safe and potable water and ad-
equate sanitation, safe and healthy working conditions, and a healthy environment.
5. The Committee is aware that, for millions of people throughout the world, the full 
enjoyment of the right to health still remains a distant goal.  Moreover, in many cases, 
especially for those living in poverty, this goal is becoming increasingly remote.  The 
Committee recognizes the formidable structural and other obstacles resulting from inter-
national and other factors beyond the control of States that impede the full realization of 
article 12 in many States parties.
2 In its resolution 1989/11.
3 The Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for the Improvement of Mental Health 
Care adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1991 (resolution 46/119) and the Committee’s 
General Comment No. 5 on persons with disabilities apply to persons with mental illness; the Programme 
of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development held at Cairo in 1994, as well 
as the Declaration and Programme for Action of the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 
1995 contain definitions of reproductive health and women’s health, respectively.
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6. With a view to assisting States parties’ implementation of the Covenant and the 
fulfilment of their reporting obligations, this General Comment focuses on the normative 
content of article 12 (Part I), States parties’ obligations (Part II), violations (Part III) and 
implementation at the national level (Part IV), while the obligations of actors other than 
States parties are addressed in Part V.  The General Comment is based on the Commit-
tee’s experience in examining States parties’ reports over many years.
I. Normative contento of article 12
[…]
8. The right to health is not to be understood as a right to be healthy.  The right to 
health contains both freedoms and entitlements.  The freedoms include the right to 
control one’s health and body, including sexual and reproductive freedom, and the right 
to be free from interference, such as the right to be free from torture, non-consensual 
medical treatment and experimentation. By contrast, the entitlements include the right 
to a system of health protection which provides equality of opportunity for people to 
enjoy the highest attainable level of health.
[…]
11. The Committee interprets the right to health, as defined in article 12.1, as an inclusive 
right extending not only to timely and appropriate health care but also to the underlying 
determinants of health, such as access to safe and potable water and adequate sanitation, 
an adequate supply of safe food, nutrition and housing, healthy occupational and environ-
mental conditions, and access to health-related education and information, including on 
sexual and reproductive health.  A further important aspect is the participation of the popu-
lation in all health-related decision-making at the community, national and International.
[…]
Article 12.2 (a).  The right to maternal, child and reproductive health
14. “The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth rate and of infant mortality and 
for the healthy development of the child” (art. 12.2 (a))1 may be understood as requir-
10  According to WHO, the stillbirth rate is no longer commonly used, infant and under-five mortality rates 
being measured instead.
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ing measures to improve child and maternal health, sexual and reproductive health 
services, including access to family planning, pre- and post-natal care11, emergency 
obstetric services and access to information, as well as to resources necessary to act on 
that information12.
[…]
Article 12.  Special topics of broad application
[…]
Gender perspective
20. The Committee recommends that States integrate a gender perspective in their 
health-related policies, planning, programmes and research in order to promote better 
health for both women and men. A gender-based approach recognizes that biological 
and socio-cultural factors play a significant role in influencing the health of men and 
women. The disaggregation of health and socio-economic data according to sex is es-
sential for identifying and remedying inequalities in health.
Women and the right to health
21. To eliminate discrimination against women, there is a need to develop and imple-
ment a comprehensive national strategy for promoting women’s right to health through-
out their life span. Such a strategy should include interventions aimed at the prevention 
and treatment of diseases affecting women, as well as policies to provide access to a full 
range of high quality and affordable health care, including sexual and reproductive ser-
11 Prenatal denotes existing or occurring before birth; perinatal refers to the period shortly before and after 
birth (in medical statistics the period begins with the completion of 28 weeks of gestation and is variously 
defined as ending one to four weeks after birth); neonatal, by contrast, covers the period pertaining to the 
first four weeks after birth; while post-natal denotes occurrence after birth. In this General Comment, the 
more generic terms pre- and post-natal are exclusively employed. 
12 Reproductive health means that women and men have the freedom to decide if and when to reproduce 
and the right to be informed and to have access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods of 
family planning of their choice as well as the right of access to appropriate health-care services that will, for 
example, enable women to go safely through pregnancy and childbirth.
Annex - General Recommendation Nº 14 - CESCR/UN
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vices. A major goal should be reducing women’s health risks, particularly lowering rates 
of maternal mortality and protecting women from domestic violence. The realization 
of women’s right to health requires the renoval of all barriers interfering with access to 
health services, education and information, including in the area of sexual and reproduc-
tive health. It is also important to undertake preventive, promotive and remedial action 
to shield women from the impact of harmful traditional cultural practices and norms that 
deny them their full reproductive rights.
Children and adolescents
[…]
23. States parties should provide a safe and supportive environment for adolescents, 
that ensures the opportunity to participate in decisions affecting their health, to build 
life-skills, to acquire appropriate information, to receive counselling and to negotiate the 
health-behaviour choices they make. The realization of the right to health of adolescents 
is dependent on the development of youth-friendly health care, which respects confiden-
tiality and privacy and includes appropriate sexual and reproductive health services.
[…]
II. States Paties’ obligations
[…]
Specific legal obligations
34. In particular, States are under the obligation to respect the right to health by, inter 
alia, efraining from denying or limiting equal access for all persons, including prisoners or 
detainees, inorities, asylum seekers illegal immigrants, to preventive, curative and pallia-
tive health services; abstaining from enforcing discriminatory practices as a State policy; 
and abstaining from imposing discriminatory practices relating to women’s health status 
and needs. Furthermore, obligations to respect include a State’s obligation to refrain from 
prohibiting or impeding traditional preventive care, healing practices and medicines, 
from marketing unsafe drugs and from applying coercive medical treatments, unless on 
an exceptional basis for the treatment of mental illness or the prevention and control of 
communicable diseases.  Such exceptional cases should be subject to specific and restric-
tive conditions, respecting best practices and applicable international standards, includ-
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ing the Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement 
of Mental Health Care24. In addition, States should refrain from limiting access to contra-
ceptives and other means of maintaining sexual and reproductive health, from censoring, 
withholding or intentionally misrepresenting health-related information, including sexual 
education and information, as well as from preventing people’s participation in health-
related matters.  States should also refrain from unlawfully polluting air, water and soil, 
e.g. through industrial waste from State-owned facilities, from using or testing nuclear, 
biological or chemical weapons if such testing results in the release of substances harmful 
to human health, and from limiting access to health services as a punitive measure, e.g. 
during armed conflicts in violation of international humanitarian law.
[…]
36. The obligation to fulfil requires States parties, inter alia, to give sufficient recogni-
tion to the right to health in the national political and legal systems, preferably by way 
of legislative implementation, and to adopt a national health policy with a detailed plan 
for realizing the right to health.  States must ensure provision of health care, including 
immunization programmes against the major infectious diseases, and ensure equal ac-
cess for all to the underlying determinants of health, such as nutritiously safe food and 
potable drinking water, basic sanitation and adequate housing and living conditions. 
Public health infrastructures should provide for sexual and reproductive health services, 
including safe motherhood, particularly in rural areas. States have to ensure the appropri-
ate training of doctors and other medical personnel, the provision of a sufficient number 
of hospitals, clinics and other health-related facilities, and  promotion and support of the 
establishment of institutions providing counselling and mental health services, with due 
regard to equitable distribution throughout the country.  Further obligations include the 
provision of a public, private or mixed health insurance system which is affordable for 
all, the promotion of medical research and health education, as well as information cam-
paigns, in particular with respect to HIV/AIDS, sexual and reproductive health, tradicional 
practices, domestic violence, the abuse of alcohol and the use of cigarettes, drugs and 
other harmful substances.  States are also required to adopt measures against environ-
mental and occupational health hazards and against any other threat as demonstrated 
by epidemiological data.  For this purpose they should formulate and implement national 
policies aimed at reducing and eliminating pollution of air, water and soil, including pollu-
tion by heavy metals such as lead from gasoline.  Furthermore, States parties are required 
24 General Assembly resolution 46/119 (1991).
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to formulate, implement and periodically review a coherent national policy to minimize 
the risk of occupational accidents and diseases, as well as to provide a coherent national 
policy on occupational safety and health services25.
[…]
Core obligations
44. The Committee also confirms that the following are obligations of comparable pri-
ority:
a) To ensure reproductive, maternal (pre-natal as well as post-natal) and child health 
care;
b) To provide immunization against the major infectious diseases occurring in the 
community;
c) To take measures to prevent, treat and control epidemic and endemic diseases;
d) To provide education and access to information concerning the main health prob-
lems in the community, including methods of preventing and controlling them;
e) To provide appropriate training for health personnel, including education on 
health and human rights.
[…]
III. Violations
[…]
25  Elements of such a policy are the identification, determination, authorization and control of dangerous 
materials, equipment, substances, agents and work processes; the provision of health information to work-
ers and the provision, if needed, of adequate protective clothing and equipment; the enforcement of laws 
and regulations through adequate inspection; the requirement of notification of occupational accidents 
and diseases, the conduct of inquiries into serious accidents and diseases, and the production of annual 
statistics; the protection of workers and their representatives from disciplinary measures for actions properly 
taken by them in conformity with such a policy; and the provision of occupational health services with 
essentially preventive functions. See ILO Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 1981 (No. 155) and 
Occupational Health Services Convention, 1985 (No. 161).
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Violations of the obligation to fulfil
5.2 Violations of the obligation to fulfil occur through the failure of States parties to 
take all necessary steps to ensure the realization of the right to health.  Examples include 
the failure to adopt or implement a national health policy designed to ensure the right to 
health for everyone; insufficient expenditure or misallocation of public resources which 
results in the non-enjoyment of the right to health by individuals or groups, particu-
larly the vulnerable or marginalized; the failure to monitor the realization of the right 
to health at the national level, for example by identifying right to health indicators and 
benchmarks; the failure to take measures to reduce the inequitable distribution of health 
facilities, goods and services; the failure to adopt a gender-sensitive approach to health; 
and the failure to reduce infant and maternal mortality rates.
[…]. 
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officiaL JournaL
february 10, 2006
government of the State of baJa caLifornia 
pubLic acknowLedgment of reSponSibiLity  
pauLina ramirez Jacinto 
p-161/02
In compliance with the Friendly Settlement Agreement concluded with the Inter-Amer-
ican Commission on Human Rights regarding the case of Paulina del Carmen Ramírez 
Jacinto, the Government of the State of Baja California states that:
The events leading up to this matter occurred in the city of Mexicali, Baja California, on 
July 31, 1999, when the crimes of statutory rape and aggravated robbery were commit-
ted against the 13-year-old minor Paulina Ramírez Jacinto (born on September 1, 1985).
Just a few hours later on the same day, the juvenile’s mother went to the Office of the 
Public Prosecutor to report the rape of her underage daughter, Paulina. 
On September 3, 1999, the minor’s mother appeared before the agency that deals with 
sex crimes to report that Paulina was pregnant as a result of the rape and requested au-
thorization for the legal interruption of pregnancy.
On September 20, 1999, the Office of the Public Prosecutor of the State of Baja Cali-
fornia issued the results of Preliminary Investigation 00249/99/10, authorizing the preg-
nancy to be interrupted.
Subsequently, that order was forwarded to the state’s health services area.  However, 
it was not possible to end the pregnancy because the public health institution she was 
referred to denied her medical care and the physicians did not give the family objective 
information on the risks of performing an abortion.
In view of the physicians’ refusal to perform an abortion, on October 15, 1999, the 
minor’s representative, i.e., her mother, exercising her parental rights under Articles 410 
and 411, and other related articles of the State Civil Code, stated expressly to the minis-
terial authority that, given the risk to her daughter, she did not want an abortion to be 
performed on the minor.
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On October 25, 1999, the complaint was filed with the Office for Human Rights and 
Citizen Protection of the State of Baja California (PDHPCBC), when there was still time 
under law for the pregnancy to be interrupted.  On October 29, 1999, the 90-day gesta-
tion period established under Article 136 of the State Criminal Code, during which an 
abortion can be performed without risk, came to an end. 
On March 3, 2000, the PDHPCBC issued recommendation 2/2000, establishing that the 
government was obliged to compensate Paulina and her mother, María Elena Jacinto, for 
moral damages, since it had denied them the right to interrupt the pregnancy, which had 
been caused by a rape.
On April 13, 2000, Paulina’s son, Isaac de Jesús Ramírez Jacinto, was born.
On July 14, 2001, in criminal case 514/99 Paulina’s attacker was sentenced to 16 years 
in prison and 340 fine-days, for the crimes of statutory rape and aggravated robbery.
In view of the foregoing, an investigation was initiated to determine administrative re-
sponsibility on the part of the state officials concerned.
On August 13, 2001, the Office of the Public Prosecutor decided not to pursue criminal 
proceedings in Preliminary Investigation 488/99/104 because of a lack of evidence dem-
onstrating illicit conduct by the civil servants for the offenses of abuse of authority, col-
lusion between civil servants, improper handling of documents, breach of confidentiality, 
and torture.
On February 7, 2002, a ruling was handed down in the appeal filed against the decision 
not to pursue criminal proceedings, establishing, among other things, that further steps 
must be taken to gather additional evidence to determine whether sufficient grounds ex-
ist to bring criminal action against the civil servants involved.   To date, the evidence has 
not been gathered nor has the matter been resolved.
Finally, on March 8, 2002, at the request of Paulina del Carmen Ramírez Jacinto, her case 
was filed with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and classified as petition 
P-161-02.  At the Commission’s urging, a friendly settlement agreement was worked out 
between the petitioners and the Government of Mexico.
As part of the agreement, the Government of the State of Baja California is making this 
public statement, acknowledging that the absence of an appropriate body of regulations 
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concerning abortion resulted in the violation of Paulina del Carmen Ramírez Jacinto’s 
human rights.
Accordingly, it is established and fully recognized that, at the time her human rights were 
violated, the State of Baja California did not have an appropriate body of regulations to 
deal with the incident that occurred and that this prevented her from availing herself of 
the right she was demanding.  It should also be made clear that this practice is not state 
policy in Baja California.
This statement also seeks to prevent the recurrence of this type of situation and demon-
strates the strong determination of the Government of Baja California to respect the in-
dividual and social guarantees enshrined in the constitution, as well as the human rights 
embodied in international treaties and conventions signed by our country.  It confirms its 
commitment to continue working steadfastly for the complete eradication of activities 
and practices that undermine human rights.  Likewise, the state government will contin-
ue seeking to implement legal and administrative reforms giving citizens greater certainty 
and legal security in their day-to-day interactions with authority.
Issued and signed in the city of Mexicali, Baja California, on February 3, 2005.
Government of the State of Baja California.
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